

**THE ROLE OF INFORMATION AND  
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN PEACEBUILDING IN MOUNT  
ELGON REGION, KENYA**

**BY**

**CHEROTICH MUNG'OU**

**A Thesis submitted to the Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research, in  
fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in Communication Studies of Kabarak University**


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## DECLARATION PAGE

### Declaration

I hereby declare that this research thesis is my own original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been presented for the award of a degree in any university or college.

### Student's Signature:



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
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## RECOMMENDATION PAGE

To the Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research:

The thesis entitled “The Role of Information and Communication Technologies in Peacebuilding in Mt Elgon Region, Kenya” and written by Cherotich Mung’ou is presented to the Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research of Kabarak University. We have reviewed the thesis and recommend it be accepted in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in Communication Studies.**



*24<sup>th</sup> June, 2016*

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## **Dedication**

This thesis is dedicated to all peace makers and all those who cherish peace.

## **Copyright Page**

The Role of Information and Communication Technologies in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon Region, Kenya

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## Abstract

There are efforts all over the world aimed at rebuilding societies torn apart by conflicts. Consequently, state and non-state actors play an active role in the peacebuilding efforts. Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) are emerging as new approaches to these peacebuilding efforts since they encourage participatory approach to peacebuilding. This study was designed to assess the role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt. Elgon region, following the aftermath of the 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans of the Sabaot community. The main objective of the study was to investigate the role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt. Elgon region. The specific objectives of the study were to: Identify the actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region, Determine the ICT tools used in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region; Examine the application of ICTs in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region; Assess the effectiveness of various ICT tools in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region; Investigate the challenges of incorporating ICTs in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon. The study was guided by the conflict transformation theory which posits that conflicts can be transformed into peaceful co-existence characterised by new structures and new relationships which can be facilitated by ICTs. The researcher adopted the phenomenological research paradigm. The target population was 20,000 respondents with 377 community members randomly selected for quantitative interviews. For qualitative data, 40 respondents were purposively selected to participate in key informant interviews. In addition, four focus group discussions comprising 12 members were conducted in the two divisions of Cheptais and Mt Elgon Sub-Counties to build consensus on peacebuilding and ICTs in the region. These included 2 representatives from the District Peace Committees (DPC), 2 members each from the Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), men, women and youth. Secondary data was obtained from peer reviewed journal articles, books, government records, daily and weekly newspapers and Internet sources. Obtrusive observation in the study area was also used to obtain information. The mixed methods data analysis and interpretation approaches were used for merging quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and the findings subjected to Pearson correlation coefficient test to determine the relationship between ICTs and peacebuilding. The qualitative data was coded and thematically analysed using the NVivo 2.0 computer software. The findings show that the ICTs used in peacebuilding included radio, Television, social media platforms, mobile phones and Websites. The findings indicate that ICTs contributed to the restoration of relationships between the Sabaot clans, psychosocial healing and economic recovery in the region. They also facilitated inter-community dialogue which paved way to negotiated democracy in the region. The findings also show that ICTs were instrumental in empowering the residents to generate information and give views regarding the peace approaches in the region. It is recommended that ICT centres should be established in the region in order to enhance the effectiveness of ICTs in peacebuilding. The study also recommends that all historical land injustices in the region should be addressed in order to avoid future land conflicts. The outcome of the study may be used to stimulate the state and non-state actors to intensify the use of ICTs in peacebuilding and conflict management. The findings may also benefit conflict managers, policy makers, security managers, academicians and all people in Mt Elgon region and beyond in the realisation of peace. The research findings may also help future researchers to identify priority areas and to carry out more research on ICTs and peacebuilding.

## Key words

Information Communication Technologies, Peacebuilding, Mt Elgon region, Kenya

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## **List of Abbreviations**

ACORD	Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development
AP	Administration Police
APT	Amani Peoples Theatre
ARP	Alternative Rite of Passage
ATC	Agricultural Training College
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BK FM	Biikaap <i>Kōōrēēt</i> FM
BVR	Biometric Voter Registration System
CAK	Communications Authority of Kenya
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CCC	Comprehensive Care Centre
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television Camera
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CDMA	Code Division Multiple Access
CEC	County Executive Committee

CIC	Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence
CNN	Cable News Network
COPA	Coalition for Peace in Africa
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DCCs	Deputy County Commissioners
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPC	District Peace Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EVID	Electronic Voter Identification System
FBOs	Faith-based Organisations
FGDs	Focus Group Discussion
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FIDA	Federation for Female Lawyers in Kenya
FM	Frequency Modulation
FPFK	Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya
GBV	Gender-based Violence

GEMA	Gikuyu Embu Meru Association
HF	High Frequency Radio
HLIT	Historical Land Injustice Taskforce
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IBRC	Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICM	International Christian Ministry
ICRC	International Community of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTs	Information and Communication Technologies
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGA	Income generation Activities
IIEC	Interim Independent Electoral Commission
IMLU	Independent Medico-Legal Unit
IPS	Internet Service Provider
ITV	Imani Television

JPC	Justice and Peace Commission
KAMATUSA	Kalenjin Maasai Turkana and Samburu
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KAREU MPYA	Kenya Agricultural Reform Elgon United Management Programmes for Youth in Agriculture
KBC	Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
KCSSP	Kenya Civil Society Strengthening Programme
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KEPSA	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KII	Key Informant Interviews
KMTI	Kitale Ministry Training Institute
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KNDR	Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation
KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
KTC	Kipsong Training College
KTN	Kenya Television Network
MEPA	Mount Elgon Professionals Association
MEPI	Mount Elgon Peace Initiative

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MSF	Medicines sans Frontiers
MYWO	Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NSC	National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
NTV	Nation Television Network
OCPD	Officer Commanding Police Division
OCS	Officer Commanding Station
OVCs	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PEV	Post-Election Violence
PRP	Peace and Rights Programme
PTN	Peace Tree Network
PWAG	Peace Women across the Globe
RCMs	Red Cross Messages
RPC	Regional Police Commander
RWPL	Rural Women Peace Link

SALWs	Small arms and light weapons
SIDO	Sabaots International Development
SLDF	Sabaot Land Defence Force
SMS	Short Text Message
SOET	Socially Organised Educative Tem
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SSCE	Sabaot Supreme Council of Elders
TJRC	Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VHF	Very High Frequency Radio
VOA	Voice of America

VUP	Vijana Umoja Pamoja
WADADIA	Women and Development against Distress in Africa
WKHRC	Western Kenya Human Rights Commission
WPDC	Wajir Peace Development Committee
YFS	Youth-Friendly Services



## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background to the Study

Conflicts have brought great distress and loss of lives across the globe. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross Society [ICRC] (2011), the suffering inflicted on the civilian population by such conflicts include deliberate attacks, destruction of infrastructure and goods indispensable to the survival, forceful displacement and murder. Other effects include forced disappearance and torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and deliberate kidnapping and targeting of aid workers leaving the fate of thousands of civilians uncertain. Since violence is costly, efforts have now been directed towards managing conflicts and rebuilding societies torn apart by war hence the global quest for peace that has attracted the attention of many actors.

The 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans of the Sabaot community and the subsequent formation of the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) greatly affected the region. The SLDF used modern information and communication technology (ICT) especially mobile phone short message service (SMS) to further their cause (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2008; HRW, 2011; Simiyu, 2008; Kamoet, 2007; Kamoet, 2011). The SLDF and the military were accused of killings and abductions, displacement of populations, mutilation and inhuman treatment, rape and sexual violence, destruction of property, theft, torture and forced recruitment of the youth into the SLDF (Kenya Red Cross Society [KRCS], 2007; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights [KNCHR], 2008). Although the 2008 military intervention led to a forced ceasefire, it raised questions on alternative dispute

resolutions and peacebuilding mechanisms that can be attained without great loss of lives and property.

The challenge of preventing, managing, transforming and mitigating conflict is a core objective of many international, regional and sub-regional agencies such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), governments, and grassroots organisations, among others (Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Abdulrahman & Tar, 2006). The international, regional and sub-regional agencies constitute the formal peacebuilding approaches. The UN, for instance, has been very active in conflict interventions in many countries although some of these interventions have been unsuccessful. For example, the Arusha peace process and the subsequent Arusha Accord was the first major international response to the civil war that broke out in Rwanda in 1990 following the invasion of the country by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)<sup>i</sup> from Uganda. However, the accord was not successful in bringing a lasting peace to Rwanda since it was not supported by the extremist groups within the government. It also failed to unearth the root causes of the conflicts in Rwanda (Bigagaza, Abong & Mukarabuga, 2002).

Other methods of managing conflicts include the semi-formal peacebuilding approaches which involve religious conflict resolution that incorporates religious thought, symbol and ritual in conflict resolution. During the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings in 1995, the Christian concept of forgiveness played a key role in influencing justice in the TRC (Shore, 2008). Indigenous (grassroots) conflict resolutions in Africa include the use of council of elders and use of rituals, symbols and curses to resolve conflicts especially among the pastoral communities (Adan & Pkalya, 2006). Among the Acholi of Northern Uganda, the offender undergoes a ritual cleansing ceremony of drinking *mato oput* before being accepted

back in the community. The word *mato* in the Acholi language means ‘drinking’ and *oput* is a type of tree with bitter herbs (Brock-Utne, 2001; Wasonga, 2009; Mutisi, 2009). The *gacaca* traditional courts have also been hailed for bringing justice in Rwanda. Similarly, the *ubuntu* concept of brotherhood in Southern Africa encourages peacemaking through the principles of reciprocity, inclusivity and a sense of shared destiny; Powers, 2011; Clark, 2012; Shore, 2008; Murithi, 2006). In Kenya the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA) and Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana and Samburu (KAMATUSA) talks were initiated in 1995 to promote unity among the previously antagonistic Kalenjin and the Kikuyu communities (Juma, 2000). The initiative was, however, short-lived since the two communities were again involved in the 1997 and 2007/2008 election violence. The Sabaot community has a council of elders known as the *kokwet* whose main function is to arbitrate family feuds, clan disputes and inter-communal conflicts within the Sabaot community (Kamoet, 2007). However, the elders, particularly from the *Soy* clan were accused of fanning violence by administering oaths to the youth thus raising doubts about their role as peace mediators (Simiyu, 2008). Nevertheless, there have been efforts in rebuilding the society as revealed in studies by Kibirige, Osodo and Mung’ou (2013) and Ndiku (2011).

Advancement in ICTs has led to increasing connectivity all over the world making Internet meetings and conferences possible. Kampf (2011) argues that ICTs are important in situations where face-to-face communication is impossible due to communication failures by the disputants. Thus, Internet-based encounters between young people are increasingly becoming common in conflict situations, for instance, in the Middle East as it is regarded as a neutral ground between the Palestinian and Israeli disputants. Similar programmes also exist in Iraq. For example, according to the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund [UNICEF] (2013), a reality TV show known as *Salam Shabab* combines social media platforms to bring together youth from different parts of Iraq to become ambassadors of peace’. Furthermore, ICTs foster

an open public sphere enabling the oppressed to air their grievances without fear (Kampf, 2011). Thus, ICTs were instrumental in bringing about political change during the Arab Spring in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia by facilitating the organisation of protests and the global broadcast of these in real time<sup>ii</sup>. Similarly, in the Philippines, large-scale demonstrations were organised via cell phones and short text messages (SMS) forcing President Joseph Estrada to resign. This event was the first known use of social media as a tool for putting an end to tyranny (Wilson & Wilson, 2009; Manrique & Mikail, 2011). Studies such as UNICEF (2013) and Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan (2008) show that Mobile technology and web-based platforms have also turned mainstream media into more interactive communication tools that regularly solicit and integrate audience feedback into programming by increasing engagement and participation. These technologies utilise Frontline SMS which is an-open source text-messaging software that enables instantaneous two-way communication on a large scale. For instance, Equal Access production team in Chad sends information via SMS to its listeners in order to promote dialogue amongst groups divided along tribal lines. Similarly, other actors employ various ICTs in their intervention efforts. For instance, the UN developed the Global Impact and Vulnerability Alert System (GIVAS) and Global Pulse to collect real-time information in order to better prepare decision makers for a response to a crisis/emergency (Search for Common Ground [SFCG] (2011).

The use of technologies by different actors to monitor peace within Africa has also been effective. In East Africa for instance, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) established the Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) mechanism in 2002 to receive and share information concerning conflicts in the IGAD region [Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda] (Babaud & Ndung'u, 2012; SFCG, 2011). According to Babaud & Ndung'u (2012), CEWARN utilises ICTs such as frontline SMS and

crowdmap Platforms which use SMS, emails, websites, tweets and other social media to collect and relay information. Oloo (2012) notes that CEWARN has an information gathering and analysis tool known as CEWARN Reporter used for coding, graphing and analysis of data. The use of these technologies in monitoring conflicts can help the actors to offer the necessary interventions so as to avoid the massive destruction of lives and property as it happened in Mt Elgon region.

The actors involved in peacebuilding in Kenya have made extensive use of ICTs. For instance, in 2010, the *Uwiano* (cohesion) peace platform was established by the Kenya government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and civil society organisations as part of the national effort to maintain peace during the 2010 referendum. Local peace monitors utilised SMS platforms and direct phone calls to report hate speech and other activities that threatened peace to security agents in hotspot areas (Oloo, 2012; Babaud & Ndung'u, 2012). Other platforms like *Ushahidi* and *Amani Kenya @108* were instrumental in providing real time information to stakeholders during the 2007/2008 post-election violence (PEV). These platforms empowered citizens to participate in peacebuilding using emails, SMS, twitter and the web to crowdsource information from citizens (SFCG, 2011; Babaud & Ndung'u, 2012). Hence, ICTs play a crucial role in peacebuilding by empowering the citizens, encouraging participatory involvement as well as acting as an early warning mechanism. Similarly, studies like Kibirige et al. (2013) and Kamoet (2011) reveal that both state and non-state actors embraced ICTs during and after the conflict. The purpose of this study was to examine the extent of ICT use in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region using a phenomenological approach.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* was devastating leading to the loss of many lives and property. The human rights abuses meted by the SLDF and military left the residents psychologically traumatised. Above all, the conflict tore the social fabric which bound the clans together as one community and resulted in feelings of fear, hatred, suspicion and mistrust in the once united Sabaot society. Unfortunately, this was not the first time the community had gone through such an intra-ethnic conflict in spite of the fact that several interventions had been initiated in the past by both state and non-state actors. The fact that such conflicts recurred is an indicator that the past interventions may have not been successful after all. It follows, therefore, that such conflicts are likely to recur in the future if the concerned parties and stakeholders do not take measures to effectively build peace in this society. In an effort to enhance the impact of their peacebuilding efforts, various actors embraced ICT tools such as radio and mobile phones. However, no study known to the researcher has been conducted to ascertain the effectiveness of these tools in contributing to lasting peace in Mount Elgon region. Thus, there exists a knowledge gap regarding the potential suitability, sustainability and impact of ICTs in peacebuilding in the region. This study seeks to bridge this gap by identifying the actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region; determining the ICT tools which were used by the various players while striving to build lasting peace in Mount Elgon region; investigating how the ICTs were used and their actual contribution to the peacebuilding process; and analysing how effective these ICTs were in facilitating the realisation of lasting peace in the region as well as examining the challenges of incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region.

### **1.3.0 General objective of the study**

The general objective of the study was to assess the role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region.

### **1.3.1 Specific Objectives**

The specific objectives were to:

- i. Identify the actors involved in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region;
- ii. Determine the ICT tools used by the actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region;
- iii. Examine the application of ICTs to the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region;
- iv. Assess the effectiveness of ICTs in peacebuilding in the region;
- v. Investigate the challenges of incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region.

### **1.3.2 Research Questions**

The questions this research study sought to answer included:

- i. Who were the actors involved in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region?
- ii. What ICT tools were used by the actors involved in the peacebuilding process?
- iii. What was the contribution of ICTs to the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region?
- iv. How effective were ICTs in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region?
- v. What were the challenges of incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region?

#### **1.4 Significance of the study**

War is costly in terms of the resources used to resolve it and also the social and economic drawbacks resulting from it. Kenya has experienced inter-ethnic conflicts pitting pastoral communities in the recent past. However, the case of a homogeneous community going to war against each other is a rare phenomenon. The conflict waged against the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans of the Sabaot community disapproved the theory that homogenous communities cannot go into war against each other. Hence, a study on how to restore interpersonal relationships and rebuild the collapsed economy resulting from the intra-ethnic conflict in Mt Elgon region becomes worthwhile.

The impact of the SLDF reign of terror and the subsequent military intervention in the conflict left the residents psychologically traumatised. Hence, the findings will enable the state and non-state actors to consider alternative dispute resolution approaches instead of military interventions as was witnessed in Mt Elgon region.

The conflict in the region attracted both state and non-state actors in the bid to offer humanitarian assistance and implement economic recovery programmes in the region. Consequently, the actors employed ICTs in their peace efforts. However, there is minimal empirical data on the role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. The findings of the study will therefore benefit the actors involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in various parts of the country.

The study findings will also benefit the government in its formulation of the ICT policy in order to guide the actors employing ICTs in their peacebuilding efforts.

Conflicts derail national development making the realisation of development goals such as the Vision 2030 elusive. The outcome of this study will enable the Ministry of Devolution and



Planning and Vision 2030 to consider the importance of ICTs in peacebuilding and thus plan for funds to support peacebuilding efforts by various groups like the youth for peace groups and women groups. This is based on the realisation that for peace, security and development to exist in Mt Elgon, the root causes of the conflict have to be addressed in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

This research may also be significant in the formulation of government policy on conflict resolution and management in Kenya. It may benefit conflict managers, policy makers, security managers, academicians and all people in Mt Elgon region and beyond in the realisation of peace. The recommendations of the research findings may also help future researchers to identify priority areas to carry out more research on ICTs and peacebuilding.

### **1.5 Scope of the study**

Although Mt Elgon region extends to Kapchorwa, Kween and Bukwo Districts in the Eastern region of Uganda, the study was limited to the Kenyan side of the region which covers four Sub-Counties: Cheptais, Mt Elgon, Trans Nzoia West and Trans Nzoia East. However, due to logistical challenges, the researcher only covered three Sub-Counties in the region: Cheptais, Mt Elgon and Trans Nzoia West. The neighbouring sub-counties which received the spill over effects of the conflicts were also covered. These included Bungoma North and Bungoma West sub-counties.

The study delimited itself to assessing the role of ICTs in supporting long-term post-conflict peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region following the intra-ethnic conflict among the Sabaot clans that engulfed the region in 2006-2008. In this regard, the study focused on the structural and social approaches to peacebuilding which aimed at restoring the interpersonal relations among

the Sabaot clans that were severed by the conflict. The study also focused on the systems and activities that foster a peace culture in the region.

The study was limited to the state and non-state actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region and their approaches to peacebuilding in the region. The study also focused on the participatory nature of ICTs in peacebuilding and their effectiveness in the peacebuilding efforts in the region.

The ICTs covered in the study included the mass media that is radio, television (TV), satellite radio, Very High Frequency (VHF) radio and High Frequency (HF) radio; cellular phones; satellite cameras, satellite phones and butterfly cameras; the web and social media platforms like Facebook, twitter and Skype.

### **1.6 Limitations of the study**

The findings of the study may not be applicable to all situations or contexts since it was concerned with the 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict in Mt Elgon region. The findings do not necessarily generalize to other conflict-prone contexts and societies, notably those which have not experienced intra-ethnic conflicts. This implies that conflict transformation can only be understood within the cultural context of the affected community.

The study was limited to the post-conflict peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region. This means that the study focused on the peacebuilding processes following the 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict witnessed in the region.

Due to the vast area of Mt Elgon region, it was not possible for the researcher to cover the entire region. This was coupled by the fact that the affected population was displaced in various regions which involved a lot of travelling in order to reach the population under study. The

researcher used research assistants in order to reach these populations with the questionnaires. The researcher also contacted the key informants and organised to meet them at locations convenient to them for interviews.

The conflict had psychological trauma on residents making it difficult to obtain information from the respondents who were still traumatised by the aftermath of the conflict. Some key informants who had been tortured by the SLDF and the military were not willing to participate in the research. Some were also suspicious of the intent of the findings and refused to take part in the research. The researcher explained to them the intent of the research with supportive authorisation documents. Accessing information from county and sub-county administrators (chiefs and assistant chiefs) was also difficult but the researcher reassured them the findings would be purely used for academic purposes. Again, the researcher used authorisation documents to reassure them of the intent of the research.

### **1.7 Assumptions of the study**

It is assumed that basic ICTs are generally accessible to all the actors involved in the peacebuilding efforts in the region if only they can embrace them. It is also assumed that all the residents of Mt Elgon region were affected by the land conflict and that the peacebuilding efforts targeted all residents in the region.

It was also assumed that all residents of Mt Elgon region had participated in the peacebuilding process in the region.

It is further assumed that all residents in the region were aware of the peacebuilding process and had participated in it. It was also assumed that the respondents would give true and accurate information regarding the role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region.

## **1.8 Operational definition of terms**

### **Alternative dispute resolution**

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to a wide range of procedures and approaches other than litigation that aim to identify resolutions to conflicts that would be mutually accepted by constituent parties. For the purpose of this study, the ADR mechanisms include the grassroots approach to peacebuilding which includes establishment of the root causes of the conflict.

### **Clan**

A clan refers to a group of people descendent from the same ancestor. But in the scope of this study, the term clan refers to the two sub-groups of the Sabaot community. The group occupying the moorland is the *Mosop/Ndorobo* while the one on the lowland is the *Soy*.

### **Conflict transformation**

It is the process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict.

### **Information Communication Technologies**

Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) covers a range of technologies which developed separately but are now converged towards the point where the technologies that support telephones and televisions are highly interconnected. The ICTs included in this study are radio, TV, mobile phones, Internet, social media platforms, satellites, high frequency radios, very high frequency radios, satellite phones and satellite cameras.

## **ICT tools**

ICT tools refer to a range of technologies that facilitate information sharing. For the purpose of this study, ICT tools included the mass media such as radio, print media and television and print media, online media such as social network sites (SNS) like Facebook and twitter; and communication technologies like mobile phones.

## **Intra-ethnic conflict**

Intra-ethnic conflict occurs when members of a homogeneous group go to war with one another. In Mt Elgon region, the *Soy* and the *Mosop/Ndorobo*, went to war with one another over the allocation of Chepyuk Phase III. The conflict, which began in 2006-2008 was forced to an end by the military intervention in March 2008.

## **Peacebuilding**

Peacebuilding refers to policies, programmes and associated efforts to restore stability and the effectiveness of social, political and economic institutions and structures in the wake of a war. Peacebuilding in this study includes the activities and programmes established by both state and non-state actors in a bid to restoring the relationship between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans of the Sabaot community following the ceasefire imposed by the Kenya Defence Forces in 2008.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

The section reviews literature regarding peacebuilding and peacebuilding approaches, the role of ICTs in peacebuilding and the gaps therein. The section further provides a theoretical framework and conceptual model that guided the study.

#### **2.1 The concept of peacebuilding**

Peace is defined as the absence of widespread physical violence. The term is derived from Galtung's (1976) idea of positive peace where non-violence, social justice and ecological sustainability remove the causes of war by addressing its roots. This is contrasted with negative peace which is characterised by the absence of war and other forms of direct violence (Galtung, 1976; Sandole, 2003; and Tschigri, 2003). Hence the aim of peacebuilding is to normalise relations, and to build institutions that can manage conflicts without resorting to violence. Peace is further held to be an unqualified goal in terms of orderly politics and the sanctity of life (Boaduo, 2010; United States Institute of Peace [USIP], 2011).

Peacebuilding is a set of activities to create and sustain a peaceful society characterised by structures which promote long-term justice, diversity and the healing of relationships and the ongoing transformation of conflict (National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding [NSC], 2009; SAIS, 2006). Peacebuilding is about changing or transforming conflicts by making room for dialogue; empowering people at different levels to cultivate peaceful relationships; and enabling people to start getting to the roots of conflict. This brings about the concept of

transformative peacebuilding which often entails physical and social rebuilding of communities devastated by violent conflicts, as opposed to technical peacebuilding which too often deals only with the consequences of the conflict (Juma, 2000; Botes, 2003; Matemba, 2008). The argument is that unless the root causes of the conflict are addressed, the society may relapse into conflict. The former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in his article entitled *Agenda for Peace* defined peacebuilding as the action to identify and support structures which would tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The fact that peacebuilding was restricted to post-conflict reconstruction was a major shortcoming that was soon rectified by Boutros-Ghali's article entitled *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* (1995) which extended the term across the conflict spectrum of pre-conflict prevention, actions during warfare, and post-conflict measures. Notter and Diamond (1996) support this view and add that peacebuilding means creating the tangible and intangible conditions to enable a conflict-habituated system to become a peace system. They add that this can be done before, during or after violence erupts.

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management at all levels and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Many aspects of this work are linked to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes that are key components of transitioning out of conflict. Other peacebuilding activities include: cantonment or demobilisation of opposing forces; constitutional measures to implement elections and establish a transitional government; governance measures to support civilian government and infrastructure, including the training and, if necessary, supervision of local police; human rights measures; return of refugees; and restoration of the infrastructure damaged by the war (Dulic, 2008; Miall, Ramsboth & Woodhouse 2011; UN, 2012).

Peacebuilding is thus an umbrella term encompassing long-term activities in the conflict cycle aimed at addressing the root causes of the conflict and includes other short-term initiatives like peacekeeping and peace-making (Jeong, 2003; Dulic, 2008; Matemba, 2008). Matemba (2008) also notes that peacebuilding aims to move a given population from conditions of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-sufficiency and well-being. According to Lederach (1997) the creation of such an environment has three central dimensions: addressing the underlying causes of conflict, repairing damaged relationships and dealing with psychological trauma at the individual level. The literature reviewed show that peacebuilding entails addressing the root causes of the conflict in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. The literature further shows that peacebuilding entails repairing damaged relationships and dealing with psychological trauma at the individual level. However, the literature focuses on peacebuilding efforts following inter-national and inter-community conflicts in countries such as Mozambique, Cambodia, El Savador, Namibia and Nicaragua. To fill this gap, there was need of examining peacebuilding processes in the aftermath of the intra-ethnic conflict that was witnessed in Mt Elgon region. The study focused on the mechanisms employed to address the root causes of the conflict between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans of the Sabaot community. The study also examined the mechanisms employed by actors involved in peacebuilding to address psychological trauma and restore the relationship between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans. The study was restricted to post-conflict peacebuilding which refers to a long-term process after a violent conflict by addressing the cause-and-effect factors in the security, political, economic, and reconciliation spheres.



## **2.2 Peacebuilding approaches**

Peacebuilding initiatives try to fix the core problems that underlie and change the patterns of interaction of the involved parties. Notter and Diamond (1996) suggest three peacebuilding approaches necessary for a successful transformation into a peace system. The first one is the political peacebuilding which deals with agreements and the establishment of political arrangements that provide the overall context for understanding the relationships of the various parties and their resources (NSC, 2009). The major shortcoming of this approach is its non-involvement of the grassroots community (Dudouet, 2006; Miall, 2004).

The second approach, structural peacebuilding, deals with creating structures that support the embodiment or implementation of a peace culture. Structural peacebuilding addresses the root causes of a given conflict by focusing on the social conditions that foster violent conflict (Botes, 2003; Matemba, 2008; Notter & Diamond, 1996). Activities of structural peacebuilding include disarming the warring factions, repatriating refugees, monitoring elections, cooperative projects for economic and social development, and economic development programs, among others (Matemba, 2008; NSC, 2009). According to NSC (2009), structural peacebuilding is a process of gradual change overtime in which people increase their awareness of their own capabilities, their rights and their responsibilities and use of this knowledge to organize themselves to acquire power in order to participate in decision making at the local and national levels, plan and share power democratically and to create and allocate communal resources equitably. The strength of this approach lies in the implementation of economic and social reforms preventing future conflict and avoiding relapse into conflict.

Lastly, the third approach, social peacebuilding, is the grass-roots portion of the peacebuilding process. It is concerned with restoring interpersonal and social relationships and deals with feelings, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, values, and skills as they are held and shared between

peoples, individually and in groups. This approach also involves reconciliation and forgiveness in a bid to prevent a renewal of the conflict (Botes, 2003; NSC, 2009). The literature reviewed revealed peacebuilding approaches used between nation-states (international conflicts) and between groups (inter-community) conflicts but not among homogenous communities such as the intra-ethnic conflict among the Sabao community. To bridge this gap, there was need of examining the social and structural approaches used in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region following the intra-ethnic conflict that severed the relations between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans and which also weakened the economy of the region.

### **2.3 Peacebuilding from below**

Regardless of the approach taken (political, structural or social), peacebuilding can be driven from above, that is, the top-down approach by external actors which include international bodies and national governments. Conversely, it can also be driven from below, that is, the bottom-up approach by non-state actors (Lederach, 1997). According to Jeong (2003), peacebuilding cannot be achieved without third party support since they play two important roles: First, third party support is necessary in building cooperation and trust by changing the behavior and perceptions of the disputing parties. Secondly, in the implementation of peacebuilding agreements, third parties bring both incentives and deterrence power to avoid derailing the peace process. However, the success of any peacebuilding initiative requires the participation of the local actors due to the expert's likely unfamiliarity with local culture, language, social structure and political history. Hence, successful peacebuilding entails supporting local negotiations rather than prescribing outcomes based on the recommendations of external experts. In addition, international actors often apply a top-down perspective which

greatly hinders meaningful peace realisation due to its non-inclusiveness (Jeong, 2003; Matemba, 2008; Boaduo 2010; Odhiambo & Ang'asa, 2010).

According to Jeong (2003) a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding involves engaging a variety of actors working through different means to achieve peace. The process, referred to as Multi-Track Diplomacy, is a conceptual way to view the process of international peacemaking as a living system. It looks at the web of interconnected activities, individuals, institutions, and communities that operate together for a common goal: a world at peace (Notter & Diamond 1996). Track One is the level of official diplomacy involving governmental and international actors at which conflicts are resolved, ceasefires agreed and peace accords signed. The third parties can engage in brokering and mediation as Norway did in Sri Lanka by facilitating a negotiated settlement to end more than fifteen years of ethnicised political struggle and two decades of civil war between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) (Sørbrø, Goodhand, Klem, Nissen, & Selbervik, 2011; Jeong, 2003; GTZ, 2004).

One of the strengths of the state actors is that they are endowed with power occasioned by constitutional sovereignty which allows them to use state resources, force, and institutions to manage and sustain peace (Abdulrahman & Tar, 2008; NSC, 2009). However, Track One diplomacy is beset by bureaucratic problems and partisanship from political interests which make people at the grassroots level not to own it since it aims at negative peace. This has been the reason for the failure of many external interventions in conflict as witnessed in the UN mediation of the conflicts in Rwanda, Cyprus and Somalia (Sandole, 2003; Nyong'o, 2000; Kyriakou & Kaya, 2011; Bigagaza et al., 2000). The literature reviewed shows Track One approach to state conflicts which necessitates the intervention of international states and foreign agencies. These are very formal approaches to resolving conflicts occurring within the nation.

The literature further reveals that the interventions encompasses signing of peace agreements at the national level and not the grassroots level. To bridge this gap, there was need of examining grassroots intervention to intra-ethnic conflicts as was witnessed in Mt Elgon region and the subsequent actors involved in the intervention efforts. In addition, there was need of investigating the mechanisms used by the actors to repair and transform the damaged relationships among the Sabaot clans in order to promote reconciliation in the aftermath of the 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict witnessed in the region.

Track Two attempts to achieve positive peace through cooperative means by engaging a range of unofficial contacts and interactions between and within states including the civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media, academia, businesses, experts and community-based organisations (CBOs) (Abdulrahman & Tar, 2008; NSC, 2009). However, there is often reluctance on the state to accept the input of the NGOs. This makes NGOs to be reluctant to engage in any activity that could trigger government suspicion. For instance, during the *Operation Okoa Maisha* (OOM) in Mt Elgon, the military sealed off the region making it difficult for the NGOs to provide relief to the affected populations. A similar situation existed in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide where the operations of the civil society were greatly limited by the Habyarimana government in order to prevent them from sending early warning reports of the brewing genocide (Bigagaza et al., 2000).

Instead of lumping together all track two events under one label, Diamond and MacDonald (1991) suggested an all-inclusive approach to peacebuilding referred to as Multi-Track Diplomacy which is a holistic approach to conflict transformation. It utilises a systems-based approach consisting of nine tracks by recognizing that the transformation of deep-rooted conflicts cannot be left solely to governmental entities, but must be expanded to include non-

governmental actors, civil society, private citizen, business, research, training and education, advocacy, religion, funding and communications and the media (Miall, 2004). The literature reviewed focused on the actors and their approaches to peacebuilding. More importantly, it focused on the multi-track approach which recognises the inter-linkage between the tracks involved in resolving conflicts between and within nation states. To fill this gap, there was need of examining peacebuilding approaches at grassroots level in order to improve relationships and address the roots causes of conflicts such as the intra-ethnic conflict which was witnessed in Mt Elgon region in 2006-2008. The study also examined the approaches used by the actors in order to foster community-based approach to peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. This supports the argument put forth by Galtung (2000) who argues that local actors are well positioned to address peacebuilding at local levels.

#### **2.4 Social healing and reconciliation**

According to Moore (2011), there are two options for societies recovering from human rights abuses. The first one is truth commissions and war crimes tribunals. These are usually organised by the national government with the help of the international community during transitional periods to help societies recovering from human rights abuses through truth-telling from both victims and perpetrators of violence (Moore, 2011). Examples are the 1994 ICTR in Rwanda and the 1994 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established in response to ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Albanian Serbs in Kosovo (Moore, 2011; Bekaj, 2010). Truth commissions have been successful in providing psychological healing to some nations through the reparations to the victims. However, the TRC in South Africa was criticised for sacrificing justice for the sake of truth and reconciliation (Shore, 2008). The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) in Kenya was set up to examine the historical injustices

which may have precipitated the 2007 PEV. However, the commission has been criticised for not promoting healing and reconciliation in the nation since it did not offer a forum for the perpetrators to confess their crimes to facilitate the granting of political amnesty. In addition, the commission had little time to document human rights abuses committed since independence (Constitution & Reform Education Consortium [CRECO], 2012). Lastly, the failure of the government to implement the commission report has made the realisation of justice for the victims of the PEV elusive.

According to Moore (2011), truth commissions cannot bring reconciliation due to two major reasons: In the first place, although truth commissions uncover crimes, they are not trials since they do not corroborate facts, cross-examine witnesses or judge individuals. Secondly, the fear of prosecution often prevents the ‘truth’ about past atrocities from emerging especially when the perpetrators refuse to apologise hence making reconciliation elusive. Furthermore, while other truth commissions have been followed by renewed violence, statement-taking across the country often pose great financial and logistical challenges to the governments who view it as unnecessary undertaking (Murithi, 2006; Moore, 2011). The literature reviewed shows peacebuilding at the international and national levels following gross violation of human rights. However, the literature indicates lack of fora for the perpetrators to confess their crimes in order to foster reconciliation. To fill this gap, there was need examining the role of ICTs in fostering reconciliation and healing among societies recovering from conflicts. In addition, there was need of addressing grassroots reconciliation and healing process among the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans and among all the six clans of the Sabaot community.

The second option for addressing human rights abuses is through the International Criminal Court (ICC) established at The Hague, Netherlands in 2002 to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Moore, 2011; Lynch & Zgonec-Rozej, 2013). The

participation of the victims in the trials plays a great role in bringing psychological healing to the victims. Boaduo (2010) however, argues that although prosecution would be consistent with justice, the prospects of war trials may heighten the perpetrator's resistance to a settlement as in Uganda and Sudan where the LRA leader Joseph Kony and President Omar Hassan al- Bashir have defied arrest warrants issued by the ICC.

Furthermore, the ICC's apparent focus on Africa has been criticised as a colonial tool of foreign interference in African affairs especially by some African politicians hence derailing the peace process. For instance, Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni accused the ICC for its perceived misplaced agenda during the swearing in ceremony of President Uhuru Kenyatta in April, 2013:

I want to salute the Kenyan voters on one issue – the rejection of the blackmail by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and those who seek to abuse this institution for their own agenda...secondly, they are now using it to install leaders of their choice in Africa and eliminate the ones they do not like (Ohito, 2013).

The 2007 PEV in Kenya witnessed a number of responses which included agreement to mediation by a panel of eminent African Personalities under the auspices of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement. According to NSC (2009) and Oloo (2012), the KNDR identified four agenda items for resolving the crisis. Agenda one item was immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties while agenda two item was immediate measures to address the human crisis, promote reconciliation, healing and restoration. Agenda one and agenda two items were attained and led to the signing of the National Accord in February 2008 that enabled the country to embark on post-conflict reconstruction process. This was followed by the formation of Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) to analyse the root causes of the conflict in order to address agenda three and four items of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreement (KNDR).

Under agenda three, it was recognised that the PEV evolved around issues of power and the functioning of state institutions (NSC, 2009). A number of reforms were therefore made which included legal and judicial reforms, police reforms, parliamentary reforms and identification and prosecution of perpetrators of violence. A major achievement of the CIPEV was the submission of the list of the suspects to the ICC following the state failure to establish a Special Tribunal to try the persons suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity (NSC, 2009). The termination of the cases for the major suspects by the ICC in December 2014 (for Kenya's president Uhuru Kenyatta) and in April 2016 (for the Deputy President William Ruto and radio journalist Joshua Sang) however, was viewed as a blow to the PEV victims (Leithead, 2016).

Other measures in agenda Three included the formation of the TJRC, the Commission on the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) and the National Commission for Integration and Cohesion (NCIC) in 2009 (NSC, 2009; Oloo, 2012). Findings such as Oloo (2012) show that the constitutional review which was attained in 2010. However, as discussed earlier on, the failure of the government to implement the recommendations of the TJRC casts doubt to the attainment of justice in Kenya. Under agenda Four, the government committed itself in making land reform, reform of the public service and strengthening of anti-corruption laws among others. Findings indicate that the reforms were meant to avoid the recurrence of the circumstances that led to the 2007-2008 PEV and to curb the culture of impunity (NSC, 2009).

The literature reviewed indicates reconciliation efforts in countries emerging from human rights abuses. Moore (2011), NSC (2009) and Shore (2006) in particular note the role played by truth commissions and the ICC in facilitating reconciliation. The authors also note that while these commissions have been successful in some countries like South Africa, other truth commissions



have been followed by renewed violence. The literature shows reconciliation approaches at the national level efforts following crimes against humanity. To bridge this gap, there was need of investigating methods of addressing human rights abuses at the grassroots level and the attainment of justice for the victims of the Mt Elgon conflict. More importantly, there was need of investing how ICTs could be used to promote reconciliation among the Sabaot community which had been characterized by feelings of hatred, animosity and mistrust following the intra-ethnic conflict witnessed in the region.

## **2.5 ICTs and peacebuilding**

Information communication technology (ICT) refers to the wide array of technologies used for gathering, storing, retrieving, processing, analysing and transmitting information (Kwanya, 2009). According to Hattotuwa (2004) ICT is the use of enabling technologies to augment the existing stakeholder interventions, enable hitherto marginalised actors to participate more fully in peacebuilding processes, empower grassroots communities and bring cohesion to the range of activities on multiple tiers that are an intrinsic part of full-field peacebuilding and conflict transformation involving all stakeholders. Conversely, ICT enables users to share conversations both horizontally and vertically (UNICEF, 2013). Hattotuwa (2004) notes that ICT can help revitalize stagnant dialogues and help sustain difficult process of conflict transformation by providing the spaces for sustained dialogue even when Track One processes have run aground.

The use of ICT for peacebuilding has been facilitated by the social media<sup>iii</sup> and user generated content (UGC) <sup>iv</sup>platforms anchored on the Web 2.0 or participatory web (Camminos, 2013). Similarly, e-campaigns and e-voting are becoming a common trend in European countries. The Barack Obama 2007-2008 campaign, for instance, utilised social media to raise funds for election purposes (Van Dijk, 2013). However, UGC can incite violence due to reactions to hate

speeches and cyber-attacks. Furthermore, some Internet sites encourage radicalization and recruitment into terror groups like the al-Qaeda, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and Boko Haram. Most of these terror groups use the cyberspace to plan and coordinate their activities (Mantel, 2011; Camminos, 2013; Oluwafemi, Adesuyi & Abdulhamid, 2013).

The digital revolution in the 2000s and the social movements in Arab countries utilised mobile phones and Internet based applications such as emails, blogs and social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, YouTube, Skype and so on to share information and organise protests that weakened the Arab regimes (Camminos, 2013; Gujer, 2011; Nierkerk, Pillay & Maharaj, 2011). Through new media technologies such as digital audio, video, mobile video and multimedia services (MMS), it is possible to link community driven production of media that addresses local issues to potentially unlimited number of people (Hattotuwa, 2006; Gujer, 2011). Personal profiles on these websites help in the formation of new relationships which promote understanding across cultures and geographical boundaries leading to the concept of unity in diversity. For instance, a ‘friendship tree’ is a contact list of about 100 Zimbabweans which is activated every time an activist is arrested to ensure witnesses are available to monitor the proceedings (Wilson & Wilson, 2009; Boaduo, 2010).

According to Njeru (2009), ICTs have the potential to empower women in rural settings in Africa to participate in peacebuilding efforts without having to relocate them to urban areas. He further argues that ICTs enable women in post-conflict societies to share common issues that they can creatively transform through ICT platforms that transcend language, stereotypes, distance and mistrust. Similarly, e-government has encouraged citizen participation in governance in most countries hence providing opportunity for improving government services through e-complaints, e-participation and e-surveillance (Van Dijk, 2013). Saudi Arabia has

supported initiatives to combat Internet radicalization and recruitment into terror groups through the *Sakinah Campaign*. Named after the Arabic word for religiously inspired tranquility, the *Sakinah campaign* uses clerics and volunteer Islamic scholars to interact online on their website (<http://english.aawsat.com>) with individuals looking for religious knowledge with the aim of steering them away from extremist sources (Hattotuwa, 2002; Mantel, 2011). Ansary (2008) notes that the volunteers visit extremists' websites, chat rooms and forums such as *alsahab*, *Sawt al-Jihad* and *al-Fajr* (al-Qaeda's multimedia production arm) and other extremist websites that were spreading *takfir* (extremist) ideology to engage in online dialogue in order to curb the spread of radicalization and recruitment over the Internet. Ansary further notes that as a result of the campaigns, some individuals from Saudi Arabia and several countries around the world had "recanted their *takfir* and deviant views" after engaging in an online dialogue with the volunteer members of the Tranquility Campaign. This shows the great potential of ICTs to promote change in the society. However, Internet sites like Yahoo have of late been used by Al Qaeda terrorists for official communication. Similarly, the Jihadist-Cyber-Attack Brigade uses emails to reach broad audiences in the Gulf and Arab countries. It is also worth noting that not all terror groups use the Internet to showcase violence. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a rebel group responsible for kidnapping, bombings and hijackings, for example, uses its website for publicity and to share information of the offences perpetrated by the Colombian and US governments (Mantel, 2011).

Internet platforms utilising crowdsourcing (voluntarily contributed information from a community of users) have been instrumental in peacebuilding. During the PEV in Kenya, *Ushahidi*<sup>v</sup> collected news of violence via short message service (SMS), email or web, and showed them on a Google map making it possible to track exact locations in Kenya where the conflicts were occurring. The sources of information were individuals who sent their

observations directly to the *Ushahidi* website (Camminos, 2013; Gujer, 2011; Allen & Gagliardone, 2011). The use of SMS was also effective in identifying heroes who did courageous deeds following the 2007/2008 PEV in Kenya. For instance, according to UNICEF (2013), Media Focus on Africa implemented an SMS campaign known as 'the Unsung Hero' where people were able to use SMS text messaging and Internet to cast their vote and recognize the work of those who courageously worked for peace among their communities. The initiatives were located / published on a website using a Google-map application.

Hence, ICTs can play a constructive role by empowering individuals to take some control of their destiny in a crisis, natural disaster or post-conflict reconstruction thus reversing the traditional information retrieval systems of relying on aid workers on the ground by decentralizing information (United States Institute of Peace [USIP], 2011; Camminos, 2013). Similarly, Oloo (2012) notes that Internet blogs have become powerful social tools for networking, information sharing, political debate and contesting discourse through platforms such as [Kenyansabroad.com](http://Kenyansabroad.com), [Mashada.com](http://Mashada.com) and [Kumekucha.com](http://Kumekucha.com). To this end, Oloo posits that ICTs are increasingly breaking spatial and political barriers between urban and rural areas and between the old and young.

However, Internet-based platforms are inapplicable in certain settings especially in the rural areas where lack of technology infrastructure hinders frequent interaction and online collaboration (Vrasidas, Zemblylas, Evagorou, Avraamidou & Aravi., 2007). Thus, the use of mobile phones and frontline SMS for humanitarian and developmental response on the ground is emerging as an alternative by humanitarian agencies in developing countries to improve communication. Mobile phones can empower at-risk communities by fostering early warning and response (SFCG, 2011; USIP, 2011).

To empower citizens at grassroots level, humanitarian organisations in Uganda initiated low cost phones and the Internet in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Northern Uganda to give the people a chance to tell their own story and do their advocacy campaigns via the Internet in addition to offering opportunities for internal emergency communication between the IDPs and the rest of the world (Meier, 2011; Wilson & Wilson, 2009; Weekes, 2011). In response to the PEV in Kenya, PeaceNet<sup>vi</sup> partnered with Oxfam GB to create a text messaging “nerve center” that served as a vital tool for conflict management and prevention by providing a hub for real-time information about actual and planned attacks between rival groups. The text messages were then relayed to local “peace committees” that deployed mediators and took other immediate action to stem the violence (Babaud & Ndung’u, 2012; USIP, 2011). Similarly, Owuor and Wisor (2013) note that prior to the 2013 general elections in Kenya, Safaricom donated 50 million text messages to the civil society organisation *Sisi Ni Amani* (We are peace). *Sisi Ni Amani* is a grass-roots organisation that used these messages to target specific groups during the electoral period. For example, if there were reports of potential violence, *Sisi Ni Amani* would send targeted messages to encourage community members to be vigilant in supporting a peaceful election. Thus the mobile network contributed to a peaceful 2013 election in Kenya through its downstream text messaging.

Baud (2011) supports the idea of relying on masses as sources of information as opposed to external interventionists who often have vested interests that can open the door to misinformation and manipulation. In Sudan, for instance, a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General was accused of waging psychological warfare and subsequently declared “*persona non grata*” by the Sudanese government, leaving the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) without leadership for ten months after he published unconfirmed information on his personal blog. This shows the importance of using victim-centric reports. For example, the

project, *Voix des Kivus* (Voices of the Kivus), which was launched in 2009 in South Kivu enables the community members to monitor peace by posting accounts (SMS) that affect their lives and also for communicating with the rest of the world (Stauffacher, 2009; SFCG, 2011). Furthermore, mapping technologies like Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and satellite imagery are also being used by the UN and local organisations to engage with communities and map information that can help in forecasting trouble spots or see trends in the field (SFCG, 2011).

Vrasidas et al. (2007) and Hattotuwa and Stauffacher (2011) note that ICTs aid in fostering collaborations and partnerships among the various stakeholders which is important in peacebuilding since it is only in the systemic involvement of the community that some of the challenges may be addressed. Following the 1992 ethnic clashes in Kenya, peace-builders in Western Kenya benefitted by networking with peace workers in other parts of the country through the Peace-Net which provided a framework for members to consult on displacement concerns such as access, assistance to victims and human rights protection for displaced victims (Juma, 2000).

Humanitarian workers can use ICTs in the protection of civilians during conflicts by encouraging victim-centric approaches once they have established contacts whether directly in the field or by means of communication tools for collecting, processing and speedy transmission of information (Wigger, 2011). However, there are challenges of using ICTs in civilian protection since any conversation with protection actors can put people at risk because of the sensitive nature of the information collected causing these people to be stigmatized or targeted. In particular areas with scarce means of communication, people with mobile phones, satellite

phones as well as users of the Internet are easily detectable therefore exposing them to danger (Wigger, 2011).

Although the digital divide is an impediment to ICT use in developing countries (Couldry, 2009; Wilson & Wilson, 2009), Internet radio for grassroots involves those who cannot read or write. Accordingly, literacy is not a requirement for digital media production that seeks to capture the views of those who may not be able to read and write, but through their life experience which may have valuable insights into the transformation of the conflict and into issues such as reconciliation, transformative justice and co-existence. Content so produced can be put on a website, but also recorded onto CD (for audio recordings) or downloaded to devices such as digital devices (for audio and video) and then played back at community level or village meetings, to foster dialogue (Hattotuwa, 2006).

According to Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan (2008), communication and media can support the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in two ways. In the first place, targeted civic education and media campaigns ensure that the ex-combatants are aware of the DDR programmes such as transitional assistance and training, skill development programmes and their role in the communities. Additionally, the media helps informants understand the various economic and social opportunities available to them during the reintegration process. The study further reveals that media can contribute to peacebuilding through coverage of war crime trials and truth and reconciliation commissions. For instance, *Radio Ijambo* was set up in Burundi in the 1990s as a direct response to the hate radio and divided press that had spread through the region. For this reason, *Radio Ijambo* promotes dialogue and reconciliation through programmes such as ‘Pillars of Humanity’ or ‘Heroes’ in Kirundi, which tells stories of local heroes who risked their lives to save people of different ethnic group (Kalathil et al. 2008; UNICEF, 2013). It is however important to note that radio and TV can also be used to

propagate hate speech and fuel ethnic conflicts. For example, the Rwandan *Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTL) radio was accused of propagating hate speech against the Tutsi, thus contributing to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Similarly, the vernacular radio stations in Kenya were blamed for fanning the 2007/2008 PEV (Yanagizawa, 2014; Allen & Gagliardone 2011). To avoid similar pitfalls, the private sector and media companies (including the Standard Group, the Nation Media Group, and the Royal Media Services) worked extensively to train and sensitise media owners, journalists, and community radio hosts on how to report on political issues in a way that would not lead people to turn to violence. In addition, the Ford Foundation funded training for community journalists reporting in local dialects, mainly through community radio, in more than half of the 47 counties (Owour & Wisor, 2013). Similarly, Search For Common Ground and Media Focus on Africa developed a radio and TV drama ‘The Team’ which depicted members of a fictional football team drawn from different ethnic groups and social classes being challenged to overcome fears and biases so that they could see each other as individuals and not members of ‘the other.’ (UNICEF, 2013).

The role of ICT in the promotion of education and reintegration of former child soldiers cannot be underestimated. SchoolNet, an independent organisation based in South Africa, for instance, runs education promotion activities in some African countries by training former child soldiers in Angola, Liberia and Rwanda equipping them with computer skills and providing psychological counselling. In addition e-learning has encouraged the promotion of tolerance and understanding among learners and educators in various countries (Wilson & Wilson, 2009; Baksh & Munro, 2009). ICTs can also be used for information gathering, global mapping of development projects in conflict zones and advocacy campaigns. A study UNICEF (2013) shows that *Voices Beyond Walls* is a participatory communication and media collective tool that supports expression and human rights advocacy among children in Palestine refugee camps in



the West Bank. The project, which was initiated in 2006, supports creative expression through digital storytelling workshops, new media production, and dissemination of their work locally, regionally and globally. The study further found that ICTs have opened platforms for engaging youth in promoting positive change. An example is the *Salam Shabab* (Views and Voices of Iraqi Youth). This is a reality TV show which brings together youth from different regions on joint peace initiatives. Similarly, a study by Oloo (2012) shows that the National Cohesion and Integration and Commission (NCIC) has been utilising ICT tools in inculcating peace in the education system in Kenya. The study further indicates that the NCIC has partnered with the Ministry of education to review the school curriculum, establish peace clubs in schools and train drama and music teachers on cohesion and integration concerns in order to influence national drama and music festivals. In addition, the Commission uses school debates, creative theatre, songs, essays and storytelling as platforms for mentoring youth into responsible citizens and empowering them to learn to appreciate diversity, prevent violence and resolve conflicts with their peers and communities (Oloo, 2012). These efforts are geared towards building community cohesiveness in order to avoid a repeat of the 2007/2008 PEV.

The mass media also played great roles in preventing a repeat of 2007/2008 PEV in Kenya. studies such as Oloo (2012) and Owuor and Wisor (2013) found that the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) launched the *Mkenya Daima* (My Kenya Forever) campaigns in 2012 in order to avoid the pitfalls of the 2007/2008 PEV. The campaigns, which were disseminated at discounted rates through TV, radio, newspapers, the Internet and social blogs were among those that ensured successful a peaceful 2013 general elections.

The literature reviewed however shows the use of ICTs in peacebuilding processes at the national level and in communities ravaged by inter-communal conflicts. To bridge this gap, there was need of conducting a study on the use of ICTs to restore peace in homogeneous

communities such as in the Sabaot community in Mt Elgon region which experienced an intra-ethnic conflict in 2006-2008.

A study by Oloo (2012) found that ICTs played a great role in information gathering, archiving, analysing and dissemination of the findings of the Commission for Investigation into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV). Some recommendations of the commission included the formation of an independent electoral body to independently run elections and the boundary commission to review and delineate boundaries. This led to the formation of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) and the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IBRC) which utilised ICTs in the conduct of their business (Oloo, 2012, NSC, 2009). The IIEC for instance, oversaw the 2010 referendum and a number of by-elections utilising ICTs to relay the results while the officials used SMS, email and Internet in all phases of the referendum. This helped in building the credibility of the commission and subsequent transformation to Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). IEBC also made greater use of ICT tools in voter registration prior to the 2013 general elections. However, Mutai (2016) indicates that biometric voter registration system (BVRs) and electronic voter identification system (EVIDs) which were meant to be used for relaying the 2013 general elections results failed during voting.

The literature reviewed such as Hattotuwa, (2006); SFCG, (2011); Camminos, (2013); Oloo (2012) and UNICEF (2013) indicate that ICTs have the potential of empowering citizens by encouraging victim-centric approaches and participatory peacebuilding process. Furthermore, the literature show that ICTs have contributed to peace in conflict regions by fostering community participation in the peace programmes. The Internet platforms and other UGC content, for instance, play a great role in peacebuilding and conflict transformation by ensuring the involvement of all stakeholders in the peace process. Much of the literature reviewed

however, focus on the contributions of social media platforms and the Internet to political revolutions and the use of these platforms in empowering the marginalised in the society. The literature also focused on contributions of other ICTs such as radio, mobile phones, SMS and TV to peacebuilding. However, the literature reviewed shows the use of ICTs in revolutionary movements and in societies affected by inter-ethnic conflicts. Thus there was need of conducting a study to ascertain the role of ICTs in peacebuilding among homogeneous communities such as the Sabaot community in Mt Elgon region which experienced an intra-ethnic conflict in 2006-2008.

## **2.6 Status of ICT in Kenya**

Kenya has witnessed a significant growth in the ICT sector as demonstrated by the increasing number of telephone lines, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), the number of Internet users, broadcasting stations, and market share of each one of them. The government has liberalised the mobile cellular market and statistics from the Communications Authority of Kenya [CAK] (2015) and indicates that fixed telephone line subscribers had maintained a downward trend of 87,111 from the last quarter (2013/2014) to 87,777 during the 2016/2016 quarter. The sharp decline was mainly as a result of the de-commissioning of Telkom Kenya's code division multiple access (CDMA) network (CAK, 2015). On the positive side, the mobile market in the country had maintained an upward trend of 37.8 million cellular mobile subscribers by September, 2015 which was up from 36.1 million subscribers 2013/2014 quarter. The mobile subscribers were Safaricom Ltd, Finserve Africa (Equitel), Telcom Kenya (Orange) and Airtel Networks Ltd. The findings further show that the volume of SMS send during the 2015/2016 financial year was 7.0 billion. The trend was attributed to provision of lucrative data bundles by mobile operators (CAK, 2015).

In addition, there were 21.6 million Internet subscriptions in the country with the mobile data/Internet subscriptions on GPRS/EDGE and 3G recording the highest portion of the total Internet/data subscriptions of 19.9 million subscriptions. In the media industry, there were 371 operational television stations and 579 FM radio stations with an estimated 60 per cent of the population having access to television and 90 per cent to radio services. According to Digital Kenya (2015), the number of digital signal distributor service providers was only 2. One was Signet, a subsidiary of the public broadcaster, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) which was licensed in 2009. And the second one, Pan-Africa Network Group (Kenya) Company limited which is privately owned was licensed in 2011. The general functions of signal distributors include establishment, operation and management of multiplexes, transmission sites, and subscriber management system among others. The growth in the media industry is of great significance to conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the country. According to Arsenault, Himelfarb, and Abbott (2011), the media provide platforms for dialogue among disagreeing parties and a critical source of information about available services and potential threats. In addition, Gujer (2011) notes that the democratisation of the mass communication implies that the viewers can get real-time information which helps change their understanding of crises and disasters, for instance, during the Gulf War in 1991, CNN enabled viewers to have more real time information than the generals and politicians in the bunkered command centres.

Finally the wireless data subscriptions declined from 17, 721 to 13,221. The decline was attributed to the migration of customers from wireless network to fibre optic (CAK, 2015). The international bandwidth was satellite-based until 2009 when the East African Marine Systems (TEAMS) and Seacom cable became operational. The TEAMS/Seacom collaboration is a public-private partnership between the government and local operators with the government owning 20 per cent share of the cable. A second cable funded in part by the World Bank landed

in Mombasa in June of 2010 (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011). In order to encourage private sector participation in telecommunications services, Kenya initiated the National Optic Fiber Backbone Infrastructure (NOFBI) project geared towards establishing a national public broadband network and Internet points of presence (PoPs) in district headquarters and border towns. In addition, the mobile telephone sector has seen a rapid expansion particularly since the licensing of two new providers (Orange Kenya and Yu) in 2008, increasing coverage and availability of low denomination calling cards (CAK, 2015, RoK, 2014).

Kenya is progressively becoming a space where different actors from the government, to private operators, donor agencies and national and international NGOs are experimenting with new ways to use technologies to support development. According to Allen and Gagliardone (2011), two major issues contributing to this trend include the Safaricom's mobile banking transaction *M-Pesa*<sup>vii</sup> which is enabling millions of Kenyans to transfer money, make deposits and withdrawals, and pay their bills progressively replacing the informal networks of agents helping move money throughout the country and collecting revenues. Secondly, the significance of issues such as corruption and lack of transparency and accountability in the Kenyan debate has made governance one of the other sectors most affected by the experimentation with ICTs as exhibited in the case of *www.mzalendo.com* aiming at keeping MPs accountable for their performance. Oloo (2012) notes that ICTs provide a more efficient work in parliamentary committees thus contributing to the speedy consideration of bills. In addition, the use of live broadcasts in parliament has enabled citizens to understand how their elected representatives operate and the democratic issues they deal with.

The third factor contributing to Kenya's success in ICT is the existence of new platforms such as *Ushahidi* and *Amani Kenya @108*, and similar projects that are largely the product of local

ingenuity accompanied by the successful integration of key local actors in transnational activist networks (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011; Babaud & Ndung'u, 2012). In addition, the media houses in Kenya are increasingly combining TV and radio with mobile phones to increase participation in debates and disseminate information more broadly, for instance, through receiving text messages while on-air and social media like Facebook and Twitter (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011).

The literature reviewed indicates that ICTs can be used in peacebuilding efforts, social movement as well as aiding in humanitarian work. The literature also shows that ICTs have the potential of empowering populations to participate fully in governance and peacebuilding. However, most of the literature focuses on the use of social media platforms, mobile phones and the Internet in peacebuilding at national level. To bridge this gap, there is need of ascertaining the application of other ICTs like the mass media, very high frequency radios and the use of satellite technology in peacebuilding at grassroots level from societies emerging from intra-ethnic conflicts. The literature also indicates the great trends in development of ICTs in Africa and specifically in Kenya. This creates a great potential for the use of ICTs hence the need to highlighting it through this study.

## **2.7 Theoretical framework and conceptual model**

The main objective of the research was to investigate the role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. The research was guided by the conflict transformation theory. This section discusses the theoretical framework which was used by the researcher and the conceptual model used in this study.

### **2.7.1 Conflict Transformation Theory**

Conflict transformation theory is a theory that draws on the concepts of conflict resolution and conflict management through contributions of many scholars such as Miall (2004), Lederach, (1997) and Vayrynen (1991). Conflict transformation departs from the theories of conflict resolution and management in that conflict management views conflicts as ineradicable consequences of values and interests between communities. Accordingly, conflicts can only be managed and contained by powerful actors having the power and resources to bring pressure on the conflicting parties in order to induce them to settle. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, emphasises the importance of skilled but powerless third-parties working with parties to address the root causes of the conflict. Conflict transformation rejects these theories arguing that the once-and-for-all intervention in a conflict cannot bring long lasting peace. Instead, it argues that conflict transformation is a long process requiring different interventions at different levels (Miall, 2004). Miall therefore contributes to the understanding of the different levels of conflict that is the pre-conflict, confrontation, crisis, outcome and post-conflict stage. Understanding these stages is important since each requires different actors employing different approaches.

Conflict transformation is a holistic and multi-faceted process of engaging with conflict. It is a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourse and the very fabric of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict (Miall, 2004; NSC, 2009). The aim of conflict transformation is to pursue non-violent social change by transforming relationships and social organisation into long-term peace. Lederach (1997) sees peacebuilding as a long-term transformation of a war system (conflict) into a peace system, inspired by a quest for the values of peace and justice, truth and mercy. The key dimensions of these processes are changes in the personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict, brought about over different time-periods (short, mid and long-term) and affecting different system levels at

different times. Structural dimensions address the root causes of a given conflict while relational dimension is concerned with repair and building relationships that were severed during the violence which will form new patterns, change attitudes and processes and address structural changes, that is political, economic, social and cultural (Matemba, 2008). It thus emphasises on peacebuilding through constructive transformation of conflicts into peaceful co-existence.

Lederach (1997) and Dudouet (2006) contribute to the understanding of the actors and their role in conflict transformation. They identify three actors which include actor I (international organisations and foreign governments), actor II (development and humanitarian agencies) and actor III (Diasporas, transnational grassroots initiatives, criminal networks and others) levels. Lederach further contributes to the idea of a pyramid consisting of elites, leaders and decision makers at the top; leaders of social organisations in the middle with the base being occupied by local leaders. This helps one locate the actors at every level and their role in conflict transformation. The strength of the theory is on its emphasis to organic peacebuilding as opposed to a top-down approach.

The strength of the theory also lies in its emphasis on the last stage of the conflict, the post-conflict stage, within the cultural context of the conflict. According to NSC (2009), conflict transformation should be directly accountable to those affected by the conflict. This is because it is at the post-conflict stage that grievances are addressed, the broken relationships restored and long-lasting peace and reconciliation among the communities that had been torn apart by violence is built up.

Miall (2004) criticises the theory due to the little attention it gives to the autonomous processes of change that transpire within the political system of the conflict-affected society due to its emphasis on the cobweb-like networking of the actors in the pyramid.




The theory informs the study since it is at the grassroots level that the participants can employ various ICTs to enable them fully participate in the peacebuilding process. The theory affirms that conflicts as the one witnessed in Mt Elgon region are inevitable. However, through appropriate interventions facilitated by the different actors employing various approaches such as ICTs, conflicts can be transformed into peaceful co-existence characterised by new structures and new relationships. The theory enables parties to address the conflicts at different levels (pre-conflict, confrontation, crisis and post-conflict levels). The theory informs the study since Mt Elgon region is at the post-conflict stage of the conflict cycle hence the need to understanding the relational, structural and social aspects of peacebuilding as well as the contribution and role of ICTs in transforming the conflict into peaceful coexistence.

### **2.7.2 Conceptual Model**

This section describes the conceptual model on ICTs and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region that was used in this study.

The concepts depicted below are drawn from the conflict transformation theory and are used to describe the variables in this research. From the research questions, it is indicative that there is a relationship between ICT and the intervening variables as depicted in figure 2.1. The state and non-state actors can use ICTs to either bring peace or fuel conflict. This means that ICTs have the potential to either compromise or promote peace depending on how it is utilised by the actors involved in the peacebuilding process.

From Figure 2.1, ICT is the independent variable while peace-building is the dependent variable. The interplay of other intervening variables like state and non-state actors can either contribute to peace or fuel violence conflict. This means that the attainment of peace depends on the approach taken by all actors.



**Figure 2.1 Conceptual model on ICTs and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Developed by researcher**

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

In this chapter the researcher presents the research design, the study area, the sampling procedures, data collection methods, data collection instruments, validity and reliability of research instruments and data analysis procedures. This is followed by ethical considerations of the study.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The research adopted a phenomenological approach with a mixed method in data collection and analysis (Baxter & Babbie, 2003; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Hart, 2005). According Creswell (2007), a phenomenological study describes the meanings for several individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or phenomenon. This entails describing what all the participants have in common as they experience a phenomenon.

The phenomenological approach enabled the researcher to see phenomena through the perception of the participants (Creswell, 2007; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Daymon & Holloway, 2011). This study sought to analyse the perceptions of the subjects regarding the extent of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. By adopting the phenomenological approach, the researcher shared the feelings and experiences of the people under study. This involved describing how the participants view peacebuilding efforts as well as the extent of ICT use in peacebuilding in the region.

### **3.2 The study area**

The study was conducted in Mt Elgon region in Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia counties. Although Mt Elgon region extends to Uganda, the study only covered the Kenyan side of the region due to logistical challenges. The sampled sub-counties were Mt Elgon, Cheptais, Bungoma North, Bungoma West in Bungoma County as well as Trans Nzoia West in Trans Nzoia County (See appendix 10).

At the onset of the conflict in 2006, Mt Elgon was one district but it was split into two districts in 2011; namely Mt Elgon and Cheptais sub-counties. However, the two sub-counties form one constituency known as Mt Elgon. Mt Elgon Sub-County has two administrative divisions namely Kapsokwony division and Kaptama division while the administrative divisions of Cheptais are Cheptais division and Kopsiro division. Appendix 11 shows the contested areas of the Chepyuk settlement scheme. The contested areas in Chepyuk Phase III are located in Emia sub-location in Kopsiro division, Cheptais Sub-County. They include Chepkurkur, Korng'otuny, Bananteega, Kaboriot, Huruma, Kaptuum, Chepngwoneibei, Cherwandoi and Saria.

### **3.3 Settlement pattern in Mt Elgon region**

Mt Elgon and Cheptais sub-counties cover an area of 956.6 square kilometres [RoK] (2009). According to the 2009 census, the population of the sub-counties was 172,377. The settlement patterns indicate that 70 per cent of the area is covered by forest and only 30 per cent is occupied by human settlement on the lower region (District Development Plan) [DDP], 2008-2012). The region is occupied by the majority Sabaot community as well as the Bukusu and Teso who are minorities. Encroachment to the forest has occurred due to the concentration of the population in the lower region of the mountain. The agricultural nature of the community

members has further put immense strain on the natural resources especially land, hence the frequent conflicts in the region (DDP, 2008-2012). As shown in the table 3.1, the greatest population is in Kopsiro Division and it is also the area where the conflict in the region emanated.

**Table 3.1 Population and Density Trends and Projection by Division**

Division	1999		2002		2004		2006		2008	
	Pop.	Dsty	Pop.	Dsty	Pop.	Dsty	Pop.	Dsty	pop	Dsty
Cheptais	40,069	189	42,931	193	44,952	202	47,068	212	49,264	222
Kapsokwony	24,526	95	26,278	103	27,915	108	28,810	113	30,167	118
Kaptama	23,885	114	25,592	122	26,796	128	28,057	137	29,378	140
Kopsiro	46,553	187	49,878	200	52,227	210	54,686	220	57,259	230
<b>Total</b>	<b>135,033</b>		<b>114,679</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>151,490</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>158,621</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>166,088</b>	<b>177</b>

Legend: pop. - Population

Dsty- Density

**Source: Mt. Elgon District Development Plan, 2002-2008**

### **3.4 Target population**

The target population was 20,000 residents of Mt Elgon region who were affected by the 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict. This was based on the 2009 population census report where the total population of Mt Elgon ( Cheptais Sub-County) was 172,377 The population was drawn from the five Sub-Counties from the region as discussed in the sampling size determination section 3.5.

### 3.5 Sampling Technique

Sampling frame, which was obtained from the 2009 population census report. A sampling frame is the list of elements from which a probability sample is selected (Adler & Clark, 2011; Baxter & Babbie, 2003). Both probability and purposive sampling were used in the selection of units for study. The researcher employed probabilistic sampling in the selection of sites and individuals for quantitative study. Probability samples give every member in the population an equal chance of being included in the study (Adler & Clark, 2011). On the other hand, purposive sampling was used in selection of sites and individuals for study. Creswell (2007) notes that in purposive sampling, the inquirer selects sites and individuals for study because they can purposefully inform understanding of the research problem and the phenomenon under study. From the wider Mt Elgon region, the researcher did purposive sampling from the regions, counties, Sub-Counties, divisions, locations and sub-locations that form key sampling units as shown in Table 3.2.

**Table 3.2 Sampled Administrative units for study**

County	Sub-County	Division	Location	Sub-Location
Bungoma	Cheptais	Cheptais	Chepkube	Chepkube
			Cheptais	Cheptais Ngachi
			Sasur	Toroso
			Chesikak	Sasur
		Kopsiro	Emia	Korng'otuny Chepkurkur
			Chepyuk	Chepyuk Kaimugul
			Chongeywo	Kapkurongo Masaek
		Kapkateny	Cheptonon Toywondet	
	Mt Elgon		Kamuneru	Kamuneru

		Kapsokwony	Elgon	Sambocho Nomorio	
			Kapsokwony	Kapsokwony Bugaa	
		Kaptama	Kaboywo	Kaboywo Mt Elgon Forest	
			Kaptama	Kaptama Kaborom	
		Bungoma West	Lwandanyi Namwela	Lwandanyi Namwela	Lwandanyi Namwela
		Bungoma North	Kimilili	Kimilili North Kamasiero	Kimilili North Kamasiero
Trans-Nzoia	Trans-Nzoia West	Saboti	Kiboroa Machewa	Kiboroa Saboti	
		Kinyoro	Kisaway	Kissaway Kinyoro	

**Source: Developed by researcher from 2009 Population Census Report**

### **3.6 Sample size determination**

The total population in the area of study for the five sub-counties to be included was 20,000 people (see table 3.1 for estimated population from the region). To get the actual sample size from 20,000, a table developed by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) was used for determining needed size (S) of a randomly chosen size from a finite population (N) 1970). See appendix 8 for details. The proportions in the table assumes a standard error of .05 (95% level of confidence) hence the researcher targeted 377 community members who were purposively selected for interviews regarding their views on the effectiveness of ICTs in peacebuilding and the peacebuilding efforts in the region. These comprised men, women and the youth who were affected by the conflict.

The sample distribution was categorised along delineated sub-locations. The sub-locations were purposively allocated samples based on population size as shown in Table 3.1. The distribution

was also based on impact of the 2006-2008 conflict on the sample units. The results are indicated in Table 3.3.

**Table 3.3 Sample Distribution of Respondents**

<b>Sample unit</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Chepkube	12	3.2
Cheptais	11	2.9
Ngachi	17	4.5
Korng'otuny	14	3.7
Chepkurkur	14	3.7
Chepyuk	13	3.4
Kaimugul	12	3.2
Kapkurongo	10	2.6
Masaek	18	4.8
Cheptonon	15	4.0
Toywondet	16	4.2
Kamuneru	12	3.2
Sambocho	15	4.0
Nomorio	15	4.0
Kapsokwony	14	3.7
Bugaa	15	4.0
Kaboywo	10	2.6
Mt Elgon Forest	12	3.2
Namwela	14	3.7
Kaptama	12	3.2
Kaborom	14	3.7
Lwandanyi	15	4.0
Kimilili North	10	2.6
Kamasiero	14	3.7
Saboti	10	2.6
Kissaway	10	2.6
Kinyoro	12	3.2
Toroso	11	2.9
Chesikak	10	2.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Data**



For qualitative interviews, 60% per cent of the faith-based organisations (FBOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) were sampled. The choice of 60 per cent was based on Kathuri and Pals (1993) who recommends that a minimum normal sample from any population was 60 per cent. The study established that there were 8 NGOs, 5 FBOs, 10 CBOs and 10 CSOs in Mt Elgon region in 2014. The researcher further purposively sampled 3 field workers from every NGO, CBO, FBO and the CSOs in the region for interviews. The selection of the field workers was based on the positions they hold in the organisation. From the 8 NGOs<sup>viii</sup> in the region, the researcher purposively sampled 4 NGOs. Hence 3 NGO field workers were purposively sampled based on the positions they hold in the NGOs. From the 10 CBOs in the region, the researcher randomly sample 6 CBOs for study. From the 5 FBOs in the region, 3 FBOs were sampled for study. Finally, from the 10 CSOs in the region, 5 were purposively selected for study.

Similarly, the researcher purposively selected the District Peace Committee (DPCs) members, peace monitors, opinion leaders and county and sub-county administrators who participated in in-depth interviews. The sampling procedure is summarised on Table 3.4.

**Table 3.4 Sampled community leaders and Sub-County administrators**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Sampled</b>	<b>County</b>	<b>Sub-County</b>
County Commissioners	2	1	Trans Nzoia	
Sub-County Commissioners	5	2	Bungoma Trans Nzoia	Cheptais, Mt Elgon Trans Nzoia West
Peace monitors	2	1	Bungoma	

District Peace Committee members	12	6	Bungoma Trans Nzoia	Cheptais, Mt Elgon Trans Nzoia West
FBOs	5	3	Trans Nzoia Bungoma	Trans Nzoia West Mt Elgon
CBOs	10	4	Bungoma Trans Nzoia	Cheptais, Mt Elgon Trans Nzoia West
CSOs	10	5	Bungoma	Cheptais, Mt Elgon
NGOs	8	4	Trans Nzoia Bungoma	Trans Nzoia West Cheptais, Mt Elgon
Chiefs	20	5	Bungoma Trans Nzoia	Cheptais, Mt Elgon Trans Nzoia West
Opinion leaders	16	8	Bungoma Trans Nzoia	Cheptais, Mt Elgon Trans Nzoia West
<b>Total</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>40</b>		


**Source: Field Data**

As indicated in the Table 3.4, the respondents were purposively selected for study in order to enable the researcher obtain in-depth information regarding ICTs and peacebuilding efforts in the region. However, due to logistical problems and suspicion especially from opinion leaders and county administrators, 38 out of the 40 respondents actually participated in the interviews. The total number of respondents included in the study for both qualitative and quantitative interviews from the target population of 20,000 respondents was 417 (377 for quantitative interviews and 40 for qualitative interviews).

### 3.7.1 Sample Distribution of Respondents

The distribution of respondents who participated in the study was categorised by counties and sub-counties.

Trans Nzoia County had the least number of respondents (24.7 %) while Bungoma County had the highest number of respondents (75.3%). This is because most of the victims of the conflict were in Mt Elgon in Bungoma County where the contentious land settlement scheme is located (HRW, 2011; Kamoet, 2011; Simiyu, 2008). However, since the region extends to Tran Nzoia County, the respondents were drawn from the two counties. In addition, the spill over effect of the conflict was also experienced in Trans Nzoia County. This is illustrated by Figure 3.1.




**Figure 3.1 County sample population frequency**

**Source: Field Data**

### 3.7.2 Distribution of respondents by Sub-Counties

The sample distribution of respondents per Sub-County was also categorised. The findings are shown in Figure 3.2.



**Figure 3.2 Sub-County population**

**Source: Field Data**

From Figure 3.2, the respondents were drawn from five sub-counties which are within Mt Elgon region. Mt Elgon Sub-County had the highest number of respondents (31.9%) followed by Cheptais Sub-County (23.1%). This was because the victims of the conflict were drawn from these two sub-counties. In addition, the contentious land was located in Cheptais Sub-County and most of those claiming ownership to the land were residents of the two sub-counties. However, other sub-counties neighbouring Mt Elgon bore the spill over effects of the conflict. These are Bungoma North, which had 19.8 per cent respondents, Bungoma West Sub-County which had 14.6 per cent respondents and Trans Nzoia West Sub-County which recorded 10.6 per cent respondents.

### **3.8.1 Data collection methods**

This section discusses the data collection methods the researcher used in this study. They include interviews, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, observation and document analysis.

### **3.8.2 Interviews**

The main data collection method was qualitative in-depth interviews both individually and in groups although field notes from observations and document analysis were used to complement the findings. Interviews offer a means of collaboratively exploring the meanings, ideas, feelings, intentions of various stakeholders or publics, and of those involved in managing formal communications (Daymon & Holloway, 2011). Hence, structured, semi-structured and unstructured questions were used to understand peacebuilding, ICT tools used in peacebuilding, contributions of ICTs in the peacebuilding process, the actors involved in peacebuilding, application of ICTs in peacebuilding, the effectiveness of ICTs in peacebuilding and the challenges of incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. There were in-depth interviews and multiple interviews with the participants who experienced the conflict that engulfed the region in 2006-2008. The researcher used triangulation whereby data was collected using both qualitative interviews and quantitative data which was obtained from questionnaires (see appendix 1).

### **3.8.3 Key informant interviews**

The researcher used a key informant interviews (KII) guide to obtain information from the study area. With the KII, the researcher had direct interaction with the respondents. Interviews were held with the key peacebuilding actors who were purposively sampled based on their

knowledge regarding ICTs and peacebuilding in the region and also due to the positions and authority they hold in the society. The researcher interviewed a total of 38 key informants. These comprised leaders from non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations (NGOs), faith-based organisations (FBOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs); other key informants were peace committee members, county administrators, chiefs, opinion leaders and peace monitors (Appendices 2, 3, 4 and 5). The responses from the interviews were recorded on digital voice recorders and later transcribed and translated from Kiswahili and mother tongue into English. Each interview took approximately 30 minutes.

#### **3.8.4 Focus Group Discussions**

The researcher used focus group discussions (FGDs) for consensus building on concepts, perceptions and ideas about ICTs and peacebuilding in the region. Four FGDs comprising of 2 members of the DPC, 2 members from each of the CBOs, FBOs and NGOs, elderly men, women and youths were conducted in the two divisions of Cheptais Sub-County, that is Kopsiro and Cheptais; in Mt Elgon Sub-County, the FGDs were conducted in Kapsokwony and Kaptama divisions. The participants were randomly assigned to four focus groups with eight members per group so that everybody got ample opportunity to talk in order to get new insights into the topics under discussion. The FGDs were conducted in Kiswahili because the participants were drawn from different tribes. Each FGD took an hour. Guide questions on ICT and peacebuilding were used by the researcher (Appendix 6).

#### **3.8.5 Observation**

This was mainly non-participant observation. The researcher visited the sub-locations under study and observed and recorded on-going peacebuilding initiatives and the use of ICTs in the

region under study. The findings from observation technique were repeated throughout the study in order to capture new developments that may not have captured during the previous observations. In addition, the researcher took photographs of the peacebuilding projects in the region (see appendices 17, 20-24). Information obtained from observation was used to verify and confirm information obtained from FGDs, questionnaires as well as key informant interviews. This provided data for descriptive analysis (see appendix 7).

### **3.8.6 Document Analysis**

The researcher obtained secondary data from institutional libraries such as Kabarak University, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology and Moi University; Internet sources; government records at the District Officer's (DO's) and sub-county Commissioners' offices and physical planning departments in Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-Counties and Bungoma County offices. According Daymon and Holloway (2011), document analysis offers data that are more comprehensive than the evidence you might acquire from interviews or questionnaires conducted over a short time period. This is because documents span time, allowing you to track historical processes or reconstruct past events and ongoing processes that are not available for direct observation. The use of document analysis entailed search for information in records especially minutes of peace meetings and district security committee minutes, newspapers and government policy documents. This helped in answering the research questions on the state and non-state efforts in peacebuilding in the region and the extent of ICT use in these peacebuilding efforts.

### **3.9.1 Research Instruments**

This section discusses the research instruments employed in the study. They included interview schedules, questionnaires and observation check list.

### **3.9.2 Interview schedule**

The researcher used interview schedules to elicit information from respondents. Interviews are advantageous since they allow the researcher to develop the questions prior to the interview and decide which course to pursue. In addition, interviews do not restrict the participants' options for responding. In other words, they are flexible (Creswell & Clark, 2011; Daymon & Holloway, 2011). The interviews used in the study were structured interviews and unstructured interviews, key informant interviews and focus group discussions (Appendices 2, 3, 4 and 5).

### **3.9.3 Questionnaires**

Questionnaires were used to obtain data from community members since they ensure uniformity of data from the respondents. This is due to the fact that the order of the questions is the same for all the interviews. However, they limit the interviewer and interviewee from exploring the object of inquiry (Creswell & Clark, 2011; Daymon & Holloway, 2011; Kothari, 2004; Baxter & Babbie, 2003). Research assistants were used to distribute the questionnaires to the sampled respondents in the region. The respondents were given sufficient time to fill in the questionnaires. Thereafter, they were collected for analysis (Appendix 1).

### **3.9.4 Observation checklist**

The researcher used an observation checklist to record field observations in the study area. Observation allows the participant to offer a holistic perspective and graphic description of the social life in the study area (Daymon & Holloway, 2011). However, they may also lead to



biasness in data collection by the researcher. Observation allows the researcher to obtain information which can be used to confirm and corroborate findings from other research methods. The researcher took photographs and records of the on-going peace initiatives and the ICT tools observed then ticked against the observation checklist (Appendix 7).


### **3.10 Validity**

Validity means that a test measures what it is supposed to measure. In addition, validity checks on the quality of data, the results and the interpretation (Creswell & Clark, 2011; Kothari, 2004). The types of validity covered for quantitative data included content validity, face validity, construct validity and criterion-related validity. Content validity of the research instruments was done to show that they comprehensively and fairly cover the items they purport to cover. Content validity refers to how well a measure covers the range of meanings or the dimensions included within the concept (Baxter & Babbie, 2003; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Hart, 2005). External experts were used to ascertain the content validity of the research instruments by subjecting them to face validity. Face validity assessed whether the research instruments covered the range of scope conceptualized by the researcher as far as relevance, clarity and unambiguity of terms used in the instruments were concerned. Construct validity on the other hand refers to whether the instruments measure what they intent to measure. It also refers to whether the operational definition of a variable actually reflects the theoretical meanings of a concept (Creswell & Clark, 2011; Kothari, 2004; Miller, 2004). The construct measured was ICTs and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. The researcher formulated a hypothesis regarding ICTs and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region and the findings subjected to Pearson correlation test. Thereafter, criterion-related validity was done to ascertain whether the scores relate to

some external standard. The questionnaires were designed to assess the relationship of ICTs and peacebuilding in the region.

Validity was also ensured by conducting a pilot study. A pilot study was carried out in Kiboroo sub-location in Trans-Nzoia West Sub-County. This entailed pre-testing the structured interviews on sample respondents. Questionnaires were administered to sampled participants and the results obtained used to rectify the shortcomings in the research instruments. The pilot study was done in two weeks to allow for analysis of pilot study results.

Analysis of the findings regarding the effectiveness of ICT tools was also done. The findings of the effectiveness of the use of radio are shown in Figure 3.3.



**Figure 3.3 Effectiveness of Radio in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**

The sub-location used for pilot study was therefore excluded from the actual study. The findings were then used in the generalizability of findings to the target population under study.

The quantitative study was designed to reduce threats to internal and external validity. Internal validity is the extent to which the investigator can conclude that there is a cause and relationship among variables. External validity on the other hand is the extent to which the investigator can conclude that the results apply to a larger population (Creswell & Clark, 2011). This involved removing selection bias of participants and using a representative sample. As explained already, the above threats were removed by conducting a pilot study and the results used to correct any ambiguities that might affect the findings.

Qualitative validity on the other hand involves assessing whether the information obtained through qualitative data is accurate (Creswell & Clark, 2011). This involved triangulation of data from various sources and member checking. Member checking of the results was done whereby the researcher took the summaries of the findings to key participants to ascertain the accuracy of their experiences in regard to the role of ICTs in the peacebuilding process in the region.

### **3.11 Reliability**

In quantitative data, reliability concerns the extent to which the scores from participants are stable and consistent over time (Creswell & Clark, 2011). Three types of reliability are stability, equivalence and internal consistency (Miller, 2004). Reliability as equivalence is of two sorts: alternate or parallel form and inter-rater form. Reliability as internal consistency on the other hand tests for the homogeneity of items in the questionnaires using split-half index, item-total correlations index, Kuder-Richardson-20 and coefficient alpha index (Oluwatayo, 2012). Split-half method assumes that items in the instrument can be split into two equal halves by assigning

even numbers to one group and odd numbers to the other and a reliability coefficient calculated. To confirm whether there were any significant relationships between ICTs and peacebuilding in the region, the findings from questionnaires, KII and FGDs were subjected to Pearson correlation test to determine the relationship between ICTs and peacebuilding.

For qualitative data, reliability refers to trustworthiness of the research instruments. To achieve qualitative reliability, the researcher used multiple research instruments to obtain data. Data obtained from interviews, structured interviews, observation checklist and FGDs were used to corroborate the findings from questionnaires regarding the role of ICTs and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. The researcher used two coders to analyse transcript data to allow determination of inter-coder agreement. The researcher also asked peers to review the data in order to ascertain its reliability.

### **3.12 Data analysis**

Mixed methods data analysis and interpretation approaches were used for merging quantitative and qualitative data. Data from FGDs, interviews, observation field notes and key informant interviews were thematically coded in order to establish commonalities and emerging key ideas for interpretation purposes. These involved giving textural and structural description of how the participants experienced the use of ICTs in peacebuilding in the region. According to Creswell (2007), textural description entails a description of what participants in the study experienced with the phenomenon while structural description shows how the experience happened. This did not take place in one discrete stage after all the data had been collected but was an iterative continuous cycle (Daymon & Holloway, 2011). The researcher first coded one participant's data before progressing to the next. This was developed at the beginning and during data collection thus allowing for modification of questions and methods to be used in the next stage. It also

involved examining the content of each interview and triangulating it with other sources of data like field notes from observation and document analysis. Data was transcribed through open and axial coding. Open coding involves unitizing the data while axial coding deals with attempting to understand a phenomenon within its context (Baxter & Babbie, 2003; Creswell, 2007). The major part of analysis was done after data collection where field notes and transcribed interviews were analysed. The NVivo 2.0 computer software programme was used in analysing the qualitative data. The software assisted the researcher assign code labels on text segments and in searching through the database for all text segments with same code label.

Quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires was organised, edited and coded according to the stated research objectives. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to determine patterns of frequency and findings presented in form of frequency tables, percentages, graphs and charts for interpretation (Baxter & Babbie, 2003). The Pearson correlation test was used to determine the relationship between ICTs and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region.

The data was analysed and presented according to the objectives of the study as shown in Table 3.5.

**Table 3.5 Data analysis Table**

No.	Objectives
i	Identify the actors involved in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region.
ii	Determine the ICT tools used by the actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region.
iii	Examine the application of ICTs to the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region.
iv	Assess the effectiveness of ICTs in peacebuilding in the region
v	Investigate the challenges of incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region.

**Source: Researcher**

### **3.13 Ethical considerations**

The researcher sought permission to undertake research from the National Council of Science Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) through the university administration. Thereafter, the researcher used the permit from NACOSTI to obtain permission from the County Commissioners and County Directors of Education for permission to conduct research in Bungoma and Trans Nzoia Counties. The Permission letters were circulated to the Sub-County Commissioners and Sub-County Education Directors from within the study area (Appendices 12, 13, 14, 15 & 16). Participation in the research was also voluntary for the participants. During the interviews, the researcher struck rapport with the respondents (although this did not influence data collection) and assured them that the information collected would be treated confidentially and would be purely used for academic purposes. Due to the sensitivity of the

information especially as regards security, the researcher did not use the actual names of some of the respondents. The respondents were not expected to indicate their names in the questionnaire, interviews or FGD hence ensuring anonymity of the respondents. In this regard, the researcher prepared structured interviews with introductory information on confidentiality that were served to the respondents. The research assistants and photographers were inducted on ethical considerations during the research period. For this reason, they were not allowed to take photographs without the respondents' permission.

## CHAPTER FOUR


### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

#### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents results and discussion of the findings on the actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region, the ICT tools used in peacebuilding, application of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region, the effectiveness of ICTs in peacebuilding and the challenges facing the incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region.

#### 4.1.1 Actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region

In order to determine if there were any peacebuilding efforts in the region, the researcher sought the views of the respondents. The findings are as shown in Figure 4.1.



**Figure 4.1 Peacebuilding efforts in the region**

**Source: Field Data**



Figure 4.1 indicates the respondents were aware of the peacebuilding efforts in the region. The majority of the residents (92.8%) agreed that there were peacebuilding efforts in the region. This could be attributed to the normalcy that had been restored in the region by the military. However, 5.3 per cent of the respondents indicated that there were no peacebuilding efforts in the region while 1.9 per cent of the respondents were unaware of such efforts. The results indicate that various stakeholders had made efforts at rebuilding the region following the aftermath of the 2006-2008 conflict.

The findings from the questionnaires and the Key informant interviews (KII) reveal that the conflict in the region attracted the attention of both state and non-state actors in the bid to offer humanitarian assistance and resolve the conflict. The state agents included the government officials and institutions which played different roles during and after the conflict. The non-state actors included the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith-based organisations (FBOs), community-based organisations (CBOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) which embarked on structural and social peacebuilding in the region. Studies such as Simiyu (2008) and HRW (2008) further support the above findings. However, after the March 2008 military intervention that put an end to physical violence, more non-state actors embarked on post-conflict peacebuilding in order to restore the relations between the warring Sabaot clans which had been severed by the conflict. The peace efforts also aimed at strengthening the economic and social development in the region following nearly five years of war that had weakened the economy of the region.

#### **4.1.2 The state actors and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

Information obtained from questionnaires, the KII and FGDs revealed that state actors were involved in the peacebuilding process in the region by deploying security forces and resolving

the contentious Chepyuk III. According to Abdulrahman & Tar (2008) state, including state officials and institutions, play very important roles in conflict management. These roles include mediator, peacekeeper or as participant. Throughout 2007, the state deployed police, the General Service Unit (GSU), Anti-Stock Theft, Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) and Administration Police (AP) to conduct operations against the SLDF (HRW, 2008, KNCHR (2008). The findings from document analysis further reveal that the state enforced curfews in the region in a bid to curb insecurity.

As indicated in the literature review section, the state deployed the military in March 2008 to help quell the violence in the region. Although the move stopped the violence, it left the residents traumatised as a result of the human rights abuses meted out on them. The findings from KII indicate that the peace was externally imposed by the military and the community did not own it since it was not involved. Although the government had initiated a disarmament exercise in the region by offering amnesty to residents who possessed illegal guns, the findings from the KII and FGDs revealed that many arms were still in the hands of civilians. It also emerged that the military never disarmed the residents and as a result, many arms were still in the hands of the civilians at the time this study was conducted. A further investigation revealed that the porous Kenya-Uganda border facilitated the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SLAWs). It was feared that this could pose a threat to security in future.

#### **4.1.3 State efforts at resolving the land issue in Mt Elgon region**

According to Abdulrahman and Tar (2008), the state can participate in a conflict in two major ways. The first way is participation by default. This occurs when the government creates policies or decisions that exacerbate conflict. Secondly, the state can participate by design. Participation by design can occur when the state, particularly its agencies take sides in the

conflict and use state resources to support a particular faction. Information obtained from the KII and FGDs indicate that the land issue in Mt Elgon region started with the advent of white settlers in the 1920s as indicated in the discussions in chapters one and two. According to Mang'esoy (2011), the original name of the people living around Mt Elgon was *Koony. Elgon*, which was the name of the region and the mountain was corruption of the name 'Koony' by the Maasai. Mang'esoy further adds that the prefix [el-] is a characteristic language lexical feature for nominalisation by the Maasai. Hence, the *Koony* were sometimes referred to as *Elgon Maasai, El-Goony* or *El-Gonyi* by the colonialists. The findings from KII revealed that the name Sabaot, which stands for '*Sabiiny, Book and Others*', was coined by the pre-independence politicians of Elgon to unite the community for political bargains when Kenya was surging towards independence. However, it emerged that from 1970s, the politicians used the name to divide the community along clans. As a result, the name Sabaot came to be detested by the community. For instance, the *Ndorobo* did not regard themselves as part of the Sabaot group. For this reason, they hardly participated in public forums involving all the Sabaot clans. The same division was witnessed in the 2006-2008 conflict between the *Ndorobo (Mosop)* and the *Soy* (who were mainly from the *Book* and *Soomek* clans) over the Chepyuk settlement scheme. A similar division was brewing up among the *Ndorobo* since a group calling themselves *Ogieks* wanted to lay a claim to their indigenous land in Chepkitale and displace the *Ndorobo*. As a result, they formed an NGO known as Chepkitale Indigenous People Development Project in an effort to agitate for their rights. However, according to a Mosop elder:

'There are no Ogieks in Mt Elgon but *Ndorobos*. The elites among the *Ndorobo* are using NGOs to get funds claiming injustice from the *Ndorobo* and the *Soy*... It may trigger conflict in Chepkitale,' (Richard Naibei, Personal communication, October 20, 2014).

This sentiment affirms the division among the *Ndorobo* where one group claiming to be the *Ogiek* was threatening to evict *Ndorobo* from Chepkitale. The sentiment was echoed by a

number of respondents including the council of elders who argued that in Kenya, the *Ogieks* could only be found in the Mau forest. The implication was that the division was driven by selfishness and a desire to create division among the *Mosop/Ndorobo* clan.

The findings from KII also indicate that the territory of the Sabaot extended to Kapenguria and Cherangany Hills which was shared with Uasin Gishu Maasai along *Kiborom* (Nzoia) River. The Sabaot also bordered the Kitosh in North Kavirondo before they were displaced to Uganda, Tanzania, Trans Mara and Mt Elgon forest which was part of North Kavirondo Native Reserve, to pave way for the white settlers in Trans Nzoia. Information from KII reveals that since the Sabaot were pastoralists, they could not provide labour to the white settlers. Consequently, the British imported labour from the Bagisu in Uganda who ended up settling in Trans Nzoia. But prior to this, the Bagisu from Bugisu region in Uganda had encroached the southern part of the Elgonyi territory in the modern Bungoma (*Bong'om*) and Malakisi (*Morkis*) which further displaced the *Bong'omeek* clan of the Sabaot from their territory (Chepkurui, Butaki & Tirot, 2011; Kipsisey, 2010). It can thus be concluded that the current land scarcity in the region was contributed by the colonialists and the immigrant native tribes. The demand for land compensation for the Sabaot community was presented by the Sabaot headman *Arap Kasis* in the 1932 Kenya Land Commission, popularly known as the Carter Land Commission (Akiwumi Report, 1999: 209). The findings indicate that although the commission had recommended that the Sabaot be given 80,000 acres of land and £ 2,000 each in compensation for lost livestock and homes, the recommendation was not implemented.

The community suffered further injustice at independence when the government bought the farms through state corporations such as the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) and Settlement Fund Trustee and sold to individuals who were not necessarily residents in the area

(TJRC, 2013: 90-93; Akiwumi Report, 1999: 209). This explains how the Bukusu, Teso, Turkana, Kisii, Kikuyu and other tribes came to be settled in Trans Nzoia among the Sabaot. In addition, the 'White Highlands' in Trans Nzoia were converted into settlement schemes for the Luhya community by both Kenyatta and Moi governments subjecting the Sabaot to further injustice. This explains the genesis of landlessness and frequent conflicts between the Sabaot and the non-indigenous tribes in the region; more so between the Sabaot and the Bukusu and lately between the Pokot and the *Cherang'any/Sengwer* tribes over the ownership of Trans Nzoia. In an effort to address the land issue in the then Mt Elgon District, the government created Chepyuk settlement scheme in 1971 to resettle the *Mosop (Ndorobo)* residing in Chepkitale moorland. But since they were not used to farming, they invited their *Soy* counterparts to till the land for them while some sold their land to the *Soy* and returned to Chepkitale (Simiyu, 2008, Kamoet, 2011). This became the genesis of the conflicts between the two clans.

The findings from KII and document analysis indicate that the land issue in Mt Elgon erupted when the government initiated a fresh resettlement known as Chepyuk phase I spearheaded by the then Western Provincial Commissioner Mr Francis Lekoolool in 1989. It emerged that Lekoolool never involved the local leaders in the resettlement exercise but instead conducted a fresh survey and relocated the people from their original farms. The findings also indicate that Lekoolool did not accept the 20 acres per family allocation suggested by the local leaders including the then member of parliament Hon. Wilberforce Kisiero who stated that:

'The 20 acre allocation per family which I had suggested to Lekoolool would have catered for the sons in the family and resolved the land issue once and for all since there was enough land for the families at Chepyuk by then. However, I was locked out of the allocation exercise by the then President Daniel Moi and the Western Provincial Commissioner's (PC's) office,' (Kisiero, personal communication, September 30, 2014).

The exercise led to dissatisfaction from the beneficiaries since the land allocation was done on an unequal basis as those who had large tracts of land ended up losing their land since each family was given 5 acres of land without consideration of the number of sons one had in the family. This is due to the cultural aspect of the Sabaot community where land is passed on to sons from generation to generation through inheritance. This led to another conflict and subsequent creation of Chepyuk II. Phase II again was marred by corruption and the worst was phase III since brokers colluded with the surveyors to be given land. After the 2005 vetting exercise for phase III, those who were not successful put claim on their original allotment letters that had been cancelled. This led to the formation of SLDF by members of the *Soy* clan who faced eminent relocation from Chepyuk.

The findings from KII indicate that non-involvement of local leaders in resolving land issues was prevalent in the region. For instance, Honourable Kisiero was barred from representing the community in the National Land Commission on Historical Land Injustices Task force (HLIT). This was allegedly due to his integrity allegations by Father Gabriel Dolan of the Coast-based *Haki Yetu Forum* who linked him to the 1991/1992 ethnic clashes in Mt Elgon region as mentioned in Akiwumi Commission and Ndung'u land reports (Ayiecha, 2014: 22). It was also indicated that radio, particularly *Radio Citizen's* morning talk show '*Yaliyotendeka*' (what transpired) by Waweru Mburu, further implicated Kisiero in the ethnic clashes as mentioned in the two commission reports. Thus, he was subsequently replaced with Pastor Peter Chemaswet in 2014. The act was viewed by the community members as a way of denying them justice to their claim of the land in Trans Nzoia since Kisiero was one of the most knowledgeable leaders from the region as far as the Sabaot historical land injustices were concerned. The findings further indicated that the new appointee was not in a position to represent the community given that the community members in many occasions barred him from attending meetings convened

by the HLIT held in the region. This further casts doubt to the realisation of justice for the community as far as the land issues were concerned.

The findings from key informants indicate that in an effort to address the land conflict in Chepyuk III, a task force team was appointed by the government and headed by the DCC Cheptais to resettle phase III beneficiaries. The first task force was formed in 2009 chaired by Mr Joseph Kaguthi. The mandate of the task force was to verify the beneficiaries of Chepyuk III. The vetting exercise was done using local leaders who came up with two lists of people to be resettled. The first list was of the 1,732 beneficiaries who had been vetted to be resettled in Chepyuk III in 2005. The second list was of 352 beneficiaries who had been left out in the 2005 vetting exercise. Unfortunately, the chairman (Joseph Kaguthi) took up another job before completing the exercise. This led to the formation of another task force to complete the resettlement exercise.

The second task force was presided over by the late Professor George Saitoti who appointed Mr Samuel Ouko in 2010 to chair the resettlement exercise. There were two terms of reference for the task force. The first one was to vet and resettle the 1,732 and 352 beneficiaries of the Chepyuk III. Secondly, the task force was given a mandate to come up with a proposal of how the beneficiaries would be resettled. The task force came up with three recommendations. The first recommendation was for people to be resettled where they were evicted from. However, there was a challenge since the land had been reverted to forest and needed to be degazetted for settlement. The second recommendation which stated that the beneficiaries should be bought for land elsewhere was unanimously accepted. In 2010, the then MP of Mt Elgon Honourable Fred Kapondi who was in charge of security in the parliament took up the matter and got an approval for degazettement which enabled the government to resettle 1,732 households in Chepyuk III

on 2.5 acres each. The government also set aside Ksh 180 million which was used to buy 780 acres land in Saboti Division in Trans Nzoia County for the remaining 352 beneficiaries. It emerged that the former list which had been rejected in 2005 leading to the formation of the SLDF was used to resettle the 1,732 beneficiaries out of 7,000 applicants. However, since the plots were not enough, the remaining 352 families were resettled in Saboti Division in Trans Nzoia County on 2.5 acres each.

As a way of promoting peaceful coexistence between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo*, the list of the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* beneficiaries was mixed in the balloting. According to the leaders in the region, the land issue had been addressed once and for all. However, the findings from FGDs indicated that the exercise was again marred with corruption since some government officials who were not residents of Mt Elgon ended up getting 20 acres of land each, while the residents got 2.5 acres each. As a result, the unsuccessful applicants in the 2010 resettlement exercise in Chepyuk had started putting claims to their original allotment letters which had been cancelled in 2005. It was feared that the move was likely to cause tension between the previous owners and the new beneficiaries. Moreover, it was also alleged that the DCC of Cheptais Sub-County Mr Omar Hajj was authorising illegal allocation of land in Trans Nzoia thus causing tensions and complaints from the public. The study found out that a number of beneficiaries of Chepyuk III from the *Mosop* clan had already sold their plots to their *Soy* counterparts and gone back to Chepyuk II. It was feared that the move would cause unnecessary tension in the region between the new owners and the previous beneficiaries since only Chepyuk I had been degazetted for settlement.

Findings from KII indicate that the resettlement exercise in Tran Nzoia faced some challenges. In the first place, the group from Cheptais who were mainly from the *Soy* clan had been



terrorizing farmers by taking provocative actions like planting on other people's plots. Secondly, the beneficiaries of the Saboti land in Trans Nzoia County were selling their land and later returning to take it away from the new owners while some sold their plots and returned to Chepyuk arguing that the plots they were given were not as productive as the ones at Chepyuk. A similar problem was being experienced in Trans Nzoia County where families evicted from Teldet forest (initially victims of Kiboroa and Romromwet forest evictions in Trans Nzoia County) were given Ksh. 400,000 each by the government in 2014 to buy land elsewhere. However, findings from KII and FGDs show that some beneficiaries had not bought land with the money. It was feared that the act was likely to result in landlessness and further conflict in the region.

Results from the KII further revealed that the *shamba*<sup>ix</sup> system or agro-forestry in Chesokwo farm in Mt Elgon forest could trigger conflict in future as the beneficiaries insisted on remaining in the farms yet the government wanted to evict the people from the same forest. Similar problems were being experienced in other areas like Kaberwa in Mt Elgon Sub-County and Teldet forest in Trans Nzoia County where the government had initiated the *shamba* system.

It emerged from the KII that a major threat to the resettlement process was land succession. The study found out that residents did not want to follow legal procedures in handling land issues but instead resorted to violence. Secondly, the Chepyuk settlement scheme, Kitalale settlement scheme and the Saboti land where the evictees were allocated in Trans Nzoia County had no title deeds. A study by Kamoet (2011) shows that the forms of land ownership in Chepyuk settlement scheme are allotment letters, ballot papers and letters of agreement. Simiyu (2008) further notes that lack of title deeds posed security threats to land ownership in the region since

the residents often ended up being victims of government manipulations and evictions. It further emerged from the KII that other areas in the region like Nomorio area in Kapsokwony Division and Chepkitale in Kopsiro Division were trust lands while Chepyuk phase II and III was still regarded as government forest since it had not been degazetted for settlement. This further raised land security concerns since the residents did not have legal ownership to land. In addition, boundary disputes were still a source of conflicts in Chepyuk since most farms did not have fences or clear boundaries (see appendix 17). As a result, community members often encroached on other people's farms especially during planting seasons.

#### **4.1.4 Other peacebuilding efforts by state actors**

The study further established that in an effort to improve security and curb possible recruitment of SLDF and other militia groups in the region, the government established a military barracks at *Bananteega* in Kopsiro Division. Findings from KII and questionnaires reveal that the community viewed the act as a commitment by the government to protect the lives of all residents in the region. Further efforts to demilitarise the region included the issuance of amnesty to community members to surrender illegal arms to the government and lifting up of the dawn to dusk curfew which had been imposed in the region in 2006.

Findings from KII and questionnaires show that the government initiated the formation of District Peace Development Committee (DPCs) in Mt Elgon region in 2008. It was the second DPC to be formed in the county after the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) which was formed in 1995. The formation of WPDC was in response to the inter-clan conflicts in North Eastern Kenya which had degenerated into confrontations between women in market places whereby the Wajir Women Association for Peace was formed to address the root causes of the confrontations. The WPDC played a great role in the April 2001 Modogashe-Garissa

Declaration that sought an end to the frequent conflicts among pastoralists in North-Eastern Kenya over pasture and water (Juma, 2000; Adan & Pkalya, 2006; Chopra, 2008). It was observed that District peace committees also played an important role in dispute resolutions. They were largely modeled and/or anchored on the respective communities' traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and approaches drawn from the council of elders. The strength of peace committees was due to their perceived inclusiveness by drawing representation from community (elders, women, and youths), civil society groups, community organisations and the government. However, some communities had completely refused to open up to peace committees due to the inclusion of women, youth, political leaders, government officials and other "alien" characters (mostly NGO workers from other regions) hence making the realisation of peace elusive in such scenarios (Adan & Pkalya, 2006). Related to DPCs are peace caravans which were formed in 2009 to mitigate the conflicts caused by perennial cattle raids among the Pokot, Samburu and Turkana. A study by Okumu (2013) shows that peace caravans had increased inter-community dialogue and understanding. Examples of these peace caravans are the Laikipia peace caravan, Kapedo peace caravan and Samburu North peace caravan. Okumu further argues that positive media coverage played a great role in winning the educated young people to support peacebuilding in Northwestern Kenya.

The District Peace Committee worked (DPC) with the National Steering Committee on peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, to carry out peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts in the country. Findings from KII show that the NSC through the support of ACT Kenya organised the Mt Elgon leaders' consultative meeting in February 2011 which culminated in the formation of the DPCs in Cheptais and Mt Elgon Sub-Counties in Bungoma County in a bid to promote peace between the two Sabaot clans (*Soy* and *Ndorobo*). Capacity building was done for the DPC from

locational to district level where they were taught conflict analysis and mapping, how to give information and how to participate in dialogue and mediation. As a result, the DPC, which had 30 members (15 from Cheptais Sub-County and 15 from Mt Elgon Sub-County) had made a number of achievements including holding dialogue meetings with elders, youth, women and people with disabilities in the affected areas that is Cheptais, Kapsokwony, Kopsiro and Chepyuk through radio, mobile phones and chiefs' *barazas*<sup>x</sup>. They also spearheaded the first ever intra-clan dialogue meeting in the community that culminated in the Mabanga Peace Accord in 2011.

The findings further indicate that the government also formed the DPC in Trans Nzoia West Sub-County which was made up of 21 members due to the cosmopolitan nature of the county. The main role of the DPC was to issue early warning in collaboration with the police. For instance, as a result of insecurity in Kakunga in Mt Elgon Sub-County, a joint cross-border meeting was held with the county commissioners from Trans Nzoia and Bungoma and the DPC Mt Elgon to end the conflict and a police post was established early 2012 to beef up the security. Similarly, an administration police (AP) camp was constructed at Nomorio market and a police post established at Kipyeto in Nomorio location, Kapsokwony Division in 2013, to improve security. The setting up of security centres had given confidence to the residents and facilitated information sharing with the government.

Findings from NSC (2009) and Oloo (2012) show that the KNDR agreement which was established to investigate the 2007 PEV embarked on peacebuilding processes which included among others, the formation of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The TJRC was tasked with the mandate of investigating the root causes of the violence was the TJRC. Findings from KII and FGDs show that the TJRC hearings in Mt Elgon documented

historical land injustices and human rights abuses. The findings however, indicate that the commission did not fully address the injustice in Mt Elgon since the perpetrators of the conflict were not arrested. In addition, it emerged that the commission only met the leaders and failed to get the views of the community members at the grassroots level who suffered in the hands of the SLDF and the KDF. The fact that the commission report has not been implemented by the government may make correction of historical injustices in Mt Elgon futile.

#### **4.1.5 The Non-state actors and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

As indicated early on, the conflict in Mt Elgon region attracted both state and non-state actors in a bid to offer humanitarian assistance to the residents and put an end to the conflict. Findings from KII and questionnaires show that the non-state actors included the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith-based organisations (FBOs), community-based organisations (CBOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs). Among them were the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS), Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), PACT Kenya, USAID, the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKHRW), Peace Tree Network (PTN), Amani Peoples Theatre (APT), Mount Elgon Peace initiative (MEPI), the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK), Mount Elgon Residents' Association (MERA), *Maendeleo ya Wanawake organisation* (MYWO), *Vijana Umoja Pamoja* 'Youth together in unity' (VUP), Rural Women Peace Link (RWPL) and the Sabaot Council of Elders among others.

The findings show that the non-state actors participated in reconciliation of the sabaot clans by fostering community dialogues, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the ex-militia into the community, offering psychosocial counselling to the violence victims, addressing human rights abuses and promotion of inter-community dialogue and rebuilding of the economy of the region.

#### **4.1.6 Reconciliation of the Sabaot clans**

The findings from key informants (KII) and questionnaires indicate that there were efforts to reconcile the Sabaot clans in the aftermath of the 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict. This was spearheaded by various actors including the state, NGOs, civil society organisations, faith-based organisations and the community members who incorporated ICTs in their peacebuilding efforts. The approach supports the conflict transformation theory which posits that through appropriate interventions, grievances can be addressed and broken relationships restored. The findings from KII indicate that the Sabaot community recognised the importance of the council of elders in resolving disputes in the community. From the findings, the structure of the Sabaot council of elders is divided into three categories. The first one is the Sabaot council of elders which is made up of 30 members from each of the six clans bringing the total to 180 members. The County Commissioners and the Deputy County Commissioners were also included in the Sabaot council of elders as co-opted members. The second category was the Sabaot supreme council of elders (SSCE) which was made up of seven members per clan and a clergyman bringing the total to 43 members. The last category was the executive council of elders which comprised two members per clan and a clergyman bringing the total to 13 members.

Findings from KII show that the composition of the elders was drawn from both men and women as a way of promoting inclusivity. However, the requirement for inclusion in the council of elders for women was 50 years and above. The findings from KII show that there were only three women in the Sabaot council of elders. The choice of the 50 years of age for women was adopted since it was deemed to be past childbearing age given that the Sabaot community was purely patriarchal. When there were crucial matters to be discussed, mobile phones acted as an effective means of reaching members of the Sabaot council of elders. Mobile phones were also effective when summoning elders for meetings and seminars. In reaction to the conflict in the

region, the council of elders identified the main actors in the conflict as the *Someek* and *Book* from the *Soy* clan who were fighting the *Ndorobo* over the Chepyuk settlement scheme. As a result, some leaders from the various clans were chosen to address the problem since the actors were coming from the identified clans. Several meetings were held in Kitale with the aim of getting a donor to finance the elders in their peacebuilding process. In 2009, the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK) which was already in the community trying to assist the indigenous people (*the Ndorobo*) partnered with the council of elders to start intra-community dialogues for each clan in an effort to address the root causes of the conflict. Under the Peace and Rights Programme (PRP), the FPFK, embarked on addressing the root causes of the intra-ethnic conflict in the region.

In the intra-clan dialogues, the participants from each clan were urged to adopt openness, honesty and truth-telling to identify its problems and come up with solutions. Thereafter, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) from each clan was written. This was followed by inter-clan dialogue meetings for all the six clans which were held from September to December 2010 at Kipsong Training Centre (KTC) and Kitale Ministry Training Institute (KMTI) at Kitale. The inter-clan dialogues provided a forum for the various clans to voice their accusations and issues against the other clans.

It is important to note that the conflict in the region was initially between the *Soy* (drawn from the *Book* and *Someek* clans) and *Ndorobo* clans over the Chepyuk settlement scheme. However, as the conflict progressed, the militia groups started targeting other Sabaot clans in the region for different reasons other than land. In the dialogue meetings between the *Ndorobo* and *Book*, it emerged that the reasons for hatred included political rivalry, oath-taking, killings, insults and abuse of power by leaders, cattle rustling, inequality in the Constituency Development Fund

(CDF) and bursary allocation, controversies on the tenure of Chepyuk trust land and forced assimilation for the *Ndorobo* to adopt the name Sabaot. The dialogue meetings were followed by confessions and apology from the *Book* for the atrocities committed to the *Ndorobo*. The *Book* also acknowledged that Chepyuk settlement scheme belonged to the *Ndorobo* but requested to be considered in the resettlement exercise of Chepyuk III. In addition, those who had fled from Chepyuk I and II were asked to return to the farms and assured of security by the elders. Thereafter, a joint committee of the *Book* and *Ndorobo* elders was formed to address the sensitive issues affecting their clans.

The findings further show that the issues of contention between the *Ndorobo* and *Someek* were prejudice, corrupt land allocation, insults and abuse of power by leaders, boundary disputes especially ancestral habitats (caves and areas of setting beehives since both are hunters/gatherers), cattle rustling and poaching. This was followed by forgiveness from both sides and a formation of a joint committee tasked with the responsibility of addressing early indicators of conflict. The same committee was also tasked to come up with strategies to promote coexistence between the two clans.

Findings from documentary analysis of the minutes of the FPFK dialogue meetings show that one of the issues of contention between the *Koony* and *Ndorobo* against the *Sabiiny* was cattle rustling that led to loss of property and lives for both clans. Other issues included possession of illegal firearms and arms trade across the Kenya-Uganda border and discrimination in land allocation especially in Kitalale settlement scheme in Trans Nzoia County. The outcry of the *Sabiiny* was that they were discriminated in employment opportunities and land allocation for they were often regarded as Ugandan citizens. Since both clans had relatives across territorial borders, a joint committee to pursue the issue of cattle rustling was formed to work closely with



both governments. The same committee was given the task of counselling the youth in both countries on possession of illegal arms and the need to surrender them to their governments.

The cause of hatred between the *Koony* and *Someek* was conflict on leadership. Both groups felt that they had not supported each other in electing political leaders as shown in the domination of political leadership of the region by the *Book*. It further emerged that the *Koony* had never recognised the *Someek* as a dialect but regarded it as part of the *Book*. In the dialogue meeting, it was further found that the main cause of hatred for the *Someek* by all the five clans was because of their participation in the SLDF conflict. As a result a joint committee of elders was formed to initiate ways of integrating and promoting peaceful coexistence between the two clans.

The issue of contention between the *Koony* and *Book* was political domination of parliamentary position in Mt Elgon Constituency by the *Book*. It emerged that all MPs from Mt Elgon Constituency (Daniel Moss, Wilberforce Kisiero, Fred Kapondi and John Serut) hailed from the *Book* clan. The *Koony* had only had one MP (Joseph Kimkung) who represented the region between 1997 and 2002. As a result, the *Koony* felt discriminated and marginalised by the *Book* in resource allocation and employment. It is also important to note that the politicians who coined the name Sabaot hailed from the *Book* and *Sabiiny* dialects. As a result, the *Koony* felt non-recognition of their dialect as an entity. The *Koony* further abhorred the SLDF saga which had tainted the name *Sabaot*. In the dialogue meeting, the elders apologised to each other for the past differences and declared a new beginning for Mt Elgon and Cheptais districts. The elders also resolved to apprehend individuals and leaders who perpetuated prejudice, greed and other retrogressive behaviour and to work together to promote unity in the region.

Lastly, the long standing disagreement between the *Someek* and *Book* was the non-recognition of the *Someek* as a dialect by the *Book*. The *Someek* were masters of the caves and bee-keeping and had for long resisted being assimilated to the *Book* clan. It also emerged that the *Someek* were hated for their involvement in the SLDF saga. Information obtained from KII show that most of the SLDF were from the *Someek* clan, hence their hatred by all the five clans. Following the dialogue meeting, the *Someek* apologised to the *Book* for the atrocities they committed. In addition, Mr Evans Sichaka, the spokesperson of the cultural leader who administered oaths to the youth (Mr Jason *arap* Psongoywo) apologised to the *Book* and the entire Sabaot community for the role played by the *Laibon's*<sup>xi</sup> family in the conflict. Councillor Nathan Wasama also apologised on behalf of his clan and the family of Wycliffe Matwakei for the atrocities they committed to the community. This was a great step in promoting healing in the community. The *Book* and *Someek* elders resolved to forgive each other and initiate joint peace projects in the region as a way of promoting unity. They also called for a forum with the *Laibons* to harmonise their relationships and to cleanse the youth who participated in the conflict. The elders further resolved to promote democracy to ensure that all political aspirants got support from the entire Sabaot community. This was because of past representations in administrative positions which had led to feelings of animosity and marginalisation since the *Book* had dominated the leadership in Mt Elgon constituency.

The findings further show that in April 2011, the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya sponsored a general peace conference for the Sabaot people at Mabanga Agricultural Training Centre (ATC) in Bungoma. Again, ICTs contributed to dissemination of the Mabanga peace conference. The findings indicate that information was disseminated through local radio stations (*West FM, Imani Radio* and *Radio Mambo*), mobile phones and emails (for the delegates) and public *barazas*. The meeting was attended by over 300 elders, community members and

professionals from Mt Elgon region. All issues affecting the Sabaot clans were identified and discussed so that one document known as the Mabanga Peace Accord was written. The meeting was attended by chairman of the Kalenjin Council of Elders (*Miot*) Major John Seii. Another MOU was signed by the chairmen of all the six clans. A study by Okumu (2013), shows that similar measures exist between the Samburu and Pokot where a peace pact known as *Damu Nyekundu Peace Agreement* was signed in June 2010 in Laikipa North District against the backdrop of Kanampiu massacre. The peace agreement put in place punitive measures in terms of fines and penalties for perpetrators from both communities.

The findings from KII show that reconciliation between the ex-SLDF and the community was done by various groups. The Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK) conducted rehabilitation sessions for the SLDF where 617 young men were reached. There were one-on-one counselling and group counselling sessions for the ex-SLDF. Thereafter, they were given life skills training and funds to start income generation activities. The wives of the ex-militia were also counselled for three days to accept their husbands and forgive them. The programme was successful since some of the ex-SLDF combatants were working with the chiefs to stop cattle rustling while some had gone back to school.

The findings from KII show that cleansing ceremonies were conducted in the region in an effort to reconcile the warring clans. Information about the cleansing ceremonies was disseminated on local radio stations and mobile phones. For example, FPFK sponsored cleansing of the soil which had been polluted by blood. The cleansing ceremonies were held in every location in Cheptais Sub-County. In Cheptais Division, the ceremony was held at Chepkube and Kipsis in Cheptais location and Tuikut in Sasur location. In Chesikaki division, the cleansing ceremony was held at Chemondi. The ceremonies, presided over by Sabaot *Laibons* entailed elaborate

rituals where a ram was slaughtered and blood sprinkled on the ground to appease the ancestors and to cleanse the soil for the blood spilt during the conflict. The cleansing ceremony which saw more than 200 youth cleansed was attended by the DC of the former Mt Elgon District Mr Omar Sallat, the then MP Fred Kapondi, elders and elderly women in Cheptais division. In the ceremony, the youth confessed their crimes and openly apologised for the same. The cleansing ceremonies were highlighted in the local radio stations, TV and the social media platforms.

In Kopsiro Division however, the cleansing was not conducted since the elders from the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans differed over the venue of the ceremony. It emerged that the group from the *Soy* had proposed Terem River, while the *Ndorobo* elders wanted it to be conducted in an open area in Chepyuk settlement scheme where the conflict started. *Laibons* from the *Ndorobo* clan rejected Terem River for two reasons. First, it was believed that the river was a boundary between the two clans and that the act would have further created a division between them. Secondly, it was believed that the river divided Mt Elgon into two equal parts and that holding the ceremony at the venue would have created further division among the Sabaot clans since *Ndorobo*, *Koony* and *Sabiiny* were on the eastern side of the divide with the *Someek* and *Book* on the western side. This was in agreement with the findings by Kamoet (2007) and Mwasserah (2007) who argue that the conflict in the region was mostly attributed to clan rivalry by the *Laibons* from the two clans. Although the cleansing ceremony failed to take place, prayers were held by religious leaders to cleanse the soil and the youth who participated in the conflict. The cleansing ceremonies were highlighted by radio, TV, social media, and the print media which showed a new beginning for the region (Obare, 2011). Following the cleansing ceremony, the government created Cheptais District in 2011 embracing the *Soy* and the *Ndorobo* who coexist in the same district. However, interviews with key informants indicate that the cleansing of the youth was never completed since some SLDF members were in jail when the cleansing took

place. This can be a challenge to peace since the perpetrators of the violence are bound to feel rejection from the community members.

The findings from KII and questionnaires indicate that various efforts were made by various actors to restore the relationship between the ex-SLDF and the residents. The Sabaot Council of Elders for instance, conducted a reconciliation meeting on 12 August, 2011 at Kaptama between the community and the ex-combatants who had been rehabilitated by the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK). In the event attended by sub-county administrators from the region, community leaders, traditional and religious leaders and the community members, there were peace songs, testimonies and peace messages from the elders and political leaders. The ex-combatants used the forum to publicly apologise for the atrocities committed and seek for forgiveness and acceptance from the community. In the meeting 36 guns were surrendered by *Ndorobo* youth while the *Soy* surrendered 11 guns bringing the total of the guns surrendered to 47. The findings indicate that the event was highlighted in the local and national radio stations, print media, TV and the social media. Similarly, during the FPFK disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) effort in the region, 9 arms were surrendered while the affected youths were counselled. This was their first step towards being reintegrated into the community. A study by Okumu (2013), shows that peace caravans have been instrumental in peacebuilding among the pastoralist communities in Northwest Kenya. In the meetings, the *morans* are invited and ceremonial rituals such as slaughter of animals and joint eating of food take place. The findings further show that the professionals use the forum to appeal to the youth to emulate positive inter-community relations.

It was further indicated that the Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) conducted a demobilisation exercise of the militia groups among the youth in the region. JPC also bought

clothes for the youth in order to reintegrate them in the society since they had stayed in the forest for long during military intervention in March 2008 when most of the SLDF members fled to the forest to avoid arrest. The findings indicate that the military sealed off the entire region making it difficult for the youth to access food and other social amenities in the villages. As a result, most of them did not have extra clothes or food. This was one of the reasons most SLDF members surrendered to the military.

#### **4.1.7 Intercommunity dialogues**

The formation of the Sabaot Council of Elders set the stage for building reconciliation and peace with the neighbouring communities in the region especially the Bukusu due to the cyclic conflicts between the two communities.

The findings from KII show that the previous efforts at reconciling the two tribes were unsuccessful. According to Chepkurui et.al. (2011), the first conflict which occurred in 1880 culminated in a peace pact between the two tribes. The ratification of the accord was graced by Chief Nabongo Mumia of the Wangi. But in 1890, the truce was broken when the Kitosh and Bagisu from Uganda attacked the Elgonyi fort at Ngachi near Cheptais in North Malakisi location. This was followed by another attack of Chetambe fort that was jointly owned by the Maasai and the Tachoni who sought the assistance of the Sabaot. However, the British intervened and shot many Tachoni, Maasai and Sabaot. The findings from KII show that the British supported the Bukusu because of their collaboration under Chief Nabongo Mumia of the Wangi. A study by Kamoet (2011) also supports the findings adding that Chief Nabongo Mumia influenced the appointment of Chief Murunga of the Wangi to be in charge of the Sabaot territory. The latter introduced forced taxation and labour among the Sabaot community forcing them to migrate further up the slopes of Mt Elgon.

A study by Kipsisey (2010) further emphasises that the encroachment of the Bantu into the Sabaot territory led to resentment and out-migration of the Sabaot to avoid absorption of their language as had happened to part of their dialects (the *Tachoni and Bongo'm*) which were absorbed to Bukusu and *Terik* which was absorbed to Nandi. Similarly, the British's replacement of Sabaot chiefs and headmen with Bukususes created discontent among the Sabaot. For example in 1898, Chief Kimengich of the *Bong'om* and Malakisi territory was replaced with Chief Murunga wa Shiundu from the Wanga community. The change of leadership led to annexation of the *Book* and *Bong'omeek* territories such that nearly 95% of their territory such as Kibabii, *Bong'om* (Bungoma), Sanga'alo, Chebukwa, Chang'ara, Malakisi among others was now occupied by Bukusu (Chepkurui, et al. 2011) The findings from KII and FGDs further indicate that the Bukusu domination of leadership among the Sabaot coupled with their encroachment on Sabaot territories were the source of conflicts between the two tribes for generations.

Findings from the KII show that the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya in collaboration with the Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), Kitale branch sponsored the first intercommunity dialogue. Following the consultative dialogue among the elders from the Sabaot and Bukusu communities which was held at KTC in Kitale, a list of 14 issues affecting the two communities were identified and committees for each of the issues formed for the Bukusu and the Sabaot. These issues included, among others, land and displacement, prejudice and leadership. The Teso also joined in citing non-involvement in the dialogue and discrimination although they were always affected whenever the Sabaot and Bukusu fought. For instance, during the 1991/1992 ethnic clashes between the Sabaot and Bukusu, the Teso residing in Sabaot and Bukusu territories were also displaced and had their property destroyed (Juma, 2000).

A second meeting called Mabanga inter-community dialogue meeting was held at Mabanga ATC On 17<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> October, 2011 bringing together the Bukusu, Teso and Sabaot communities. Again, radio, TV and mobile phones (calls and SMSs) provided forums for disseminating information about the meeting. The various issues of contention which emerged were documented in the Mabanga Peace Accord which was signed on 21 October, 2011 in the presence of the then Vice President Honourable Kalonzo Musyoka. These included, among others, land and displacement where it was resolved that those who had been forcibly displaced should be assisted to repossess their land.

The findings from KII however, indicated that despite restoration of peace in the region, there was fear among the minorities especially the Bukusu who had not returned to their land after the 1992 clashes. This had been in spite of the several meetings held by the elders from the Sabaot community urging them to return to their farms. It also emerged that there were pending cases in the land board of Bukusus who had not collected their title deeds to return to their land due to fear. However, the Bukusu cited injustice from Sabaot who forced them to sell land at throw-away prices (Ksh 5000 per acre) during the 1991/1992 ethnic clashes and also during the 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict in the region. The findings further indicated that the Bukusus were still traumatised by the 2007 incident where 11 family members from the Bukusu community were hacked to death and dumped in a pit latrine by the SLDF in Kapkurongo in Emia Location, Kopsiro Division. However, the perpetrators of the incident who were well known to the Bukusu had been released from jail thus sending more fear among the Bukusu. Thus, most of the Bukusu people had not returned to their farms but lived in the shopping centres and would only go to their farms during the day.



Information from document analysis further show that prejudice among communities in the two counties also emerged as a source of conflict and hatred in the region. It was manifest in the use of derogatory terms and lack of respect for other community's cultural practices and traditions. The Teso, for instance, cited discrimination due to their culture of not circumcising their male members, as a result, the Bukusu and the Sabaot often forced them to adopt their cultural practice of circumcision. In addition, the Teso cultural practice of exhuming the dead was frowned upon by both the Bukusu and the Sabaot. However, in the dialogue meetings, it was agreed that all parties should respect each other's cultural practices for peaceful coexistence in the region.

Findings from KII revealed evidence of distortion of Sabaot place names and names of rivers which have been replaced by Bukusu names. For instance *Toror* in Uganda was changed to *Tororo*. Other place names in Kenya which had witnessed similar changes include *Kimelil* (Kimilili), *Kamokoywo* (Kamukuywa), *Kapsirisyo* (Sirisia), *Bong'om* (Bungoma), *Morkis* (Malakisi), *Kapchonge* (Khachonge), *Kamorondio* (Sikhendu) *Bokol* (Bokoli), River *Kimosong* (Sabwani river), River *Rorok* (Lwakhakha) and *Kiborom* (Nzoia) River. Although it would have been expected that the over-dominance of Bukusu in the region could pose a threat to the Sabaot language, Kipsisey (2010) argues that this has not been the case in Mt Elgon because frequent tribal clashes between the Sabaot and Bukusu disrupt and widen the harmonious interactions leading to language shift. The study further adds that the existing animosity between the two communities makes language use and transfer very difficult since those fluent in both languages do not speak for fear of being considered traitors.

Similar inter-community dialogues were conducted in Trans Nzoia County by the Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) after the 2007 PEV to promote peaceful coexistence between the

Kikuyu, Luhya, Sabaot and the Kamba. The findings from KII indicate that as a result of the dialogue meetings, peaceful coexistence among the Sabaot and Kikuyu especially through intermarriage had been realised in Gituamba in Trans Nzoia County. Similarly, the findings show that in a post-reconstruction bid in the region, the JPC constructed houses for the victims of the 2007 PEV from the Luhya community in *Khalaha*, *Cheptumbei* and *Kokwo* in Trans Nzoia West Sub-County in Trans Nzoia County. The poorest among the Sabaot community were also included in the house construction project in order to promote coexistence between the two communities.

Another major contentious issue in the region was leadership and inequitable distribution of resources. This was manifest in the culture of political domination with the minority tribes being left out of leadership positions. For instance, the Sabaot community was the minority community in both Bungoma and Trans Nzoia counties with the Bukusu dominating all the leadership positions. Thus to promote a culture of inclusivity and political domination, the Mabanga agreement included a negotiated democracy to ensure equitable distribution of all political positions in Bungoma and Trans Nzoia counties. The conference thus recommended the formation of the Sabaot Supreme Council of Elders (SSCE) and Mount Elgon Professionals Association MEPA as a technical arm of the SSCE to implement the various accords (PRP, 2012).

The publication of a strategic plan for Mt Elgon region in December 2012 was a milestone in the activities of the SSCE. The development of a conflict sensitive Development Strategic Plan for Mt Elgon region directly emanated from Resolution 3 of the Mabanga Peace Accord which among other things resolved that the elders and residents of Mt Elgon had the responsibility of

promoting good leadership in the region. The strategic plan provided the SSCE a framework and document for guiding development in the region and holding the leadership accountable.

The findings from KII indicate that prior to the 2013 general elections, the elders from all the Sabaot clans approached Honourable Moses Wetangula on the sharing of administrative seats. Following the meeting, an agreement was reached and signed over the following elective county positions. The senatorial seat in Trans Nzoia was given to the Sabaot (Mr Henry Ole Ndiema). The findings from KII indicate that although the *Miot* (Kalenjin Council of Elders) had proposed their own senator, the ten sub tribes of the Kalenjin agreed to relinquish the senatorial seat to the Sabaot while the position for the Deputy Governor was given to the Nandi (Dr Stanley Kenei Tarus). It was also agreed that the Bukusu take the gubernatorial seat which eventually went to Mr Patrick S. Khaemba. Thus, peace prevailed in Trans Nzoia County as a result of negotiated democracy by the elders.

Findings from KII indicate that in Bungoma County, it was agreed that the Sabaot were to be running mates for the gubernatorial seats. The elders identified Mr Hillary Chongwony for the position of Deputy Governor under New FORD Kenya ticket. These followed several meetings held in Kimilili involving four elders, four clergymen, two women representatives, two professional and the supreme chairman to elect a Sabaot representative. There were three candidates for the same position: Mrs Jeniffer Mbatiany, Mr Hillary Chongwony and Mr John Barkach Mukholi. In order to get a candidate for the post of Deputy Governor, the elders subjected the three candidates to an interview. Hillary Chongwony scored the highest (92%). Jeniffer Mbatiany was however, disadvantaged due to a lack of a university degree. Another criterion in the selection was fluency in the vernacular. Again, Hillary scored the highest

compared to the two other candidates. Thus Mr Hillary Chongwony became the running mate for Mr Kenneth Lusaka.

The elders further negotiated for other public office positions in the two counties. In Bungoma County for instance, the elders negotiated for two positions of the County Executive Committee (CEC) although the Sabaot were given one position only. The positions of the chairman of public service board and the advisor to the ministry of gender were also given to the Sabaot community. The elders further negotiated for the positions of the Chief Officers where the Sabaot were given two positions and the Teso one position although the elders had negotiated for four positions for Sabaot community. These negotiations were replicated in Trans Nzoia County where the Sabaot community got two positions for Chief Officers and two for the ward administrators. It however emerged that the Mabanga Peace Accord had not been fully implemented to the satisfaction of the Sabaot community. For instance, although the elders had negotiated that the positions of Deputy Director of Education, Women Representative, the gubernatorial positions and 40 per cent of the elective positions in Bungoma County to be given to the Sabaot community, it was never implemented. However, all communities agreed to respect the decisions made by the elders in order to promote peace and development in the county.

The findings from KII indicate that although there was equitable distribution of leadership positions in the region, the concentration of development projects in the former Bungoma District could bring conflicts due to inequitable sharing of resources in the region. For example, there was poor infrastructure in Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-Counties in comparison to other Sub-Counties in Bungoma County (Appendix 19).

It also emerged that the quest by the Bukusu for equitable sharing of leadership positions in Mt Elgon Constituency was not agreed upon. Findings from KII show that the Sabaot community viewed the move as a strategy for Bukusu domination in all the elective and appointive leadership positions in the county to the exclusion of the Sabaot. Therefore, the elders resolved that the elective positions in Mt Elgon Constituency were to be left to the Sabaot community. It can thus be concluded that through the negotiated democracy, equitable sharing of leadership positions had partially been realised thus promoting peace in the region.

The findings from KII also indicate that peace had prevailed in the region because of other initiatives of the elders and the District Peace Committee. For example, the elders conducted seminars on radio, and public forums especially during the 2013 pre-election period to sensitise people on Mabanga Peace Agreement and negotiated leadership positions. They also visited hotspot areas and held peace meetings especially in the Mt Elgon region. In addition, they organised leadership and governance seminars to sensitise the residents on the devolved system of government and promoted interactions with other communities through support from donors. For example, the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD) took the Sabaot elders to Tana River for an exchange tour mission and learning. On 13 October 2014 there was an exchange visit by elders from Tana River who wanted to learn about the Mt Elgon conflict and how it was resolved so that they could also use the same strategy to resolve their conflicts.

#### **4.1.8 Psychosocial healing**

Kenya's history has been characterised by gross violations of human rights (Kagwanja, Barasa & Nyukuri, 2009; Oyugi, 2002). Studies show that most of these violations were committed during the period 1963-2002 when KANU was in rule. As a result, many individuals had social

and psychological wounds that needed to be addressed (Kagwanja, Barasa & Nyukuri, 2009; TJRC, 2014). The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) embarked on truth-telling sessions from victims and perpetrators of the 2007/2008 PEV in the hope that it would bring reconciliation in the country. The commission visited various regions in the country including Mt Elgon in a bid to address historical injustices. Trauma-healing sessions were conducted by various organisations to enable the victims to talk about the injustices meted on them during the violence. The findings from KII however, indicated that the commission only met the leaders and gave little hearing to the victims and perpetrators at the grassroots level thus failing to provide healing to the victims of the violence. In addition, it was feared that the TJRC could not offer healing to the community since the government had not implemented the report.

Information from KII indicates that Action Aid Kenya donated Ksh 460,000 to *Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation* (MYWO) to promote psychosocial counselling among widows and women in general. 40 women across the region were trained to counsel the affected women and rape victims and refer the ones who had been infected with HIV/AIDS for Comprehensive Care Centre (CCC) in Eldoret. For example, two girls from Kibuk Girls High School in Kapsokwony Division were gang-raped by the SLDF in 2006 on their way to Kopsiro. When they got pregnant they were chased from their homes for fear of delivering *Janjaweed babies* (the local name for the SLDF was *Janjaweed*). These and other traumatised girls were taken out of Mt Elgon to Eldoret for counselling and they went back to school after delivery. Some however, refused to be associated with the Sabaot even after counselling and resorted to changing the identity due to the trauma they had undergone. Similarly, reports from (KNCHR, 2008) confirm that both the security forces and the SLDF molested girls and women sexually. The counselling sessions which were conducted in every location in Mt Elgon and Cheptais sub-counties were meant to restore unity through forgiveness for the wrongs committed by the SLDF.

The findings from KII also indicate that Action Aid Kenya sponsored women for exposure trips to Garissa, Nakuru and Siaya to learn from other communities which had little land or living in arid areas. The trip to Garissa was however meant for cultural exchange since the two communities were grappling with similar challenges which included FGM, early marriages and high school dropout rates among girls. The media played a great role in highlighting a case where 18 girls from Chepkurkur Primary School in Kopsiro Division were forced to drop out of school because of pregnancy. A study by Mung'ou and Kwanya (2014) found that one of the causes of the problem was lack of shelter where the girls were forced to seek alternative shelter in the neighbourhood as they could not share shelter with their parents. The second cause was lack of education on reproductive health among teenagers in schools which exposed them to greater risks of pregnancy apart contracting sexually transmitted infections. Lastly, lack of responsibility among parents also contributed to the menace since most of the parents could not provide the basic needs to the girls thus making them seek alternative means of survival from men who exploited them sexually. Through the counselling sessions, the women learnt to promote education especially of the girl-child since most of them were affected by the conflict and forced into early marriages and prostitution in neighbouring towns like Kimilili, Chwele, Kitale and Bungoma. The trips also provided an opportunity for them to learn new farming techniques like fish farming in Siaya and horticulture in Hidayia in Garissa.

A study by Mutere (2007) confirms that the conflict had negative impacts on the girls as most of them were forced to drop out of school either due to lack of fees or to become breadwinners for their families. Information from KII shows that Peace Tree Network (PTN) in conjunction with Femienza International conducted counselling sessions for girls. The programme mainly targeted school dropouts and rape victims. This was in agreement with a study by Achoka (2007) who found that the closure of schools in Mt Elgon during the conflict forced many

students to drop out of school. This endangered the girl-child in particular due to exposure to gender-related abuses such as early pregnancies, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), rape and early marriage. The findings indicate that by 2014, 9 girls from Cheptais Sub-County were given bursaries and had gone back to school and some to polytechnics. The PTN also had school visitations for the orphans and affected girls which were meant to provide psychological healing as a result of the SLDF menace and the military intervention which exposed many girls in the region to sexual abuse.

To reach women who faced sexual and gender-based violence (GBV), PTN in conjunction with Women and Development against Distress in Africa (WADADIA) used rape victims to counsel women experiencing similar challenges. WADADIA had a gynaecological centre in Eldoret where rape victims were referred for free treatment and counselling in order to overcome fear and trauma. Thereafter, they were given a chance to go back to school or polytechnics. The findings indicate that the programme was successful since 11 women from Cheptais Sub-County had been treated and were already in polytechnics.

Findings from KII show that the District Peace Committees in partnership with the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK) conducted counselling and reconciliation of the ex-SLDF with the community in Cheptais and Kopsiro. This was followed by dialogues with the youth, widows, women and elders. Thereafter, dialogue meetings for the entire community were held at International Christian Ministry (ICM) in Kopsiro, while others were held at KTC in Kitale and Mabanga ATC in Bungoma. In 2011, the widows from both *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans were taken to Malaba to share their experiences. The session further promoted healing since it provided a forum for interpersonal communication between the victims and the perpetrators of the conflict.



Findings from KII indicate that other groups in the region had also had exposure tours. For example, the District Peace Committee members (DPCs) were sponsored to visit other communities in Kenya such as the *Kaya* in the coast and the Nandi elders in Eldoret in order to have joint sharing on peace and conflict resolutions. It emerged that they learnt the importance of involving the whole community in the peace process. Findings from key informants further indicate that the DPC conducted a one-on-one disarmament exercise in Kopsiro where more than 10 guns were surrendered to the DCC of Cheptais. Studies such as Kibirige, et al. (2013) also confirm that exposure tours provided a cross-cultural exchange for communities along the Kenya/Uganda border to share their experiences. For instance, in 2011, Mount Elgon Residents Association (MERA) organised a peace tour for the ex-SLDF members, SLDF widows, and leaders to Lira, Uganda to witness the effects of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) war on civilians. The Mount Elgon Peace Initiative (MEPI) funded a cultural exchange tour in 2013 where youth from Chepyuk were sponsored to visit other youth in Musese in Bungoma. The exchange tours were meant to provide exposure and learning experiences from other communities to dissuade the youth from participating in conflicts.

The findings further indicate that the Amani community-based organisation initiated *Amani shule* (peace at school) initiative which involved counselling teachers on the need to foster moral values among learners. Similarly, the ‘Lest We Forget’ campaigns initiated by the *Chanuka* in 2011 were instrumental in fostering peace among school going children in the region. This could be interpreted as one way of dissuading the youth from engaging in crime or joining militia groups. Inter-school debates and drama were also organised and awards given to winning students. The topics for debate were mainly on conflict and peace. These were meant to provide an open forum where the students would discuss alternative solutions to conflicts. The findings are in agreement with study findings of Ndiku (2011) who argues that teachers

participate in conflict transformation through various processes like mainstreaming peace education, teaching life-skills in schools and engaging in other extra- curricular activities.

Tree planting in schools was initiated by District Peace Committees and other community-based organisations in some schools in the region like Cheptais Secondary School and Bukonoi Primary School, among others, since most schools were either vandalized during the conflict or had victims and/or perpetrators of the conflict. The planting of trees events in schools was one way of soil conservation. This is in agreement with studies by Omuterema (2007) and Oteng'i (2007) who noted that the movement of forest guards to clash-hit areas in the region led to deforestation by residents hence leading to destruction of the natural ecosystem of the Mt Elgon forest. The exercise further provided a forum for community leaders counsel students and preach peace to them. This can be interpreted as a grassroots initiative for reaching out to all community members with peace messages.

#### **4.1.9 Economic empowerment of the residents**

The findings from documentary sources such as HRW (2011), Kamoet (2011) and Simiyu (2008) indicate that the conflict weakened the economy of the region. This was because during the conflict, many farms were left fallow as thousands of the residents were displaced and property vandalised by the SLDF and the military. Consequently, there were efforts by both the state and non-state actors to economically rebuild the region. The US Embassy, for instance, donated Ksh 150 million in 2010 to be used in peacebuilding in Kopsiro Division. The money was channeled through NGOs like PACT/ACT Kenya which encouraged the formation of self-help groups from Kopsiro Divison. Among the community-based organisations that benefitted from the funding were Kopsiro IDP Network and Mount Elgon Peace Initiative (MEPI) which were formed in 2011. MEPI received Ksh 3 million which was used for economic

empowerment of 20 youth and women groups composed of the *Soy*, *Ndorobo* and minority tribes in Kopsiro. In 2013, for instance, it hired 20 acres of land in Kopsiro Division for the youth groups to plant maize. After harvest, the produce was sold and the proceeds shared amongst the group members. The project, which was still ongoing at the time of thesis writing, empowered the youth socially and economically by promoting self-reliance among them (see appendix 24 for details of maize harvest in Kopsiro).

The findings from KII further found out that MEPI participated in the formation of peace clubs in six secondary schools and six primary schools in Kopsiro Division. The peace club members participated in planting vegetables in schools which were later sold and the proceeds shared among the students and the teachers. MEPI also initiated poultry projects for students and teachers which acted as IGAs for the schools. The projects were extended to other ethnic communities in Kapkateny, Namwela and Mukuyuni in Bungoma West Sub-County where the groups received Ksh 20,000 for agricultural projects. This was in partnership with Syngenta Company which gave the groups money maker irrigation pumps to be used during dry seasons. Interviews with key informants indicate that the groups were given money at low interest rates of 5 per cent which was thereafter returned to MEPI to be used as a revolving fund. The projects were meant to empower the youth socially, economically and to encourage cohesion and integration among all the communities. In addition, Kiswahili was used as a medium of communication as a way of promoting unity among the group members given that they were drawn from different ethnic communities.

The findings from KII and document analysis further indicate that as a result of the stigmatisation that the widows of the ex-SLDF were facing in the society, Widows Network was formed in 2012. The group was funded by Action Aid Kenya to start IGAs like poultry

keeping and small-scale farming. Membership to the group provided a forum for the widows to share their challenges, interact with other members of the community and to fend for their children. Similarly, Chesikak Widows Network was formed in 2013 to accommodate all widows in Cheptais Division. The widows are engaged in small scale business, merry-go round (table banking) and farming. In January 2014, they were given one incubator per ward by Consolidate Crown Company to start poultry projects in an effort to empower them economically.

The findings further show that the government, through the Ministry of Sports, Culture and Arts, gave 30 sheep to the *Keewaap Ngē'tuny* women group; each woman in the group got two sheep. After the sheep had bred, the firstlings were given to the Deputy County Commissioner (DCC) to fund other groups. The sheep were meant to promote self-reliance among the women. Similarly, Kaimugul youth group was given five cows to be shared among three members on a rotational basis where one member would take care of the cow until it breeds then give it to another group member when the calf was old enough. The firstlings were again given to the DCC to fund other groups on a rational basis. The project was meant to promote self-reliance among the youth. The findings show that the programmes were successful in promoting self-reliance among the youth and women in Cheptais Sub-County.

Interviews with key informants indicate that the Kenya Red Cross Society had been supporting the community from 2008-2009 through relief distribution. Thereafter, it initiated cash transfer programme where women groups were given financial support to start IGA/projects since women were key supporters of households. The findings show that each group from Kopsiro and Cheptais was given Ksh. 20, 000. However, the programme did not run for long due to insufficient funds. In 2013, the Kenya Red Cross Society initiated cash for work programme

where the beneficiaries drawn from all the three communities in Mt Elgon and Cheptais Sub-Counties would get Ksh 300 per day for work. At the end of the project, the tools such as pangas, spades, wheelbarrows, *jembes* (hoes) and other farm implements remained with the community members as a way of supporting them directly in their farming activities in order to boost food production in the region. The beneficiaries were often identified through community participation in open forums. For example, after completion of feeder roads (mostly after 6 weeks), the participants would meet and discuss with the provincial administration on ways of distributing the tools amongst themselves. The findings indicate that the feeder roads were meant to facilitate access to market centres and encourage investment in the region apart from ensuring efficient service provision for the security agents in the region.

Interviews with key informants show that *Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation* (MYWO) in collaboration with Action Aid Kenya initiated women empowerment programmes for the IDPs in the region. For instance, it provided funds for life skills training, small scale farming and business opportunities for women. Through mobile phones and local radio stations, MYWO linked up women with financial institutions such as Faulu Kenya, Micro Finance, Kenya Women Enterprise Fund and the Poverty Eradication Fund. This enabled women in the region to start small-scale businesses and even buy plots as a way of improving their livelihood and promoting economic independence.

#### **4.1.10 Human rights**

Following the conflict in the region, the rights of the residents were violated by both the SLDF and the military (KNCHR, 2008; HRW, 2011). Interviews with key informants revealed that various organisations advocated for respect of human rights for the residents in the region. Among them were the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKHRW), Coalition for Peace

Africa (COPA), *Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation* (MYWO) and Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), among others.

The findings from KII further show that there had been no justice for the 1991/1992 tribal clash victims in Kenya. Thus there was advocacy for justice by various human rights groups. Similarly there had been no justice for human lives lost in Mt Elgon conflict as the perpetrators who had been convicted had been released from jail one by one. This indicates a lack of respect for human life due to impunity perpetrated in the country.

Findings from KII show that *Vijana Umoja Pamoja Foundation* (VUP) was formed in 2008 to advocate for social justice and transparency in governance among young people. The findings show that VUP, *Amani Peoples Theatre* and *Amani Community Based Organisation* had transformed the lives of many youth in the region through their well-crafted interventions through songs, theatrical performances and providing civic education to the community in order for them to access justice for the human rights abuses meted against them. Theatre advocacy during public forums helped the community address challenges facing them such as insecurity, crime, forced evictions and corruption. This was because the actors dramatized the problems and provided solutions to the issues they dealt with. Similarly, *The Magnet Theatre Group* from Mt Elgon Sub-County had monthly outreach meetings in market centres to sensitise the community on girl-child rights, youth-friendly health services (YFS) and conflicts through drama and songs. Justice and Peace Commission also adopted a similar approach where youth groups from Bungoma staged plays to public audiences in Mt Elgon on ways of restoring peace in the region.

The findings from KII further indicate that the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKHRW) had been advocating for justice for the people in Mt Elgon especially on the disappearances and inhuman treatment. The WKHRW had also been advocating for justice for the widows of the Mt Elgon conflict. According to the findings, 228 widows had legal problems due to lack of death certificates as, some, even at the time of data collection, had not accessed the bodies of their husbands in the mortuaries nor traced the bodies of their loved ones. The findings from the HRW (2008) also show that in order for the hospitals to release the body without a post mortem, the relatives were forced sign an affidavit stating that they would not lodge any claim against anyone. As a result, the widows could not send their children to school since they could not access their husbands' money in the banks. Lastly, they faced succession problems due to lack of land title deeds since the government had not issued title deeds for Chepyuk settlement scheme.


The findings from KII revealed that the major challenge facing the region was low literacy level which was partially contributed by overreliance on farming which often led to conflicts over the scarce land resource. Thus, there were efforts by various actors to promote the rights of the children to access education in the region. As a way of promoting the right of the children to access education, five new schools were founded in Chepkitale moorland in 2013 and given teaching and learning materials by the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya. These were *Laboot, Iyaa/Kapchepkelta, Tomoi, Kewoi and Toboo*. In 2014, *Toboo* Primary school registered 14 candidates for KCPE for the first time in its history. A study by Simiyu (2008) confirms that the only school in Chepkitale was Laboot Primary School which remained at class four for a very long time. As a result most of the *Ndorobo* often sought education from the lower regions. There were other pilot schools in Cheptais Sub-County targeting areas with low enrolment for girls. They included Kaptaboi, Kamarang, Chesiywo, Walanga, Bandaptai and

Burkwo. In September 2013, five classrooms were constructed in *Chepkurkur* Primary School in Kopsiro Division to promote education since this was one of the areas with highest school dropout rate. In the same year, a foundation for the girls' dormitory was laid by the Deputy County Commissioner for Cheptais Sub-County in conjunction with community leaders from the region. The dormitory was to act as a rescue centre for the girls who faced the challenges of early pregnancies and marriage.

Similarly, the Kenya Agriculture Reform Elgon United Managing Programmes for Youths in Agriculture (KAREU MPYA) community-based organisation installed solar panels in five boarding schools in Cheptais Sub-County to improve the performance in the education sector. Apart from promoting learning, the schools allow the community members to charge their phones for free in order to boost early warning mechanisms and information sharing among the residents and security agents. This was also meant to promote good relations between the schools and community members in order to avoid a repeat of the 2006-2008 conflict where most schools from the region were vandalized by the militia groups.

The researcher went further to find out whether the respondents had participated in the peacebuilding efforts in the region. The results are indicated in Figure 4.2.





**Figure 4.2 Respondents' participation in peacebuilding**


**Source: Field Data**

Table 4.2 indicates that the majority (66.3%) of the residents had participated in peacebuilding activities in the region. 31.8 per cent had not participated in peacebuilding while only 1.9 per cent were not aware of such initiatives. This implies that great efforts were put on restoring the social relations and rebuilding the collapsed economy following the 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict. It further implies that the residents had been involved in the peacebuilding process thus supporting the grassroots approach to peacebuilding.

The above findings show that both the state and non-state actors were involved in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region. These actors, who included the District Peace Committees, the Sabaot Supreme Council of Elders, the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya, Western Kenya Human Rights Watch, the Justice Peace and Commission and Mount Elgon Peace Initiative among others participated in resolving the contentious Chepyuk III, rebuilding the economy of the region, reconciliation of the Sabaot clans, promoting psychosocial healing, advocating for human rights and promoting inter-community dialogue.

### 4.2.1 ICT Tools used in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region

The researcher sought the respondents' views regarding the incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding. The findings are shown in Figure 4.3.




**Figure 4.3 Respondents' views on incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding**

**Source: Field Data**

Figure 4.3 indicates that most (83.6%) of the respondents were aware of the incorporation of ICTs in the peacebuilding efforts in the region. 13.6 per cent of the respondents indicated that there was no ICT use in peacebuilding efforts while 2.7 per cent of the respondents were not aware of the incorporation of ICTs in the peacebuilding efforts. The findings from KII and FGDs also indicate that ICTs like mobile phones, radios, television, Internet and social media platforms were incorporated in the peacebuilding efforts.

The researcher went further to find out the education levels of the participants so as to gauge their awareness of the various ICT tools. The results are indicated in Figure 4.4




**Figure 4.4 Education levels of the participants**

**Source: Field Data**

The findings in Figure 4.4 show indicate that 40.1 per cent of the participants had secondary education. 31.0 per cent had tertiary level of education, 13.3 per cent had primary education while only 15.6 per cent had University education. The findings indicate that most of the respondents who were literate were in the youth bracket. This implies that the elites and the youth in Mt Elgon region were avid users of ICTs especially the social media as will be discussed in the subsequent sections.

To find out the specific ICT tools which were incorporated in the peacebuilding efforts, the researcher sought the views of the respondents. The findings are shown in Figure 4.5.



**Figure 4.5 Frequency of ICT tools used in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**

Figure 4.5 shows the ICT tools used by the actors involved in peacebuilding. Radio was the most accessible ICT tool in the region (55.7%). The wide accessibility of the radio was due to its affordability and wider geographical coverage. It was followed by the mobile phone (26.5 %) which was accessible to most members of the community. The findings indicate that the SLDF exploited the mobile phones technology to advance their cause. For instance, the community members were required to buy mobile phones and airtime for the SLDF and to send ‘protection’ fees to the SLDF commanders through mobile money transaction (*M-pesa*). Failure to comply with the SLDF requirements was often met with prompt SLDF retaliation which often included losing an ear or execution (HRW, 2008; Kamoet, 2011, MSF, 2008). (See appendix 23 for details of one of the victims whose ear was chopped by the SLDF). Moreover, the SLDF used mobile phones and short message service (SMS) to issue death threats to the community members and especially to political sympathisers of the then MP, John Serut.

The respondents who indicated the use of TV in peacebuilding were 7.2 per cent implying that few residents could afford them. In regard to the social media platforms, Facebook was the leading platform (6.6 %) followed by twitter (2.9 %). Other ICT tools like satellite cameras, butterfly cameras, Skype, websites and satellite phones were not so popular among the residents and the actors involved in peacebuilding process. A study by Oloo (2012) confirms that ICTs were used in various peacebuilding initiatives in Kenya including the 2008 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement to engage the general public and make them part of the reconstruction process.

Information from KII confirmed the use of other ICT tools. The Kenya Red Cross (KRCS), for instance, had VHF radio calls used by the personnel and fitted in all their vehicles. The VHF radios are used by the drivers and KRCS personnel and line managers. It uses a coded language which cannot be deciphered by laymen. The findings from KII show that VHF radios were mainly used in Mt Elgon due to poor network coverage for mobile phones. Findings from KII indicated that VHF radios were also used by the police. There are two main types of radio calls: the first is the VHF which is used for short distances and mainly for internal communication. The second type is the high frequency (HF) radio which is used long distance communication. The findings indicated that the HF radios were mainly used for communication with the Regional Police Commander (RPC) at Kakamega police headquarters (HQs).

#### **4.2.2 Mobile phone usage in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

The findings from FGDs and KII indicated that mobile phones were the widely used ICT tool in the region by various and community members as an early warning mechanism and also for information sharing. For instance, the Free Pentecostal Fellowship in Kenya (FPFK) distributed Google-compliant phones to identified individuals in hotspot areas within the region. There


were identified individuals in every ward whose task was to monitor the levels of tension on a daily basis according to the indicators in the manual guide. In case of tension, the peace monitors relayed the information based on the tension level indicated in the manual via SMS. In the manual, for example, community polarisation was indicated by the code 2a. This means that the monitor would send a text message indicating 2a to the system analyst in the control room at Kitale who filters the information according to origin, codes it for content and cleans up the data to avoid duplication. The information was thereafter relayed to relevant authorities including the police, county commissioners in Bungoma and Trans Nzoia, county commanders and the Inspector General of Police for appropriate intervention. But if the tension level in the region reached level three which was characterised by human rights abuses, burning of houses, shifting populations among others, the Kenya Red Cross Society would be contacted to provide humanitarian assistance (see appendix 9).

The phones were distributed to the residents of Bungoma West, Mt Elgon, Cheptais and Bungoma East Sub-Counties in Bungoma County. In Bungoma County, Mt Elgon and Cheptais sub-counties received the highest number of mobile phones because of the intensity of the intra-ethnic conflict. Thus, a total of 50 mobile phones were distributed to 45 wards in these sub-counties. Similarly, Trans Nzoia County received 50 mobile phones whereby Kiminini, Cherangany, Kwanza, Endebess and Saboti sub-counties were identified as hotspot areas. In general, 25 wards in Trans Nzoia County benefitted from the project. A study by Owuor and Wisor (2014) also shows that the mobile network contributed to peaceful elections in Kenya in 2014. The study notes that Safaricom donated 50 million text messages to the civil society organisation *Sisi Ni Amani* (We are peace) that used these messages to target specific groups during the electoral period.

The findings from KII and questionnaires also show that the residents employed SMS and mobile phone technology in contacting security agent in times of distress. The findings further show that all the security agents like the Officers Commanding Police Division (OCPDs), the Deputy County Commissioners (DCCs), chiefs, District Peace Committee members (DPCs) and other stakeholders often gave their mobile numbers to community members in public forums. There were also hotline numbers for contacting these authorities. However, verification of information often had to be ascertained to curb on rumours.

### 4.2.3 Television stations with peace programmes for Mt Elgon region


The researcher was interested to know whether the respondents watched TV and if there were TV stations promoting peacebuilding in the region. The results are indicated in Figure 4.6.



**Figure 4. 6 Respondents’ views on watching TV programmes promoting peace**  
**Source: Field Data**

From Figure 4.6, results indicate that 31.8 per cent of the respondents interviewed watched TV promoting peace while 68.1 per cent respondents had not watched these programmes. The high frequency of those who did not watch peace programmes on TV could be due lack of TV sets among the residents due to unaffordability or lack of electricity. From field observation however, the researcher found out that electricity was slowly penetrating into the region due to the government initiative of installing electricity in all public primary schools. As a result, shopping centres and homes close to the main roads were beneficiaries of the rural electrification.

The researcher further sought the respondents' views regarding the TV stations promoting peace in the region. The findings are indicated in Figure 4.7.



**Figure 4.7 List of TV stations promoting peace in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**


The findings in Figure 4.7 indicate that *K24* (53.3 %) was the leading TV station promoting peace in the region and also the frequently watched TV station. As will be discussed later, the



findings from KII and FGDs show that *K24* has been highlighting peacebuilding programmes in its news bulletins. This was followed by *Kenya Television Network (KTN)* (26.5 %), *Nation Television (NTV)* (10.4 %), *Citizen* (5.3%) and *Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC)* which had (4.5%). Information from KII and FGDs indicate that the TV stations which have TV programmes for Mt Elgon region are *Imani TV (ITV)*, *NTV*, *K24*, and *Citizen TV*.

**4.2.4 Radio stations with peacebuilding programmes for Mt Elgon region**

Studies indicate that the use of traditional forms of communication for example radio, TV and newspapers have long served as sources of information to communities and organisations on the ground (Oloo, 2012). It was therefore necessary to find out whether radio was used in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. The results are indicated in Figure 4.8.



**Figure 4.8 Radio stations with peace programmes for Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**

Figure 4.8 shows that there were 7 radio stations with peace programmes for the region. *West FM* which broadcasts from Bungoma town was the most frequently listened to radio station


(55.4 %). This was followed by Radio Citizen (14.1%), *Biikaap Kōōrēēt* (BK) FM (translated as Sabaot People FM) which had (10.6%), *KBC Radio* (6.1 %), *Radio Jambo* (4.5 %) *Radio Mambo* (5.3 %) and *Sayare FM* (4.0). The KII indicate that the Sabaots in the diaspora founded the Sabaots International Development Organisation (SIDO) in 2010. In the same year, SIDO initiated an online radio station that broadcasts 24/7 through their website <http://www.sabaots.com>. In May 2013, SIDO News Network initiated a radio station available on 98.2 FM called *BK FM* which broadcast from Kapsokwony in Mt Elgon and Minnesota (USA). The broadcasts from Minnesota however, required the listeners to log into the SIDO websites or [www.bkfmradio.com](http://www.bkfmradio.com) and listen online. Other stations in the region were *Radio Mambo* which broadcasts from Webuye; *Radio Jambo* broadcasting from Nairobi; and *Sayare Radio* which broadcasts from Eldoret.

The findings from questionnaires and KII indicate that there were other radio stations promoting peace in the region as will be discussed in the subsequent sections. These included *Imani Media* in Kitale which has both radio (*Imani Radio*) and television (*Imani TV*) stations. Other radio stations promoting peace in the region were *Sabo Sema FM* and *Kalya FM* (translated as Peace FM) which cover Kitale, West Pokot, Turkana and parts of Samburu. *Nyota FM* broadcasting from Webuye and *Radio Maisha* (Nairobi) also highlighted and promoted peace in Mt Elgon region.

#### **4.2.5 Social media platforms promoting peace in Mt Elgon region**

As indicated in the literature review section, social media platforms were used to bring political transformations in Arab countries (Gujer, 2011; Nierkerk, Pillay & Maharaj, 2011; Camninos, 2013). ICTs were also instrumental in post conflict reconstruction since they encouraged inclusivity by promoting user generated content and citizen journalism. As indicated earlier on


in Table 4.4 the social media platforms promoting peace in the region were Facebook (6.6 % respondents) and Twitter (2.9 % respondents). The findings indicate that the respondents had not embraced Skype. The researcher went further to investigate whether the respondents had Facebook accounts. The results are indicated in Table 4.9



**Figure 4.9 Respondents views on whether they have Facebook accounts**

**Source: Field Data**

From Figure 4.9, 200 (53.1%) of the respondents had Facebook accounts while 177 (46.9%) did not have Facebook accounts. This implies that most respondents had embraced social media platforms as reflected in their membership to Facebook group accounts. The researcher went further to find out the Facebook groups promoting peace in the region. The findings are indicated in Figure 4.10.




**Figure 4.10 Facebook groups in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**

Figure 4.10 indicates that there were various Facebook groups in the region. The leading Facebook group in the region was *Sabaot Peoples Online* (68.4 %). The Facebook link was used by the Sabaots in the diaspora and in Kenya to keep in touch with the community members and spread peace among the Sabaot community in the region. This was followed by *Chepyuk Peoples Online* (27.3%). The findings from KII and FGDs indicate that the group was formed to build solidarity among Chepyuk residents who had been scattered by the conflict. The other groups were *Kapsokwony Peoples Online* (2.6%) and *Kaboywo People Online* (1.5%).

Findings from KII show that *Kaboywo People Online* and *Kapsokwony People Online* had the objective of updating residents on the latest news in the region. Results from the FGDs and KII indicated that there were other Facebook groups in the region which included *Bungoma County 411*, *Mount Elgon News Network*, *Sabaot Women Online*, *Sabaot People Forum* and *Sabaot County* (for Sabaots in Saboti, Endebess and Mt Elgon). However, the findings from FGDs and KII show that the Facebook groups were popular among the youth.

The researcher went further to find out the age brackets of the respondents in relation to the use of ICT tools. The findings regarding the age brackets of the respondents are shown in Figure 4.11.



**Figure 4.11 Age of respondents**


**Source: Field Data**

Figure 4.11 shows that the lowest age of the respondents was 18 years while 51 years and above was considered to be the highest. 28.7 per cent of the respondents were in the age bracket of 18-25 which was the second highest percentage. Those aged 26-30 formed the highest proportion of those interviewed (31.0 %). The second highest age bracket was 31-40 which formed 19.1 per cent of the respondents. The respondents aged between 41-50 and 51 years and above were 11.4 per cent and 9.8 per cent respectively. They formed 21.2 per cent of the total number of respondents. Age 18-40 was considered the youthful age bracket and formed 76.7 per cent of the total number of respondents. These were considered to be the most energetic and active members of the community especially in their quest for land and other resources in the region. In addition, they were also active users of social media platforms. The youthful bracket was also

prone to political manipulation by leaders in the region. It is worth noting that the majority of those who took up arms in protest to forceful eviction from Chepyuk III in the 2006-2008 conflict in the region were youth (Simiyu, 2008). Hence, their views are of great importance.

**4. 2.6 Twitter accounts promoting peace in Mt Elgon region**

The researcher wanted to further understand the social media platforms promoting peace in the region, the researcher sought the respondents’ views regarding twitter accounts. The results are indicated in Figure 4.12.




**Figure 4.12 Respondents with twitter accounts**

**Source: Field Data**

Figure 4.12 shows that most of Mt Elgon residents do not have twitter accounts. Only 34.2 per cent had twitter accounts in the region while a majority (65.8%) did not have twitter accounts. This implies that most of the respondents were either not aware of twitter or embraced its use.

The researcher went further to find out the trending twitter accounts in the region. These were the twitter accounts promoting peace in the region. The results are shown in Figure 4.13.



**Figure 4.13 Twitter accounts promoting peace in Mt Elgon**

**Source: Field Data**

Figure 4.13 shows the trending twitter accounts in the region. It emerged that the respondents had been following the trending twitter groups in the traditional media like the TV. *Mt Elgon Peace Tweets* was the leading twitter account promoting peace in the region (39.8 %) followed by *Our Citizens* (31.8%), *KTN* (15.2 %) and *K24* (13.3 %). The results further support the findings from KII and FGDs which show that the leading TV stations that highlighted peacebuilding in the region were *KTN* and *K24*.


**4.2.7 Websites and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

Studies indicate that following the 2007 PEV, the *Uwiano* (Cohesion) peace platform was established shortly before the 2010 referendum to monitor hate speech and violence and

implement swift action where the same was detected. The local peace committees used voice recorders and mobile phones to monitor and relay information to the National Commission for Integration and Cohesion (NCIC) website [[www.cohesion.or.ke](http://www.cohesion.or.ke)] (Oloo, 2012). The findings from KII indicate that the District Peace Committees in Elgon region forwarded crime indicators through mobile phones (voice recording and SMS) to the NCIC website for appropriate action. Thus ICTs acted as an early warning mechanism since violence could be prevented through timely response by the appropriate authorities. The findings show that when relaying the information, the individuals were required to provide the exact location of the incident. The NCIC usually demanded for verification of the incident before acting in order to curb rumour mongering and false information. Thus mobile phones were used for verification purposes.

The researcher sought the views of the respondents regarding the use of websites in promoting peace in the region. The findings are indicated in Figure 4.14.





**Figure 4.14 Websites promoting peace in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**

The findings in Figure 4.14 show that there was minimal use of websites in promoting peace in the region. 40.8 per cent of the respondents indicated that there were no websites promoting peacebuilding in the region. The website that led in promoting peace in the region was *Imani media* (14%). It was followed by Sabaot International Development Organisation (SIDO) and the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (12.7 %). The other websites were the Kenya Red Cross Society (8.2%) and the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (11.6%).

Findings from KII indicate that websites were mainly used by the NGOs and CBOs. For instance, SIDO website which gave rise to SIDO News Network website (<http://www.sabaots.com/>) in 2011 relayed current news updates about the Sabaot community globally. The findings further indicate that the website was popular among the youth and the elite due to their accessibility of the Internet.

The study found that the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKHRW) had a website for information sharing and documentation of human rights abuses with the human rights monitors at the ground level and international human rights organisations. Similarly, *Imani Media* had a website (*imaniradio.org*) for the residents to give their views during the healing process in the region. However, use of the website in *Imani Media* was stopped in 2011 due to junk mails which overwhelmed the web managers.

Findings from KII further show that the Kenya Red Cross Society website (*kenyaredcross.org* or *redcross.org.ke*) was used for providing news updates for the KRCS staff. The study found out that in KRCS, all communication from the ground to the top was done through email. Any rapid assessment on the ground was usually sent by email since it was fast. The information moved from the team leader, operations manager and the coordinating office. However, the community was unable to use the website due to lack of Internet. The community members would communicate with the KRCS using the volunteers on the ground who would relay the information to the branch offices using special mobile phones. The research also found that the KRCS Bungoma branch had a communication mast for radio call communication, satellite communication and Internet communication with other branches, staff and volunteers on the ground. The system was also effective in communicating with the staff and volunteers in the regions with poor network coverage like Chepkitala moorland. Amani People's Theatre (APT) in Mt Elgon also used its website for coordination with the head office in Nairobi. Similarly, Mount Elgon Residents Association (MERA) and Peace Tree Network (PTN) had websites for coordination and sharing of news amongst its members and the general public.

The findings presented above show that various ICT tools were employed in the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region. These tools included radio, mobile phones, social media platforms

(Facebook and Twitter), television, very high frequency and high frequency radios and the Internet. The findings also show local FM radio stations and mobile phones were the frequently used ICT tools.

#### **4.3.1 Application of ICTs to peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

The findings indicate that following the conflict that engulfed the region, peacebuilding initiatives were undertaken by different actors who employed ICTs in their reconstruction efforts. The study examined peacebuilding efforts at the economic, structural and social levels and the contribution of ICTs to these reconstruction efforts. The study found that ICTs were used in various peace processes in the region including resolving the contentious land issue in Chepyuk, reconciliation of the Sabaot clans, facilitation of intercommunity dialogue, forums for psychosocial counselling and platforms for economic empowerment and advocacy for human rights in the region. Hattotuwa (2004) argues that ICTs enable groups and individuals to produce and share information between and within sectors. This supports the conflict transformation theory which argues that peace can be initiated at any level by different actors utilising various ICTs. The section begins by discussing how ICTs were applied in various peace efforts in the region.

#### **4.3.2 Use of ICTs in resolving the land conflict in Mt Elgon region**

ICTs played a great role in highlighting the conflict in the region. The findings from questionnaires and KII show that radio and TV contributed greatly to airing the gravity of the conflict in the region thus prompting the government to act in March, 2008 by sending the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to quell the violence in the region. This was similar to the Cable News Network (CNN) effect which refers to the influence CNN and other forms of global

communication had on foreign policy making, notably in encouraging military intervention into Iraq (1991) and Somali (1992) conflicts (Cushion & Lewis 2010; McPhail 2010). This means that as a result of media coverage, governments could no longer sit and watch as the ordinary citizens suffer. During the military intervention, the government efforts to seal off the region to avoid the media from covering human rights abuses were unsuccessful as again the media and human rights organisations highlighted gross human violations by the military in the region. As a result of the coverage, the British government threatened to suspend training of the Kenya military in 2008 (Xan, 2008). The success of the military in quelling the violence was partially contributed by ICTs. For instance, mobile phones assisted the military to identify the Sabaoth Land Defence Force (SLDF) sponsors. This was enabled by Safaricom which tracked all the *M-pesa* transactions used by the SLDF members. In addition, Safaricom helped the military to locate the exact locations where the SLDF leaders especially Wycliffe Matwakei used to make calls from. Findings indicate that the SLDF leader was gunned down on 10<sup>th</sup> May, 2008 as he was making calls in a specific location in the forest. However, findings from KII and FGDs blamed *West FM* for fanning the conflict in the region by focusing on sensational news.

Information from KII further indicates that during the SLDF reign of terror, radio (particularly *West FM*) and TV (*KTN*, and *K24*) were used by the SLDF to air their views. Simiyu, (2008) further argues that the SLDF spokesperson and other SLDF top commanders were on different occasions interviewed by the reporters deep in the forest and would occasionally seek audience with the administration demanding them to address the land issue.

The findings from KII and questionnaires show that ICTs were used to reach the displaced populations. *West FM*, *Radio Mambo*, newspapers and mobile phones were used to disseminate information of the vetting exercise and the vetting dates to the residents. ICTs facilitated

community discussion on resolving land issues. Radio provided open discussion forums for the community members to air their views about the resettlement exercise conducted. For example, through open forum in the radio, it emerged that some community members were dissatisfied for being left out of the resettlement exercise citing corruption and biasness in the allocation exercise.

Interviews with key informants however, revealed that Kaimugul Sub-location in Chepyuk settlement scheme had successfully dealt with boundary disputes as a result of the efforts of a CBO known as *Keewaap Ng'ētuny* Women Group. In 2012, the group, in conjunction with PACT Kenya embarked on planting *siikoowēēt*<sup>xii</sup> seedlings for 49 families which had boundary disputes. The *siikoowēēt* was preferred since it was cheaper than buying barbed wire. The group also extended the seedlings to other community members outside their sub-location in order to avert future boundary conflicts. This was done in order to promote peaceful co-existence among all the beneficiaries. Interviews with key informants revealed that mobile phones facilitated information sharing among the women in the group as well as for mobilisation to attend weekly meetings. Thus, *Keewaap Ng'ētuny* Women Group had promoted peace among neighbours by resolving boundary conflicts. In this grassroots peace initiative, mobile phones and SMSs contributed to information sharing and mobilisation for meetings among villagers. The women often involved the chief, village elders and the entire village in resolving disputes and they also encouraged communal resolution to conflicts instead of litigation. As a result, all who had been displaced from Kaimugul location had gone back to their farms and reconstructed their homes. The women in the group also advised their sons to desist from criminal activities. This indicated that women acknowledged the role played by their sons in the conflict. It also shows the importance of grassroots initiative to peacebuilding.

Interviews with key informants further indicate that the District Peace Committees (DPCs) had been active in resolving land conflicts in Trans Nzoia County. In 2014, there was a conflict in Chepchoina farm between the Pokot and other settlers. The issue was addressed by the DPC, security officers, County Commissioners and the residents who ensured that all those with allotment letters had right to own and till the land. The security forces were deployed in the area to provide security to the farmers. Another source of conflict in Trans Nzoia was the boundaries and the importation of names by the settlers. For example, prior to the 2013 general elections, the Bukusu had proposed Nabiswa location in Kiminini ward to be taken to Saboti ward while the Sabaot wanted it to remain in Kiminini ward. The DPC negotiated with the County Commissioner and Deputy County Commissioner Trans Nzoia West to ensure that it remained in Kiminini ward. The move was interpreted as a strategy by the Bukusu to win all the ward positions in the 2013 general elections in Trans Nzoia County.

The research findings from KII indicate that ICTs were playing a great role in promoting peace in Trans Nzoia in an effort to avert land conflict among the various tribes claiming ownership to Trans Nzoia. *Sabo Sema Radio* and *Kalya FM* were used to disseminate peace messages to the Sabaot, Pokot and *Sengwer/Cherangany* tribes in Trans Nzoia County. The radio stations had programmes where different community leaders were invited to preach peace to their community members. The radio stations had also received support from well-wishers. For instance, The Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya donated Ksh. 247, 000 to *Kalya FM* to be used for promoting peace in the region.

The findings from KII indicated that Radio had played a great role in promoting peace in the region. The media especially *Radio Citizen* had repeatedly highlighted the Mt Elgon conflict and its effects in an effort to dissuade the residents from engaging in conflict. *Radio Citizen* also

used the forum to promote peace in other parts of the country experiencing similar conflicts. For example, it appealed to Tana River residents to visit Mt Elgon to learn conflict resolution mechanisms.

#### **4.3.3 ICTs and Reconciliation of the Sabaot clans**

The findings from KII and questionnaires show that ICTs, particularly radio, played a great role in disseminating the Mabanga peace agreement to the community members. Findings from KII show that the chairman of the Sabaot Supreme Council of Elders had a programme once a week in *West FM* to discuss issues in the Mabanga Peace Accord under the Peace Rights Programme (PRP) which was broadcast every Saturday from 7:30 pm to 8:30 pm. The PRP in Mt Elgon was meant to sensitise the people on peacebuilding and promote human and community rights. It was also meant to emphasise the need of consulting the council of elders on disputes as a way of promoting grassroots resolution to conflicts. Community leaders drawn from all the Sabaot dialects participated in the PRP in an effort to promote unity co-existence among the Sabaot clans. There were provisions for the community members to give their views through call-in sessions and SMS, thus promoting participatory and inclusive approach to peacebuilding. Studies such as NSC (2009) and Oloo (2012) confirm that most institutions involved in peacebuilding efforts in Kenya under the KNDR agreement had embraced ICTs. These included the parliament, the judiciary, civil society organisations, the TJRC, the National Commission for Integration and Cohesion and the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) among others. According to Oloo (2012), ICTs were used by citizens and actors involved in the reconstruction process for networking, advocacy and mobilisation both locally and globally.

Findings from KII further show that the topics for discussion under the Peace and Rights Programme aired in *West FM* included rights of individuals, rights of indigenous people and importance of peace. As a result, a professional body known as Mount Elgon Professionals Association (MEPA) was formed to enable the professionals from the region to talk to the community on the need to embrace peace. Similar presentations existed in *Radio Mambo*, *Imani Radio*, *Nyota FM* and *BK FM* with programmes being presented in the vernacular in order to target the community members at the grassroots level. For instance, *Radio Mambo* dedicated one hour for Sabaot peace programmes on weekly basis (Saturdays 5:00 pm-6: 00 pm). In *Imani Radio*, the peace programme, which was also aired once a week, was segmented into two; 40 minutes for discussion and 20 minutes for call-in sessions from the listeners. During the shows, the listeners gave their contributions through SMS and direct call-in sessions. Community-based organisations such as *Mount Elgon Residents Association* also disseminated Mabanga Peace Accord through their weekly newspaper, *The Link Newspaper*. Studies such as Kalathil et al. (2008) also reveal that radio programmes are useful for civic education programmes that address reconstruction and reconciliation issues. A section of the MERA offices where one of the FGDs were conducted is shown in appendix 18.

Social media platforms also contributed to the promotion of peace and reconciliation among the youth in the region. For example, findings from KII and questionnaires show that the *Sabaot Peoples Online* Facebook group, which was popular among the young, was used to promote unity in the community by facilitating information sharing. It also emerged that *Sabaot Peoples Online* acted as an early warning platform to the security agents since the hate speech and other security threats could be intercepted by the local security agents. The forum further acted as an agenda setter for the community to discuss social, political and cultural issues affecting them. Other Facebook groups in the region like *Chepyuk Peoples Online*, *Sabaot Peoples Forum*,



*Mount Elgon News Network, Sabaot County, Kapsokwony Peoples Online and Kaboywo Peoples online* were mainly used for information sharing and promotion of peace in the region. *The Sabaot Women Online* provided a forum for women in Mt Elgon region to share social issues concerning them. It emerged that men also used the forum to give their contributions especially on issues of culture affecting both men and women. This showed that there was communal responsibility in the community when it came to social issues.

Findings from KII revealed that other social media platforms like twitter were mainly used by the youth to follow the discussions in the mainstream media outlets. This meant that TV stations set the agenda for what would be discussed. For example, the community would give their views when the media highlighted issues on Mt Elgon. Hence, the trending twitter accounts were from the main TV stations watched by the community members. These were *KTN* and *K24* although *Mt Elgon Peace Tweets* and *Our Citizens* were the other trending twitter accounts used by the community members to promote peace in the region.

Findings from KII show that during the military intervention, the community leaders used radio especially *West FM, Imani Radio, Radio Mambo* and newspapers to appeal to the SLDF to surrender since the government had already issued an amnesty to those who had surrendered the arms. Consequently, the SLDF ringleaders were identified and taken to the local radio studios to appeal to the rest to surrender. Those who surrendered were given letters to prove that they had been cleared by the government. This was one of the ways of reintegrating them into the community as the letters were proof that they had been ‘cleaned up’. The approach was effective since some arms were surrendered to the government.

In 2005-2006, Justice and Peace Commission trained community paralegals (people trained to deal with legal issues) to reach out to the youth in Mt Elgon region. Three of the paralegals who

were from the Sabaot community reached out to the youth in the forest to accept the government amnesty to surrender guns. The information about amnesty was disseminated through radio, TV, newspapers, social platforms and public *barazas*. As a result, three AK rifles were surrendered to the Catholic Bishop at Kitale.

Prior to the 2013 general elections, the elders conducted civic education on devolved government systems through radio. The findings from KII show that civic education was mainly conducted in *West FM*, *Imani Radio*, *Nyota FM*, *BK FM* and *Radio Mambo*. The programmes were meant to augment the existing structures in the community. Thus radio encouraged community participation and open discussion in governance issues. The sub-county administrators used radio stations to sensitise community members on government programmes. For instance, the Deputy County Commissioner (DCC) of Cheptais Sub-County had a programme once a month in *Radio Mambo* to highlight security and peace issues in the sub-county. The Officers Commanding Police Divisions (OCPDs) in the five sub-counties had similar programmes in *West FM*, *Radio Mambo*, *Imani Radio* and *Nyota FM*. The *BK FM* radio station was, however, only used by the DCC and other community leaders from Mt Elgon Sub-County due to its limited coverage.

#### **4.3.4 ICTs and inter-community dialogues**

Findings from KII and questionnaires show that ICTs provided a forum for highlighting issues, mobilisation and information sharing among the residents in the region. The findings show that mobile phones (calls and SMSs) and radios were effective when summoning elders for meetings and seminars. The inauguration of Mr Reuben Butaki as the Sabaot Supreme Council of Elders chairman on 20 August, 2011 was highlighted by radio, TV, social media and mobile phones (SMS and calls).

During the intra-clan and inter-clan dialogues, mobile phones and radio (*Imani Radio*, *West FM* and *Radio Mambo*) were used to mobilise the elders to attend the dialogue meetings. Similarly, ICTs facilitated the dissemination of the Mabanga Peace Accord resolutions to the community members. For instance, *West FM* radio used the Peace and Rights Programmes to promote unity among the Sabaot, Bukusu and Teso communities. Elders from the respective tribes used the forum to promote unity and peaceful co-existence in the region. Community participation was encouraged through the call-in sessions and SMS from the listeners. The forum was also used to disseminate the Mabanga resolutions to the community. Other forums for dissemination of information were mobile phones (calls and SMSs), *PeaceRights Magazine* and public forums.

The study found out that ICTs contributed to peaceful coexistence of all communities in Trans Nzoia County. *Imani Radio*, *Kalya FM* and *Sabo Sema Radio* promoted peaceful coexistence in Trans Nzoia prior to the 2013 general election. There were live talk show programmes by different community leaders from all tribes who called upon the residents to uphold peace. *Imani TV (ITV)* had talk-show programmes aired by the political leaders and other government officials in order to address the animosity between the Sabaot, Luhya and other tribes residing in the region. This was as a result of the realisation that politics was the major contribution to Mt Elgon conflict (Simiyu, 2008). As a result of the peace messages in these platforms, the region a peaceful general election in 2013.

Findings from the KII show that ICTs facilitated the democratic negotiation in the region. Through ICTs, the community members were able to give their views regarding the administrative positions in the region. Through the Facebook group *Bungoma County 411*, information sharing and development issues were highlighted in the region. This encouraged

community participation since the forum was used as an agenda setter. Other social platforms in the region also provided forums for information sharing and community participation on leadership in the county governments. Similarly, radio stations like *West FM*, *Nyota FM*, *Radio Mambo*, *Imani Radio*, and *BK FM* provided forums for community participation in governance issues. The elders had also given out their mobile phone numbers to negotiators so that they could be contacted on different county issues.

Findings from KII and questionnaires indicate that the neighbouring communities also participated in restoring peace in the region. For example, the Teso Peace and Human Rights Development Initiative was formed in the neighbouring Teso District to spearhead peacebuilding in the Mt Elgon region. The information was disseminated through radio, TV, and social media platforms. The group used cultural activities to unite the Sabaot, Bukusu and Teso from Kenya on one hand and the Bagisu, Teso and Sabiiny from Uganda. The first inter-cultural meeting was held at Cheptais High School followed by one in 2012 at Kapchorwa in Uganda. This was one way of promoting cultural diversity in the region for cohesion.

Findings from KII indicate that the Kenya Red Cross Society initiated cash for work programme in the region in 2009-2013 as a way of promoting cohesion among all the tribes in Mt Elgon. ICTs contributed to coordination of the peace programmes and provided a forum for information sharing with all the stakeholders. Mobile phones were used to coordinate the programmes with the volunteers and committee members on the ground. The VHF radios, HF radios and satellite phones were used for coordination especially during relief distribution in areas with poor network coverage like Chepyuk, Kopsiro and Chepkitale. The findings show that the most vulnerable communities in the region were engaged in community based activities in return for financial tokens. They constructed feeder roads connecting Toywondet-Chepyuk,

Kopsiro-Kubura-Cheptais in Cheptais Sub-County and Kimobo-Kamtiong, Kaptama-Kaboywo roads in Mt Elgon Sub-County. Most of the feeder roads were between 3 to 5 kilometres. By the end of 2013, the total length of the roads that had been completed in the region was of 13 kilometres. The feeder roads were meant to provide access to market places and increase inter-community dialogue. A similar study by Okumu (2013) which shows that the efforts of the Laikipia Peace Caravan led to reopening of markets and trade routes leading to cessation of hostilities among the Pokot, Turkana and Samburu.

The findings show that information for the work programme was disseminated through West FM, *Radio Mambo*, *Imani Radio*, public *barazas* and the Kenya Red Cross (KRC) volunteers in the region who disseminated information by mobile phones (calls and SMSs) and face-to-face interactions with community members. With the help of the community leaders such as the chiefs, assistant chiefs and village elders, the KRCs selected were 30 community members from each community (Sabaot, Teso and Bukusu) and 10 members from the special category (the aged, the sick and people with disabilities). This brought the total to 40 members from each the three communities. During the programme, the participants and community members gave their views regarding the programme through mobile phones (calls and SMSs), radio, social media platforms and public forums. The activities were publicized in the KRCS website, *Reach out Magazines* and documented in internal branch reports.

#### **4.3.5 ICTs and psychosocial healing**

The impact of the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) reign of terror and the military intervention left the residents of Mt Elgon region psychologically traumatised. In addition, during the conflict, families were torn apart from their relatives as most of them sought refuge in other places (HRW, 2008; HRW, 2011, KNCHR, 2008). Interviews with key informants

indicate that ICTs contributed to restoring family links in the region. The Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) participated in tracing of missing persons in order to reunite them with their family members. The findings from KII indicate that ICTs contributed to tracing the missing persons. There were two categories of tracing: 1) physical tracing which entailed moving from point to point; and 2) online tracing. The Internet and special mobile phones (this was before the android phones came into the Kenyan market) were used by the volunteers in tracing the missing persons. There was one tracing volunteer in each of the regions, which are Trans Nzoia, Mt Elgon and Bungoma. The volunteers would take the picture of the missing person and give them a reference number without highlighting the details of their names. The image was thereafter posted on KRCS webpage thus enabling the volunteers to link up and exchange the information. The people would be asked to identify the person using their photographic images and contact the Red Cross office for further details. The tracing programme was still going on in the region when the data was collected.

The Kenya Red Cross Society also created linkages (reuniting families) between the ex-SLDF in prisons and their families at home by use of Red Cross Messages (RCMs). This was a countrywide programme supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The RCMs are open letters in which the prisoner writes the name, the message and the addressee's details. In Mt Elgon, the programme started after the military operation where most SLDF members were arrested and imprisoned in Bungoma and Webuye prisons. The tracing volunteers in Bungoma collected all RCMS during prison visits, put them in envelopes and addressed the same to the other tracing volunteer in Mt Elgon branch who would take them to the family members addressed. For the prisoners in faraway prisons like Kamiti Maximum Security Prison, the RCMs were delivered to the tracing volunteer in Mt Elgon via G4S courier services. The findings show that the messages were screened for security reasons so that

prisoners would not send threatening messages. Once the family got the RCMs, it would write a feedback which was again taken to Bungoma by the volunteer to be delivered to the prisoner in Bungoma and other prisons. The programme was successful in providing psychological healing to the families and prisoners.

Information obtained from KII revealed that ICTs provided a forum for reaching out to community members and provided a forum for bringing all the actors, that is, victims and perpetrators to voice their issues. Radio was also used by community members seeking reconciliation and forgiveness from the community for the atrocities committed. Mrs Salome Ndiwa (wife to the slain SLDF leader) was interviewed on different occasions by *Imani Radio*, *West FM* and *Radio Mambo* and *Imani TV*. She used the media to give her views regarding the trauma she suffered as the wife to the SLDF leader and to seek for acceptance in the community. The forum provided psychosocial healing to her since through community participation and involvement she was accorded forgiveness and acceptance for the atrocities committed by her husband. However, she was bitter and blamed the government for her suffering as indicated:

‘I still blame the government for killing my husband. The security officers came to my home by force in 2006 and I left it to them. I only fled with my children...I feel bitter when I remember the cows and other property I lost to them... they also brutally killed my husband... The government should also compensate me for the death of my husband’ (Salome Ndiwa, personal communication, October 13, 2014).

Findings from KII show that radios helped in the reintegration programmes for the ex-SLDF. The youth used the platform to apologise to the community for the crimes they committed. For instance in Endebess Sub-County, the youth used *Kalya FM* and *West FM* to confess their crimes while in Mt Elgon *West FM*, *Imani Radio* and *Radio Mambo* provided forums for the perpetrators to confess their crimes. During these sessions some perpetrators of the violence

identified themselves, narrated the crimes they committed and asked for forgiveness from the community members.

Information obtained from KII and questionnaires show that ICTs provided forums for counselling the victims of Mt Elgon conflict. Counselling sessions were conducted in the local radio stations especially *West FM*, *Imani Radio*, *BK FM* and *Radio Mambo*. Counselling sessions were also conducted through personal visits by counsellors from different organisation. The findings indicate that the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKHRW) conducted counselling sessions for widows from Mt Elgon by categorising them into two groups. The first group was for widows whose husbands were killed by the military. The second group was for widows whose husbands were killed by the SLDF. This was mainly because of the hatred the two groups bore against each other. It was thus difficult to mix the widows in one group before they had forgiven each other. Trauma counselling for the widows was conducted between August 2008 and December 2008 in Bungoma, Sirisia, Kamukuywa, Kimillili, Chwele, Lwandanyi, Kikai and Mt Elgon. The victims would be asked to identify where they wanted the counselling session to be conducted. The churches were often used as counselling centres for the victims. Similarly, Peace Tree Network used *West FM* and Mobile phones (SMSs and voice calls) in the dissemination of counselling programmes to the community members to enable the affected persons to attend them.

It further emerged from the KII that the religious leaders (pastors) who were affected by the conflict were also counselled by various non-state actors. For example, *Imani Media* in conjunction with USAID and the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK) counselled over 300 pastors who had been affected by the conflict in the region. This was in a bid to make them extend forgiveness and reconciliation to the perpetrators of the violence and the community at



large. The affected pastors were also given Ksh. 600 per month for a period of six months to help them rebuild their lives. In addition, they were provided with bibles for free distribution to residents in the affected areas. The counselling was also meant to assist them handle their church members who had been involved in the conflict and how to reconcile broken families. This led to the formation of the pastors' network forum for collaboration, identifying early warning signs and resolving conflicts. Information from KII indicates that the pastors' network forum mainly utilised mobile phones (calls and SMSs) and the local FM radio stations for information sharing.

In an effort to provide social amenities to the residents, the Kenya Red Cross Society opened mobile medical camps in Kopsiro, Cheptais and Chepkitale in 2008-2012. Most of these medical camps targeted the IDPs since most health facilities were either closed down during the conflict or had no medical personnel since most trained personnel were not from Mt Elgon and had left the region at the onset of the conflict. The KRCS also provided counselling sessions for victims of the conflict in their medical camps. Apart from the KRCS, other groups which participated in counselling included *Keewaap Ngē'tuny* women group and Teso Peace and Human Rights Development Initiative. The counselling sessions were conducted in churches, schools, homes and through radios like *West FM* radio, *Radio Mambo* and *Imani Radio*. All the counselling efforts were meant to address the psychological needs of the residents.

Information from KII show that Amani People's Theatre (APT) also organised exchange tours for its members who visited other APT groups in various parts of the country such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in the Coast. Information about APT activities was disseminated through mobile phones, SMS and Internet. These ICTs were also used for information sharing with other APT groups in the country. It was further revealed that APT

used *KTN* to highlight tourist attraction sites like caves, Mt Elgon National Park and waterfalls in the region. Further investigation revealed that APT was formed to address trauma facing the ex-militia especially as most of them had either killed or had their family members killed. APT used drama to reach out to the ex-militia. The findings indicate that there were 20 actors of APT in Cheptais who were all ex-SLDF and were being used to reach out to other former SLDF members who had not surrendered. The ex-militia used theatre advocacy forums to testify of the crimes they committed and the trauma they were undergoing thus providing psychological healing to them since they are not victimised by the government or society. The confessions were often followed by counselling sessions for the individuals in order to help them heal faster.

Findings from KII and questionnaires further indicate that sports were used to promote healing and peaceful co-existence among various groups in the region. ICTs were used to highlight sports in the region in an effort to encourage community participation in the same. This was mainly on *K24*, *NTV*, *Citizen*, the local radio stations and on the social media platforms. The findings further show that the Justice and Peace Commission organised sports between the youth from various communities in Trans Nzoia in 2008-2009. During the events, the PEV victims and perpetrators in conjunction with government institutions especially forest departments participated in sports at local levels to the district level to promote cohesion and peace in the region. The findings show that sports encouraged openness, confession and forgiveness among the participants who were drawn from different communities. Mount Elgon Peace Initiative organised football on 12 August every year where youth from different communities in Bungoma County compete. At the time of data collection, the games had been held at Terem and Cheptoror in Kopsiro Division. This was followed by games in Lukhome and Namwela in Bungoma West Sub-County. During the football matches, the winning teams were given balls and games kits. A study by Owuor and Wisor (2014) also shows that the Kenya

Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) initiated *Mkenya Daima* (My Kenya forever) campaigns in 2012 which used sports such as the Ndakaini marathon and golf tournaments to promote peaceful elections in Kenya during the 2013 general elections.

Information from KII and questionnaires show that the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) used sports to reconcile the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans. For example, in February 2009 and February 2012, the KRCS organised Mt Elgon Peace Run and Football at Kapsokwony in Mt Elgon Sub-County to promote healing between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans. In Cheptais Sub-County, Peace Tree Network (PTN) organised sports for the youth who played with the police at the Deputy County Commissioner's (DCC) playground. The sports events were meant to eliminate fear and restore confidence in the security forces in the region which had been instilled in the residents during the military operation. On 20<sup>th</sup> Nov 2014, PTN sponsored a peace run between the police and the residents in Cheptais Sub-County. The race was meant to restore harmony between the police and the residents and to advocate for arms surrender. As a result, a total of four AK rifles were surrendered to the DCC Cheptais. The winners of the race were given goats and money as a way of empowering them economically. See Appendix 22 for details of the winners and the prizes.

Interviews with key informants indicate that PACT Kenya sponsored *Amani Community Based* organisation from Kopsiro Division to organise sports (football and athletics), drama and singing competitions among the youth from sub-location to divisional levels. The local community members were always involved in singing during public gatherings and in drama as a way of incorporating them in the peacebuilding process. This supports the conflict transformation theory discussed in chapter two which argues that peace has to be initiated from the grassroots level. However, the main target was the youth in Cheptais Sub-County since most

of those who participated in the conflict were the youth. The activities were also meant to strengthen cohesion among the youth from the various groups. Inter-clan competitions were also organised. For example, in 2013 the Chepkitale team from the *Ndorobo* clan played against the Chepkube team from *Soy* clan yet they were enemies during the conflict. After the games, all the participants shared meals as a way of promoting forgiveness and healing between the clans. The games also created a forum for dialogue between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* elders which facilitated peaceful coexistence between the two clans.

Similarly, Socially Organised Educative Team (SOET) CBO from Mt Elgon Sub-County sponsors sports (football) on a yearly basis as a way of providing opportunity for interaction between the caregivers and orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs). Local radio stations especially *West FM* and *BK FM* provided forums for disseminating information about the matches. The membership of the group was drawn from all ethnic groups in the region as a way of promoting integration and coexistence. SOET used drama, songs and dances in order to promote cultural diversity and to promote unity in the county. The findings further indicate that SOET, in conjunction with APHIA Plus Western Kenya, had been supporting OVCs in Mt Elgon by paying school fees, buying uniforms and bedding for the OVCs and giving them funds to start income generation activities (IGAs) as a way of empowering them economically.

The use of sports to promote psychosocial healing and promotion of cohesion and integration in Mt Elgon region was also incorporated by international actors. For instance, information obtained from KII show that the United Kingdom (UK) government in conjunction with the English Premier League and ACORD Kenya conducted training in Kapsokwony and Kopsiro Divisions targeting boys and girls in and out of school for talent training. Their aim was to establish training camps in Cheptais and Kopsiro where youth from *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans

would form teams which could compete with other football teams in the country. By October 2014, 25 coaches from the region had been trained. The English Premier League also provided free games kits and balls to the players and sponsors them for various tournaments in the region in an effort to promote national cohesion and integration among the youth. Similarly, the county government had started the construction of a high altitude training camp for the youth from Mt Elgon region in order to tap athletic talents among the youth and also to engage them in more meaningful activities in an effort to demilitarise the region. Findings from KII indicate that radio, mobile phones, social media platforms and played a great role in mobilising the youth to attend the training sessions. At the same time, the events were highlighted by the national TV stations, radio stations and print media.

#### **4.3.6 ICTs and economic empowerment of residents**

The conflict in the region had economic implications in the region since most lands were left fallow. In addition, most of the residents had their property destroyed by either the SLDF or security forces leaving them impoverished (HRW, 2008; Mwasserah, 2007; Simiyu, 2008). Findings from KII and questionnaires show that radio, particularly *West FM* and mobile phones provided forums for information sharing and mobilisation of the community members to form community based organisations (CBOs).

The Free Pentecostal Fellowship in Kenya (FPFK) for instance funded 11 youth groups from Mt Elgon to start IGAs. Radios, mobile phones and SMSs were used to mobilisation the community members to join the CBOs and also for information sharing among the group members. Some of the groups formed include *Yyootēēt Nyeē Lēēl* (New Birth) Group from Kamuneru, Peace and Rights Group from Kapsokwony and *Keechamgei* (Let us love one another) Youth Group from Kapsokwony among others. The findings show that the groups, drawn from different sub-clans

of the Sabaot community held regular meetings to resolve conflicts at group levels. This clearly indicates the success of the grassroots initiative at peacebuilding. Each of the groups which were made up of 20 former SLDF members was given Ksh 75, 000 to start IGAs. The projects were meant to make them self-reliant. The same programme was extended to 180 widows from Kopsiro and Cheptais divisions who formed 12 groups. Each group was given 70,000 to start IGAs like horticulture, poultry keeping, and others. As a result, some of the ex-SLDF combatants went back to school while the others engaged in the *boda boda* (motor bike and bicycle riders) business. Similarly, Amani Peoples Theatre (APT) initiated capacity building for the ex-SLDF members through the county government where they received interest free ward trade loans and ward funds. The initiative promoted self-reliance. As a result, most of them were *boda boda* riders in the region. However, the findings indicate that some youth groups disintegrated and the funds were diverted.

A study by Coalition for Peace in Africa [COPA] (2011), shows that Rural Women Peace Link (RWPL) was a network of grassroots women's organisations in rural areas affected by armed conflicts in western Kenya. RWPL created a forum to enable women to share experiences and access information in order to enable them to become change agents in the communities affected by ethnic and GBV violence. Njeru (2009) supports the approach and argues that sharing information provides women with a platform to engender a culture of open information sharing. Information from KII indicated that ICTs especially radio (*West FM and Radio Mambo*) and mobile phones (calls and SMSs) provided platforms for dissemination of information and community mobilisation for widows from Mt Elgon region to form community-based organisations for economic empowerment. One such network was Cheptais Rural Peace link which initiated economic empowerment programmes for widows of the ex-SLDF in Cheptais and Kopsiro. The widows were involved in income generation activities

(IGAs) in order to be self-reliant. The findings reveal that the widows used the forum to instill peace messages among their sons in order for them not to fall prey to political manipulation. As mentioned earlier in the study, the youth who took up arms were mainly from Cheptais and Kopsiro hence the grassroots initiative in reaching them. The chairlady of the group was Mrs Salome Ndiwa, the wife of the SLDF leader. She was also elected as the chairlady of the *Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation*, Chesikak Ward as one way of integrating her and other SLDF widows to the community.

Information from KII shows that the KRCS embarked on spring protection by planting trees around springs and provision of safe drinking water in the region. The findings are in agreement with Oteng'i (2007) who argues that there is need of sensitisation on protection of springs in Mt Elgon since it is one of the largest water towers in Western Kenya after Cherangany Hills. The initiative by the KRCS was a long term intervention incorporating the aspect of development to those affected by the conflict. Information for the tree planting exercise was disseminated to the community members through mobile phones (calls and SMSs), radio (West FM), social platforms and public forums. The findings show that 44 schools in Mt Elgon were given water tanks by the KRCS. The water projects were also supposed to encourage interaction and coexistence among community members through sharing of common resources. This is in agreement with Okumu (2013) who posits that establishing shared resources like schools and dispensaries between communities is an important starting point for inter-community peacebuilding. In the lower parts of Mt Elgon, there were shallow wells rehabilitation from Namwela in Bungoma North Sub-County to Bungoma town. This was to enable schools and the community to access water for household activities and irrigation. In order to reduce waterborne diseases among residents, 400 water (household ceramic) filters were distributed in Sirisia Division in Bungoma West Sub-County due to challenges of access to safe water.

Similarly, the Kenya Civil Society Strengthening Program (KCSSP) together with *Changia Rasilimali* (CRM) funded a Ksh 47 million water project in *Banaantega* in Kopsiro Division in 2013. The project was also meant to unite the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans after the 2006-2008 conflict. The findings by Sentama (2009) also show that following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the *Abahuzamugambi* coffee cooperative society and the peace basket provided a favourable environment for enabling genocide perpetrators and genocide survivors to overcome division, fear, suspicion, anger and hatred, while fostering positive communication, trust and conviviality among them. Similarly, the USAID/PACT Kenya initiated two water projects in Kopsiro Division. One of the water tanks was located at Chepyuk and served the *Soy* and the *Ndorobo* clans. The other one, which was stationed at Chelebei, served the *Sabaot* and the *Bukusu* communities. These projects were meant to promote cohesion among the once antagonistic communities. See appendix 20 for details of water project in Kopsiro Division.

Findings from KII show that the Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) Bungoma branch bought farm inputs like maize, onions and other horticultural seeds for Mt Elgon residents as a way of promoting self-reliance while the JPC Kitale branch bought 10 donkeys for five women groups from Kopsiro Division to enable them to transport their produce to the markets. It however emerged from the findings that the JPC used the churches and other public forums to disseminate information for fear of misrepresentation and distortion of information by the media (radio and TV) and other ICTs. It is worth noting that due to the deplorable state of roads in the region especially during the rainy seasons, the only means of transportation of farm produce in Kopsiro Division was donkeys. In addition, the traders use forest footpaths to access the markets in Chwele, Kimilili and Kamukuywa in Bungoma County and Gituamba in Trans Nzoia County (Appendix 21).



The County Government of Bungoma also supported the widows and the most vulnerable members of the society in the region by donating maize seed and fertiliser as a way of empowering them economically. Again, ICTs were used to mobilisation the widows to register with the ward administrators. For example, in April 2015, widows from Chesikak, Cheptais and Chepyuk wards were given seeds and fertilizer. These were the areas which were greatly affected since most of the SLDF were from these regions. As a result, during the military intervention, most young men from these areas were either killed or forcefully disappeared by the military leaving the women to fend for the families. These groups were identified through the ward administrators to ensure inclusivity and equity in the distribution of seeds. Radio, mobile phones (calls and SMSs), social media platforms and public *barazas* were used in disseminating information about registration and distribution of farm inputs to these groups.

#### **4.3.7 ICTs and human rights**

ICTs were incorporated in the advocacy campaigns for documentation, networking and mobilisation. Findings from the KII show that one of the groups advocating for human rights was Dynamics Rights Care (DRC) based at Cheptais. Its members were trained by Coalition for Peace Africa (COPA) and Federation of Women Lawyers in Kenya (FIDA) on how to identify the indicators of domestic violence, communicating with the victims of 2006-2008 violence and empowering vulnerable groups on legal matters. The group utilised mobile phones (calls and, SMSs) and local radio stations for sharing information and mobilising the community members. The issues addressed included disinheritance for women in the event of loss of their husbands and the rights of women, orphans and IDPs. In addition, community health workers had been trained on health issues including hot to deal with cases of fistula among women.

The findings further indicate that other advocacy groups were using *Radio Mambo*, *Sabaot Women Online*, *Imani Radio* and *K24* to empower women and other vulnerable groups on their rights for instance, children's rights, the demand for title deed issuance and land compensation for those displaced from Kopsiro among other rights. A study by Njeru (2009) further confirms that women in post-conflict societies can use ICT platforms to transform issues affecting them. As a result of the advocacy campaigns in Mt Elgon region, gender-based violence (GBV) victims had been empowered to visit hospitals within 72 hours and report defilement cases to the police. In the past, such cases were never reported. It can therefore be concluded that through these advocacy campaigns, the women could stand up for their rights. However, the greatest challenge to according justice to women in the region was the Sabaot culture which did not allow women to inherit land. In addition, the patriarchal nature of the society had made many women to suffer in silence.

Findings from KII and questionnaires show that *Maendeleo ya Wanawake* (MYWO), Kenya Female Advisory Organisation and other local community based organisations (CBOs) had been sensitising girls and women on their rights such as resisting FGM, forced marriages, early pregnancies, GBV and land disinheritance especially after the death of their husbands. These actors also offered legal aid to the vulnerable groups on succession, inheritance and children's rights. In an effort to empower the vulnerable in the community to get justice, the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK) identified 30 widows (35 years and below) per division for psychosocial counselling and life skills training. Again ICTs provided forums for information sharing, networking and mobilisation between the widows and FPFK. The women were enlightened on legal inheritance of land and their right to remarry. As a result some widows who had been disinherited had repossessed their lands through the state agents in the region. Findings from KII further show that the FPFK gave each group Ksh 150,000 to start

IGAs for self-reliance. Consequently, the widows held regular meetings to identify challenges and make referral cases since they had been empowered to demand for their rights.

Interviews with key informants further indicate that Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) Kitale branch addressed human rights abuses by offering pre-trial detention programmes to the arrested SLDF suspects. This involved working with inmates in penal institutions and helping prisoners understand trial processes through the trained paralegals. Following the military intervention in the region in 2008, the paralegals identified youth transferred from Bungoma who had been tortured and referred the cases to Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU) for legal action. The paralegals also reached out to the vulnerable groups in the community to sensitise them on their rights. ICTs were used for networking with other paralegals, mobilisation as well as documenting human rights abuses. The JPC for instance, had programmes on *Imani Radio* and *Kalya FM* for sensitising the community on their rights.

Interviews with key informants revealed that ICTs were used by the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKRHW) to address the human rights abuses meted out on the civilians by the General Service Unit (GSU), the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU), AP, regular Police, KDF and the SLDF. There were two main interventions. The first intervention was to train a response task comprising 41 human rights monitors on monitoring human rights violations during and after the conflict. The training of the monitors was done in June 2006 where the monitors, drawn from each sub-location from Mt Elgon (there was one monitor per sub-location) underwent training in Bungoma. The second intervention was on ante mortem data collection training. This was a three-day training where forms were designed and installed in smart phones to be filled in by the monitors. Each monitor was given Ksh. 1,000 airtime for sending information on phone. The monitors documented reports on human rights violations and sent

the same to the WKRHW contact centre in Bungoma. The monitors were required to provide detailed and accurate information of individuals affected. For instance, they indicated the date, person arrested, by whom, what time and so on. The monitors deleted the information immediately after sending to the control centre for security purposes. They were also trained on secrecy in order to obtain information. In this regard, the monitors were not supposed to reveal to the community members and the government authorities that they were working for WKHRW.

The findings show that by July 2006 information had started streaming in from the monitors on the ground level that the youth were training in the forest. The WKHRW also sent reports on human rights violations on a daily basis. ICTs, particularly the *British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)*, local radio stations, *Al Jazeera TV* and print media were used to highlight reports on militia training in Mt Elgon forest and the violation of human rights by the SLDF and the military. Radio and TV also helped in the advocacy for the protection of the individual rights of the people in Mt Elgon. During the interventions, the sub-locations were narrowed down as units for monitoring. By the time the Kenya Defence Forces intervened, WKHRW had recorded over 50 enforced disappearances (deliberate abductions and killings) by the SLDF. More training was conducted in March 2008 after the military intervention to train the monitors on how to document enforced disappearances by the military.

The findings from the Human Rights Watch [HRW] (2008) and *Medecins Sans Frontieres* [MSF] (2008) show that the government's strategy to flushing out all the SLDF in Mt Elgon was arresting all adult and teenage males for 'screening' at the Kapkota military camp in Cheptais Sub-County. The detainees were subjected to torture and others died. However those who had since not reappeared were feared to have been 'disappeared' by the military since their

bodies could not be traced even in the mortuaries. Findings show that the WKHRW used their website (<https://www.wkhrwnewsnetwork.org>) for information sharing with HRW and other international human rights organisations. However, a lot of caution was taken to avoid losing information (hacking) in the Internet. Consequently, the documentation of torture and disappearances was reflected in Bungoma, Geneva and put in email and saved as documents not sent. Mobile phones contributed to information sharing and documentation of human rights violations even after the imposition of the curfew in the region when all NGOs were barred from entering the region. According to WKHRW official:

‘We documented more than 95 per cent of all cases of torture, forced disappearances and abduction by relying on information from the ground’, (John Juma<sup>xiii</sup>, Personal communication, November 4, 2014).

The findings indicate that the 41 trained personnel kept sending reports on human rights violations on a daily basis up to August 2008. The reports revealed that there were 98 abduction cases by the SLDF, 228 enforced disappearance cases by the military and 128 cases of those disappeared by the security officers (RDU, GSU, regular police and AP). It emerged that a big percentage of the disappearances was caused by the military. The findings from the HRW (2008) also reveal that by June 2008, over 220 suspects had been ‘disappeared’ by the military and the police in Mt Elgon.

The findings from KII indicate that the above cases had been filed against the government of Kenya in Geneva by the WKHRW and the Human Rights Watch 128 gross disappearance cases from Mt Elgon had been submitted before the UN Security Council. The findings were in agreement with HRW (2008) and (HRW (2011) which revealed that by June 2008, there were over 220 cases of enforced disappearances in Mt Elgon. Further investigation of the matter revealed that cases of enforced disappearances or involuntary disappearances which were to be heard in June 2015 in Geneva before the UN Human Rights Commission did not take place.

Consequently, three records had been submitted by the WKHRW before UN Commission on Human Rights/working group. These were convictions against torture, enforced or involuntary disappearances and conviction against killings.

Although the cases were before the UN working group, the findings from KII however, indicate that victims of enforced disappearance by the SLDF were unlikely to get justice since the UN working group only dealt with cases committed by states and not militia groups. The Independent Medico-legal Unit (IMLU) had however, presented these cases before the Arusha court of justice. IMLU had also presented the cases of torture to the African Court and Justice System in Banjul which has sittings in Arusha. The hearing was in February 2014 and February 2015. However, findings from the KII show due to unknown reasons, the cases were dismissed. This raises concerns to the attainment of justice for the victims of the SLDF and KDF atrocities.

Other initiatives included the advocacy for the rights of the girl-child. The findings from KII show that anti-FGM campaigns were organised in the region every December to offer girls an alternative rite of passage (ARP). This was meant to coincide with the Sabaot traditional circumcision ceremonies which were conducted every December. The findings reveal that although the government had banned FGM, it was still being conducted secretly especially in Kopsiro Division and areas bordering the forest. *Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation* (MYWO) in collaboration with United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) had conducted four ARP sessions from 2011 for girls aged 12-22 years. The four-day training sessions which were conducted on a rotational basis had been held in Cheptais High School, St. Teresa's Girls Cheptoror, Kaptama Boys Secondary School and Kibuk Girls' School. ICTs, especially radio and mobile phones (calls and SMSs) were used to sensitise the community on the effects of FGM, as well as highlighting the ARP meetings. At the climax of the training, all leaders and


community members attended to witness the ARP graduation ceremony and used the forum to denounce FGM. The researcher also found out that MYWO also rescued girls from FGM, early marriage and school dropouts. Some cases like rape and early marriages were referred to the children's department and the police. As a result of these campaigns, some girls and single mothers had gone back to school. It further emerged that MYWO did not rely on FIDA Kenya since their cases took too long hence failing to accord immediate justice to the victims.

The findings from KII show that Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA) in partnership with Peace Women across the Globe (PWAG) carried out women empowerment programmes on radios and public *barazas* in Trans Nzoia, Mt Elgon and Uasin Gishu in order to enhance women participation in the 2013 general elections. This was done in collaboration with local community-based organisations and advocacy groups in the region who conducted civil education on local radio stations, public forums, school debates and radio shows. During radio presentations, women were allowed to call or send SMS for clarification of issues. This was due to the realisation of the negative impact of culture which did not allow women to exercise their democratic rights such as voting or taking up leadership positions. The gender and governance programmes presented by these groups strengthened the capacities of women in leadership and decision-making at the community levels in these areas.

Data from KII further show that the *Tears of Women Organisation* had six programmes in *Imani Radio*. The programmes were meant to provide women with information in order to empower them into leadership positions and also to promote cultural values in Mt Elgon, Turkana, Trans Nzoia, Pokot and Marakwet. These were regions with poor representation of women in leadership positions (COPA, 2011). As a result of these media advocacy campaigns, women had taken up leadership positions. For instance, there were two female assistant chiefs

in Kaptama Division and eight women in the Mt Elgon and Cheptais District Peace Committees.

In order to find out if the women from the region had been empowered to participate in public events, the researcher analysed the gender of the research participants. The findings are indicated in Figure 4.15.



**Figure 4.15 Gender of respondents**

**Source: Field Data**

From Figure 4.15, 53.1 per cent of the respondents were male while 46.9 per cent were female. These findings indicated that the male actively participated in public events compared to the female. This was due to the patriarchal nature of the community. This was also reflected in leadership which was dominated by the male members of the society.

Apart from the women rights, the findings from KII further revealed that people at the grassroots level had been empowered by the District Peace Committees (DPCs) to provide information to state agents. For instance an administration police (AP) officer was dismissed




from Muroki in Trans Nzoia County for raping women. The information was volunteered to the DPC members since they had been assured of confidentiality of any information. The findings from KII further indicated that the residents had confidence in the DPCs more than the security officers who were often accused of corruption and collusion with criminals in the region.

Findings from KII, FGDs and questionnaires indicated that the District Peace Committees (DPCs) had restored confidence between the residents and the police in order to promote peaceful coexistence. In Trans Nzoia County, this was reflected during the annual year parties where the police also invited residents for joint celebrations. The findings also indicate that community policing provided a forum for the community and the police to interact and share information. ICTs provided forums for facilitating these interactions. For instance, members used mobile phones and SMS for information sharing with the DPC members. This came in the wake of the military operation in the region whereby the residents had lost confidence in the security officers (KNCHR, 2008; HRW, 2011). Similarly, in Mt Elgon Sub-County, the DPC had initiated community policing to restore the relationship between the police and the community members who had lost confidence in them because they engaged in crime especially in Kaptama location where community members staged a demonstration leading to the transfer of the officer commanding police station (OCS). Community members were provided with contact details of the Deputy County Commissioner (DCC) and top police officers so that they could share threats to security with them. This was further reflected in the FGDs where it emerged that the residents preferred to call the OCS, Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) or the DCCs directly instead of the regular police officers.

Findings from KII and FGDs indicate that the *Nyumba Kumi*<sup>xiv</sup> initiative had intensified security since the 10 households know each other. The initiative greatly relied on mobile phones

(calls and SMSs) for sharing information in order to facilitate early warning and response. The structure of *Nyumba Kumi* initiative had three levels. The top level was occupied by the chairman who often contacted or would be contacted by the local area chief in case of insecurity. Next was the village coordinator who contacted the chairman about issues in his/her village. And lastly, there were committee members who met regularly to discuss issues and report to the relevant authorities. The initiative had further enhanced peacebuilding at the grassroots level by empowering the local people to control of security matters within their neighbourhoods.

The researcher sought the respondents' views regarding the peacebuilding efforts in the region. The results are indicated in Figure 4.16



**Figure 4.16 Respondents' views towards the peace initiatives**

**Source: Field Data**

Figure 4.16 indicates that the community response towards the peacebuilding efforts was positive (72.7%). This implies that the community welcomed peace having been in conflict for

almost three years which saw the collapse in the economy and social relations in the once united community.


The findings presented above show that ICTs facilitated the finalisation of Chepyuk III and final resettlement exercise in the region. In addition, the ICTs promoted the reconciliation of the Sabaot clans by offering platforms for confession and apology for the SLDF members. In addition, they were used by the various actors in reaching out to the affected community members with psychosocial healing programmes. ICTs further offered platforms for human rights advocacy and mobilisation of the community members to form community-based organisations geared at rebuilding the economy of the region.

#### **4.4.1 Effectiveness of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

This section discusses the effectiveness of various ICTs in the peacebuilding process in the region; that is radio, TV, social media platforms, websites and other ICT tools.

#### **4.4.2 Effectiveness of radio in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

The findings indicated that radios have been frequently used by various actors in the peacebuilding process. The researcher wanted to know the response of the participants regarding the effectiveness of radios in the reconstruction process. The findings are shown in Figure 4.17.



**Figure 4.17 Effectiveness of radio in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**

The results from Figure 4.17 show that 53.1 per cent of the respondents indicated that radios were very effective in the peacebuilding process. This was more than half of the total respondents implying that most of the peacebuilding efforts were disseminated on radio. 39.8 per cent of the respondents indicated that radio was effective in the peace process while 7.1 per cent indicated that radio was not effective in the peace process. The response could imply that these respondents did not tune in to the peace programmes on radio or that they relied on other ICTs.

As discussed in the preceding sections, radios were used for dissemination, advocacy, creating awareness and sharing of information. Findings from KII show that from the very onset of the conflict in 2005 all the way to 2008, radios were effective in highlighting the conflict in the region. The local, national and international radio stations like the *BBC* and the *VOA* helped in highlighting the militia atrocities in the region. This resulted to the 2008 military intervention that helped quell the violence. Radios were further effective in highlighting human rights

violations in the region and advocacy for justice for the victims of torture. The WKHRW and Mwatikho National Rehabilitation Centre for Victims of Torture used radio to create awareness of human rights violations in the region and to advocate for justice. Other programmes, for instance, *Radio Citizen*, were effective in dissuading the residents from having a repeat of the conflict. The morning talk show programme *Yaliyotendeka* (what transpired) which was aired daily at 6:30 am by Waweru Mburu was effective in persuading Tana River residents to visit Mt Elgon to learn conflict resolution mechanisms due to the similar nature of the conflict in the two areas. As shown earlier on, the visitation, which took place on October, 2014 provided the Tana River residents an opportunity to learn conflict resolution mechanisms from the DPCs in the region. The visit also provided them with an opportunity of learning farming practices from the region.

The findings show that radios were effective in mobilising the elders from the Sabaot community to attend the intra-community dialogue meeting facilitated by the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FKFK) and the subsequent inter-community dialogue meeting that led to the signing of the Mabanga Peace Accord. The findings further indicate that radio was effective in mobilising the community members to attend various peace meetings in the region for example, cleansing ceremonies, and the vetting exercise for Chepyuk III and inauguration meetings of the Sabaot Supreme Council of Elders (SSCE). Radio also provided a platform for the community members to participate in the discussion through the call-in sessions and SMS and seek clarification for contentious issues. For example, the Mabanga Peace Accord was disseminated through various local radio stations as the information could reach a large audience. At the same time, radio provided an opportunity for feedback to the audience.

The findings from KII and FGDs show that radio was also effective in promoting peaceful coexistence in the region through dissemination of peace programmes to the community members. For example, the PRP by the FPFK in *West FM* had promoted peaceful coexistence among all the Sabaot clans by focusing on forgiveness and reconciliation. In addition, peaceful co-existence among the Sabaot, Teso and Bukusu in the region had been realised through the various peace programmes focusing on equitable sharing of resources and leadership positions, cultural tolerance and forgiveness disseminated by elders in the local and national radio stations notably *Imani Radio, BK FM, Radio Mambo, Kalya FM, Sabo Sema, Radio Maisha* and *Radio Citizen*.

Radio was effective in providing civic education to the community prior to the 2013 general elections. This was in regard to the devolved system of governance in the country. The elders and other community leaders used the forum to inform and educate the community on their rights as the minority tribe in Bungoma County. As a result, the Sabaot community participated peacefully in the 2013 general elections.

Findings from KII show that radios had contributed to tension reduction in the region. This was mainly been due to the fact that the programmes targeted hotspot areas. For example, the Free Pentecostal Fellowship in Kenya programmes aired by *Kalya FM* and *West FM* which aimed at demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) had led to arms surrender in Turkana, Uasin Gishu, West Pokot and Mt Elgon region. As a result, the youth from these regions had started engaging in more productive work in the society instead of crime. Similarly, the ex-combatants also used local radio platforms to confess their crimes and to seek for forgiveness from the community. Thus radios were effective in providing healing to the victims and perpetrators of the conflict. The findings further indicate that the ex-militia preferred radio since

it acted as a neutral platform for the victims and participants. For instance, the ex-militia from Endebess and Mt Elgon used *Kalya FM* and *West FM* to confess to the entire community of the atrocities hence facilitating their reintegration. The findings further indicate that radio was effective in promoting the healing process in the region since the religious leaders and counsellors used the platform to make the community accept the inevitability of the conflict and to extend forgiveness to the perpetrators of the conflict.

The study further established that radio was effective in promoting security in the region. Various community leaders used radio to highlight security matters in the region. The Deputy County Commissioners and Officers Commanding Police Stations from the region had programmes once a week in the local radio stations to highlight peace and security in the region. The radio was also used to highlight government policies in the region. For instance the amnesty for arms surrender and places of surrender was highlighted in all local FM radios. As a result, a number of arms were surrendered to state agents. The exercise was an important step in demilitarising the region.


The findings from KII indicate that radios were effective in empowering the weak and the vulnerable in the society. For instance, the widows used local radio stations for networking and to explain their challenges to the rest of the listeners. Radios were also effective in advocating for rights of the people in Mt Elgon region. These were advocated for by the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch and Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya among others. The economic empowerment programmes on various local radio stations were effective in improving the economic standards in the region. For instance, experts from different fields talked to the community on the latest farming methods on *Imani Radio*.

Findings from KII further show that the High Frequency (HF) radios and Very High Frequency (VHF) radios were effective in coordination of relief efforts by the Kenya Red Cross Society since most of the areas in Mt Elgon have poor network coverage. They were effective in relaying the state of the affairs on the ground to the branch office in Bungoma. For instance, vehicle breakdown and attacks from the SLDF were very common during the conflict. The findings show that the SLDF mostly targeted relief distributors in order to confiscate food and medical supplies which often ended up in their hideouts deep in the forest. In fact, the findings from KII show that the Doctors without Borders or *Medicins Sans Frontiers* (MSF) were forced by the government to cut short their support to Mt Elgon since they had very powerful radio calls for communicating directly with the international community. Findings from HRW (2008) and MSF (2008) show that the move was aimed at denying the international community evidence of torture on suspected SLDF victims by the military. Similarly, radio was effective for communication purposes thus helping in beefing up security in the region since with the VHF radios, the Officers Commanding Police Stations (OCPDs) could communicate directly with the Officers Commanding Stations (OCSs), the Regional Police Commander (RPC) and the Inspector General of Police.

#### **4.4.3 Effectiveness of mobile phones in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

To assess the effectiveness of mobile phones in the peacebuilding reconstruction process, the researcher sought the respondents' views. The results are indicated in Figure 4.18.





**Figure 4.18 Effectiveness of mobile phones in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon**

**Source: Field Data**

From Figure 4.18, 50.4 per cent of the respondents indicated that mobile phones were very effective in facilitating the peacebuilding process in the region. 42.4 per cent of the respondents indicated that mobile phones were effective while 7.2 per cent indicated that they were not effective. The findings which agree with KII and FGDs imply that most of the residents in the region had embraced mobile phones as a tool of communication. It can be concluded that the 7.2 % respondents either did not have mobile phones or were in areas with poor network coverage.

The findings show that mobile phones were effective in information sharing even after the imposition of the curfew when all NGOs were barred from entering the region. Calls and SMSs provided information to the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch, the media and other human rights organisations which helped in documenting human rights abuses in the region such as torture, disappearances, defilement and other atrocities.

The findings indicate that phone calls were very effective in clarifying issues. Findings from KII show that while contacting the National Commission for Integration and Cohesion, the District Peace Committee Members or security agents, the informants were usually expected to identify and verify the issue on the ground before action could be taken. This was aimed at ascertaining the truth of the information. Mobile phones enabled the police in many areas in the region to act swiftly in curbing crime as a result of the information provided by the residents.

Mobile phones were also effective in promoting security in the region especially in the hotspot areas. This was due to the empowerment of the people at the grassroots. A notable example was the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya project of issuing phones to peace monitors in the five Sub-Counties. Findings from KII show that the phones acted as an early warning mechanism for peace monitors on the ground and the security agents. Similarly, the District Peace Committee Members (DPCs) were expected to monitor the situation on the ground and send free SMS or voice recording to PeaceNet using code 6397-108 for indication of tension on the ground.

Mobile phones were effective in information sharing in the region at all levels. Mobile phones used by elders, chiefs, residents in dissemination of information about vetting exercise in Chepyuk III, dissemination of the Mabanga Peace Accord, information sharing with the DPC members, sharing information about peace programmes on radio among others. Mobile phones were also effective in empowering the residents to share information on other platforms like the radio during call-in sessions. Mobile phones were also effective in linking the displaced with those at home who would be updated on events on the ground. For instance, following the displacement of residents during the conflict, mobile phones were effective in mobilising them from various areas to attend peace meetings and vetting exercises in the region. In the end, some


displaced persons were able to return to their farms in 2009 after getting assurance from their relatives that normalcy had been restored in the region.

The findings show that mobile phone were effective in mobilisation for meetings. They were mostly used by the elders, Community based organisation members and the residents to mobilisation members to attend various peace meetings and for enhancing networking among the various peacebuilding actors. The findings show that the peace actors always linked up with other actors on the ground for efficiency. Thus, mobile phones were used in networking among the non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations and other groups on the ground.

Interviews with key informants show that the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) relied on mobile phones for efficiency in communication. The society relied on personal numbers of the volunteers on the ground who fed the operations coordinating office with information. In case of crisis, the KRCS would send teams for rapid assessment before raising the issue to higher authorities. The crisis would thereafter be reflected in the data base of the emergency events to be attended to. Mobile phones were also effective coordinating programmes with the volunteers and committee members on the ground. For instance, the cash for work programme in the region was coordinated using mobile phones and SMSs. Satellite phones were effective in coordinating relief distribution in area with poor network coverage. The findings indicate that the satellite phones were efficient in providing information on the state of events on the ground to the branch office in Bungoma. The findings further show that mobile phones were also effective in tracing the missing persons thus providing family linkages.

#### **4.4.4 Effectiveness of television in peacebuilding efforts in Mt Elgon region**

In order to ascertain the effectiveness of TV in peacebuilding, the researcher sought the views of the respondents. The findings are shown in Figure 4.19.



**Figure 4.19 Effectiveness of TV in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**

The findings in Figure 4.19 show that 26.8 per cent of the respondents indicated that TV was very effective in the peacebuilding process. 66.3 per cent of the respondents however indicated that they were effective while 6.9 % indicated that they were not effective. This implies that a small percentage of the residents in the region either had TV sets or watched TV programmes focusing on peace. This could also be coupled with poor reception of TV in some areas in the region and lack of electricity.

The findings from KII indicate that TV was effective in highlighting the conflict in the region. It also provided a forum for the top SLDF leaders to air their dissatisfaction in the resettlement exercise in Chepyuk III and their intention to resist forced evictions. TV was also efficient in highlighting the gravity of the conflict and human rights abuses committed by the SLDF and the military in the region. The findings further show that TV was efficient in highlighting the vices in the region. For example, the plight of the teenage pregnancies in Kopsiro were highlighted by the media prompting action from the state and non-state actors in order to protect the girl-child.


TV was efficient in publicising and highlighting peacebuilding projects in the region. For instance, the 2009 Mt Elgon peace run organised by the Kenya Red Cross Society was publicised by *the Royal Media Services, NTV, K24* and *The Standard Group*. These TV stations had also been highlighting development projects in the region in order to encourage investment in the region due to the normalcy that has been restored. Findings from KII further revealed that TV was being used to highlight tourist attraction sites in the region. For instance, the Amani Peoples Theatre used *KTN* to highlight tourist attraction sites like caves, natural forest and waterfalls in the region. As a result, there was investment in the region which was likely to promote economy of the region.

The findings further show that TV was efficient in advocating for protection of individual rights in the region. The Western Kenya Human Rights Watch and other human rights organisations used the local and international TV stations like *Al Jazeera* to advocate for protection of the rights of Mt Elgon residents. The advocacy was as a result of torture, killings, enforced disappearances and defilement committed by both the military and the SLDF. As a result of these media highlights, the torture cases from the region had been submitted to international courts in the hope of according justice to the residents.

TV was efficient in empowering the vulnerable members of the society. For instance, *Imani Television* provided a forum to the wife of the SLDF leader to air her views regarding the trauma she was undergoing. This enabled the community to forgive her for the atrocities committed by her husband. The TV station was also efficient in promoting unity among the various tribes in the region. This was due to its talk show programmes where government officials and individuals from different communities were invited to address animosity in the region.

#### 4.4.5 Effectiveness of Facebook in peacebuilding efforts in Mt Elgon region

An inquiry into the effectiveness of Facebook in peacebuilding in the region established that 27.8 per cent of the respondents indicated that Facebook was very effective in the peacebuilding process in the region. 65.3 per cent were of the opinion that Facebook was effective while 6.9 % of the respondents indicated that it was not effective in the reconstruction process. These findings are shown in Figure 4.20.



**Figure 4.20 Effectiveness of Facebook in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**


The findings in Figure 4.20 could imply that most of the respondents from the region had embraced the use of Facebook in peacebuilding. Findings from KII show further show that Facebook was mostly used by the youth.

The findings from the key informants further revealed that Facebook groups were efficient in the peacebuilding efforts since they provided up-to-date information to the community members. As shown earlier on in Figure 4.9, the most effective Facebook group in the region

was *Sabaot Peoples Online* (68.4%). The findings show that the Facebook group was effective since it united all the Sabaot community in the region and the diaspora. Information from KII show that other effective Facebook groups in the region were *Mount Elgon News Network* and *Bungoma County 411*. *Bungoma County 411* Facebook group was effective in promoting coexistence in the region since it had provided a forum for all the tribes from Bungoma County to participate in the governance issues. The forums were also effective in agenda-setting since they determined what the participants discussed. For instance, the community uses the forum to give their views about development issues, corruption, education standards and other issues in the county.

*Sabaot Women Online* was also effective in empowering women from the region by providing them with a platform to air their views. The findings reveal that the social forum was used by women to share their challenges in society and to demand for their rights such as the right to own land and to vie for various elective posts in the region. As a result, most women especially the widows had been empowered to demand for land inheritance and their right to remarry after the death of their husbands in the conflict. More women from the region were also active in the political sphere as a result of empowerment from this social group.

The researcher sought the views of the respondents regarding the frequency of posting on Facebook. The findings are shown in Figure 4.21.



**Figure 4.21 Frequency of Facebook postings**

**Source: Field Data**

The findings in Figure 4.21 show that 21.2 per cent were active users of Facebook. 18.6 per cent indicated that they always posted messages on Facebook. 13.3 per cent of the respondents did not frequently post on Facebook frequently while 46.9 per cent of the respondents indicated that they never posted on Facebook.


Findings from KII and FGDs show that social group forums were effective in curbing hate speech in the region. Since the community was in the healing process, the residents were concerned about utterances that might throw the community back into another conflict. For this reason, the social media groups were used for sharing messages that were a threat to the community for reaction and views from the community members. Such messages were further forwarded to the relevant authorities for action. For instance, in September 2014, the area MP Hon. John Serut threatened a university student over his social media comments that accused the MP of unfair allocation of bursary funds (Kahawa, 2014). The threats, issued on phone, were recorded by the student and the audio clip shared in all the social media platforms locally and



nationally. The threats prompted the local security agents to launch investigation into the matter by asking the student to record a statement with the police. However, the findings show that no action was taken against the MP since due to unknown reasons, the student failed to record a statement against the MP.

**4.4.6 Effectiveness of twitter in Peacebuilding efforts in Mt Elgon region**

The researcher sought the views of respondents regarding their frequency of posting on twitter. The findings are shown in Figure 4.22.




**Figure 4. 22 Effectiveness of twitter in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**

From Figure 4.22, 7.2 per cent of the residents indicated that twitter was very effective in the peacebuilding process in the region. 26.5 per cent of the residents indicated that twitter was effective while 66.3 per cent indicated that it was not effective.

The findings reveal that twitter was not so efficient in the peacebuilding efforts. However, findings from KII and FGDs show that there were twitter groups such as *Mt Elgon peace tweets*, *Our Citizens* and the twitter groups in the TV stations (KTN and K24) which were promoting peace in the region as shown on in Table 4.11. The researcher went further to seek the views of the respondents regarding the frequency of posting on twitter. The findings are shown in Figure 4. 23.



**Figure 4.23 Frequency of posting on twitter**

**Source: Field Data**


The findings in Figure 4.23 show that twitter was not so popular among the residents. This is shown by 13.3 per cent of the respondents who frequently posted on twitter. 15.9 per cent of the respondents indicated that they always posted on twitter while 17.7 per cent of the respondents did not often post on twitter. The findings further show that majority of the respondents (53.1%) never posted on twitter. This can imply that the use of twitter in peacebuilding in the region had

not been fully embraced. And for this reason, twitter was not so effective in peacebuilding in the region.

Information from KII indicate that twitter was effective in curbing hate speech in the region since the messages could easily be accessed and acted upon by security agents. Thus twitter was further effective in providing early warning mechanism in the region. It further emerged that twitter was effective in empowering residents to give their views to organisations promoting peace in the region. To this end, twitter was effective in empowering the residents to give their views regarding the peacebuilding process in the region.

**4.4.7 Effectiveness of the web in peacebuilding efforts in Mt Elgon region**

To ascertain the effectiveness of web in the region, the researcher sought the views of the respondents regarding the matter. The results are indicated in Figure 4.24.



**Figure 4.24 Effectiveness of websites in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

**Source: Field Data**

Figure 4.24 shows that only 7.2 per cent of the respondents were of the opinion that websites were effective in the peacebuilding process. 13.2 per cent of the respondents indicated that websites were effective while the majority (79.6%) indicated that websites were not effective in the peacebuilding process. The implication of the findings is that websites had not been embraced by the actors in the region maybe due to unavailability of the Internet or due to lack of affordable services.

Interviews with key informants indicate that websites provided forums for residents to give their views during the peacebuilding process in the region. The actors who used websites to promote their peacebuilding activities included the *Imani Media*, Peace Tree Network, Amani Peoples Theatre, *Vijana Umoja Pamoja*, Kenya Red Cross Society, KAREU MPYA and the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya websites among others. The websites provided the residents with interactive discussion forums(blogs). For example, the KII shows that the information posted on *Imani Media* website enabled it to source for donors, friends and new partners to support them in their the peacebuilding efforts.

The results also show that websites were effective in establishing family links in the region. The Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) web page was used by the tracing volunteers in Bungoma, Mt Elgon and Trans Nzoia to search for missing persons. The tracing volunteers had special phones for taking pictures of the missing persons which would thereafter be posted on the KRCS webpage to enable other volunteers to tracing the person and reunite him or her with the family.

The websites were effective in documentation of human rights violations in the region. The findings show that Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKHRW) used the website to document all the torture cases, forced disappearance, killings and defilement cases from Mt

Elgon and file them before the international courts. It was expected that the courts would provide justice to the victims of the Mt Elgon conflict.

On the other hand, websites like SIDO global news and Sabaots.com were effective in providing updates on the news affecting the Sabaot community globally. The website was effective in providing news to the sabaots globally who could tune in to both local and international news from Mt Elgon and Minnesota respectively. Lastly, the websites were effective in promoting peace since they enabled the users to generate peace messages that could be read by all who could access the website.

#### **4.4.8 Effectiveness of other ICT tools in Peacebuilding efforts in Mt Elgon region**

The findings show that other ICT tools like Skype, butterfly cameras and satellite phones were not effective in the peacebuilding process since most actors did not have access to them. However, the findings indicate that satellite phones were only used by the KRCS and they were effective in coordination of the relief efforts in the region. This was especially in inaccessible areas and areas with poor network coverage. The satellite phones were effective in providing information about the state of affairs on the ground to the branch office. For instance, the KRCS personnel would send information about attacks from the SLDF, vehicle breakdown and so on. Such information would first be sent to the branch office in Bungoma which would take the appropriate measures to ensure the safety of its personnel.

The findings presented show that ICTs were very effective in facilitating the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region. For instance, radio was effective in dissemination of the Mabanga Peace Accord and facilitating inter-community dialogue. Other ICT tools such as mobile phones and Facebook groups were effective in promoting early warning and disseminating of peace messages among the residents in the region.

#### **4.5.1 Challenges of incorporating ICTs peacebuilding in Mt Elgon Region**

This section discusses the challenges facing the incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. The ICT tools discussed include radio, mobile phones, television, social media platforms and websites.

#### **4.5.2 Radios**

Information obtained from KII and FGDs show that radio was extensively used by all actors in the Mt Elgon conflict. As already discussed, the SLDF exploited the FM radios particularly *West FM* to advance their cause. Consequently, during the peacebuilding process, both the state and non-state actors used the platform to promote peace. However, the findings from KII and FGDs indicate *West FM* fanned the conflict by focusing on sensational use and offering a platform to the SLDF leaders to advance their cause. This raised questions of credibility of the radio station as a neutral platform. Since *West FM* was located in Bungoma which was predominantly dominated by Bukusu community, it could imply that the Sabaot community had lost credibility in the radio station. Similarly, most of the FM radio stations were accused of fanning the 2007/2008 PEV in Kenya due to the use of inflammatory language (Allen & Gagliardone 2011). Findings from KII show that *West FM* sensationalized the conflict in the region. Thus, the local FM stations could be a threat to peace in the region if the reporters are not adequately trained on reporting social and political issues.

During the peacebuilding process, local FM radio stations played a critical role in reconciling the Sabaot clans and initiating the inter-community dialogue in the region. Hattotuwa (2004) argues that ICTs augment stakeholder interventions by providing platforms to the marginalised actors which would not otherwise be possible. Findings from KII show that *West FM*, *Radio Mambo* and *Imani Radio* provided platforms for various actors including the state and the non-

state actors such as the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK), the Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) and the Sabaot Council of Elders to initiate peace programmes. However, sustained peace in the region depends on cooperation outside the ICT interventions. Findings from KII indicate that the politicians from the region were not committed to supporting the peace process since most of them never used the platforms to preach peace in the region. This was in spite of the fact that studies conducted in the region implicated most of them in the 2006-2008 conflict in Mt Elgon (HRW, 2008; HRW, 2011; Kamoet, 2011; Simiyu, 2008). The non-involvement of the local politicians in the peacebuilding process could derail the peace process in the long run.

Findings from KII show that radio and local newspapers were used to disseminate the Mabanga Peace Accord. However, findings from FGDs indicate that the Mabanga Peace Accord had not fully reached the community members at the grassroots level since most of the community members either did not have radios or listened to the local FM stations since there were other national FM radio stations competing with them. For example, findings from KII show that some Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) and the police were not aware of the reconciliation of the ex-militia to the community were harassing the youth who had surrendered in Trans Nzoia. This could pose a challenge to peace in the region since the feelings of rejection could lead to formation of other militia groups. The amnesty for the residents to surrender illegal weapons was mainly done on radio. However, at the time of data collection, findings from KII and FGDs indicated that most of the arms had not been surrendered to the government. This was mainly because most of the SLDF members were in hiding and could not access radio at the time the amnesty was offered. At the same time, the 2008 military intervention also never embarked on disarmament of the residents. It was therefore feared that the guns could pose a threat to peace in the region.

The findings further show that use of radio in peacebuilding did not target all the community members. Most of the peace programmes targeted the ex-militia, youth, women, elders and community members in general. For instance, most of the local FM stations did not have peacebuilding programmes for children. It was thus feared that most of the children were still traumatised since they had not been involved in the peace process. In addition, peace programmes were aired when children were in school or late in the evening when they supposed to be doing their homework. This means that comprehensive peacebuilding must be all-inclusive.

The findings further indicated that there were few community radios in the region. Most of the radio stations such as *West FM*, *Radio Mambo* and *Nyota FM* broadcast in Kiswahili and were located in Bungoma. As a result, it was difficult for them to communicate to the illiterate members from the Sabaot community or to have them participate in the call-in sessions. Findings from KII further show that FM stations which broadcast in the vernacular allocated less airtime to Sabaot community. Similarly, the community radios which were available for the Sabaot community included *BK FM*, *Kalya FM* and *Sabo Sema Radio* and *Imani Media*. However, similar to the previously mentioned radio stations, they could not target all the communities in the region such as the Bukusu or Teso due to language barrier. The findings show that most of the FM radio stations strove to be inclusive by inviting presenters from all the communities in the region to address the peace issue. There was also a negative perception by the community members about the radio stations which were not from their community. As a result, most of them did not listen to radio stations from other communities. This could be a challenge to promoting cohesion among the three major tribes in the region (Sabaot, Bukusu and Teso).



Another challenge of incorporating radio in the peace process was poor coverage and access to radio. For instance, *BK FM* was only available in Mt Elgon Sub-County. As a result, the actors using these platforms to preach peace could not reach all the residents in the region with peace messages. Similarly, *Sabo Sema Radio* located in Kitale reached the Sabaot, Pokot and Sengwer tribes in Trans Nzoia with peace messages. However, when it was relocated to Kapenguria in 2013, it lost coverage in Kitale and the surrounding areas. As a result, it was not very effective in targeting the entire region with peacebuilding programmes.

Findings from KII indicate that the Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) avoided using the media in its peace programmes. This was because the media often distorted and misrepresented information. A notable example is the *Radio Citizen* which implicated Honourable Wilberforce Kisiero to the 1992/1997 land clashes in Trans Nzoia and Mt Elgon Districts. This led to his degazettement from the National Land Commission on Historical Land Injustices Task Force (HLIT) and subsequent replacement with Peter Chemaswet. But as already mentioned in the previous sections, the replacement was not welcomed by the community members thus casting doubt to realisation of historical land injustice in the region. Findings from the KII also indicate that some of the non-state actors were using the media for propaganda in order to continue receiving funding from the donors. For instance, in late 2015, some non-state actors broadcast false reports of was regrouping of the SLDF in the region. Findings from KII reveal that the information was being used by some non-state actors to continue receiving funds for their projects from the donors.

The sustainability of the ICT interventions was another challenge facing the peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. Information from the KII show that most of the peace programmes relied on donor funding. For instance, there was doubt whether the FPFK peace programmes aired on local FM stations would run for long since most donor projects were short time. In addition,

most of the local FM stations relied on advertising to run their programmes and could not thus offer free airtime for peace programmes in Mt Elgon. The lack of donor support for continued peace programmes could thus be a threat to peace programmes in the region.

#### **4.5.3 Mobile phones**

Findings from the KII show that the SLDF exploited mobile phones during the conflict whereby the community members were asked to buy mobile phones and airtime for the SLDF. However during the peacebuilding process, the mobile phones were used for networking, dissemination of peace messages and coordination of relief efforts among others.

The findings from KII and FGDs however show that the use of the mobile phones was hampered by poor network coverage and unavailability of electricity for charging the phone thus making it unreliable in some regions especially in Chepkitale moorland, parts of Kopsiro and areas along the forest belt. As a result, mobile phone usage was unreliable in disseminating peace messages in these areas among the actors involved in the peace process and the residents in these areas.

Findings from KII show that mobile phones provided early warning mechanism to the peace monitors in the region. For example, the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya issued mobile phones in hot spot areas to help curb insecurity. It was however feared that the early warning system which relied on SMS was bound to be short-lived if the donors withdrew their support. Similarly, the District Peace Committee members had been empowered to relay information to the NCIC website via the SMS. However, the use of peace monitors raised safety issues among the users since they could become targets by criminals in the community. This was supported by findings from Wigger (2011) who argued that there were challenges of using mobile phones in

civilian protection since any conversation with protection actors could put people at risk because of the sensitive nature of the information collected.

Findings from KII and FGDs also indicate that the use of Mobile phones and SMS to curb crime in the region was hampered by biased government officials who did not act on reports given by the residents. As a result, there was often delay by government officials to act in time of crisis. Findings from KII also indicate that the residents feared calling the police and other government officials and instead relied on members of the District Peace Committees who would relay the same information to the security agents. The long channels of communication often relayed response in crisis. The use of mobile phones in peacebuilding especially by the grassroots population was hampered by the high costs of SMS and calls charged by mobile phone users. Oloo (2012) argues that the development of ICTs in Kenya is driven by business including the telecommunications operators who seek profit rather than the public service.

The use of coded messages also posed a threat to peace. The use of SMS for early warning in the region was a challenge to peace for example, if the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya tension indicators manual guide strayed to the residents, it could easily be misused for raising alarmists reporting in the region (see appendix 9). Findings from KII also show that mobile phones could be used to spread hate speech thus derailing the peace process. This was mainly because mobile phones were extensively used by the SLDF to issue threats to the residents and demand for 'tax' which had to be sent by *M-pesa* (Kamoet, 2011). The findings from KII further show that some politicians from the region used the mobile phones to threaten the residents opposed to their leadership styles. Thus the misuse of mobile phones could be a threat to the entire peace process.

#### **4.5.4 Television**

Findings from KII, FGDs and questionnaires show that TV was used by the actors involved in peacebuilding process in the region. The findings also show that a number of TV such as *K24*, *KTN*, *NTV*, *Imani TV* and *Citizen TV* had peace programmes for Mt Elgon region. However, the findings indicate that lack of access to TV coupled with lack of electricity in most parts of the region meant that the actors involved in the peace process could not reach all the residents. Lack of access to the TV was also due to inability of the residents to acquire the digital set top boxes.

The proliferation of TV stations in the region was a great impediment to reaching the residents with peace programmes. Although the findings in Figure 4.6 show that *K24* was the leading station with peace programmes for Mt Elgon region, findings from KII and FGDs show that most residents watched *K24* and *Citizen TV* instead. The implication was that the peace programmes in particular TV stations could fail to reach the intended audience who had different preferences to TV channels.

Findings from the KII show that some non-state actors like the Justice and Peace Commission did not use the media for fear of misrepresentation. In addition, the media had also been accused of giving false information thus casting doubt to its credibility. The findings further show that TV was prone to focusing on sensational news and negative coverage from the region such as teenage pregnancies and allegations of regrouping of militia groups. Findings from KII indicate the some non-state actors were giving false reports from the region in order to get funding from their donors.

The findings indicate that most of the TV programmes lacked vernacular content. This was an impediment to the peace process given the high levels of illiteracy in the region which affected the residents' interpretation and comprehension. Furthermore, the findings reveal that most of

the TV stations covering peacebuilding programmes were national broadcasters which devoted less airtime to their programmes. Findings from KII and questionnaires show that *Imani TV* was the only privately-owned TV station in the region.

Although ICTs can augment stakeholder interventions, the findings from KII show that the political leaders were not committed to promoting peace in the region. This was because most of them never used the TV to preach peace in the region. This implies that the success of ICT interventions depended on other factors such as political goodwill and support.

Finally, findings from KII show that most TV stations did not have programmes for children affected by the conflict in Mt Elgon region. This was in spite of the fact that there were many orphans in the region as a result of the SLDF menace. Furthermore, the conflict traumatised the residents of the region including the children. The fact that there were no TV programmes targeting children with peace messages could be an impediment to the entire peace process since successful peacebuilding should involve all the actors in the affected community (Hattotuwa, 2004).

#### **4.5.5 Social media platforms**

Findings from questionnaires and KII indicate that the social media platforms which were extensively used in the peacebuilding process in the region were Facebook and Twitter. These were basically people-driven initiatives to support the healing process in the region. The findings however, show that Facebook groups and twitter accounts were popular among the youth who were often accused of using the platforms to propagate hate speech. The findings are agreement with a study by Gujer (2011) who notes that Facebook and other social networks are still new and are therefore used more by the younger people. During political crises, this may lead to distortions since the views of the users are not always the views representative of the

whole population (Gujer, 2011). The findings also show that the politicians were using the platforms to propagate hate speech and attack their opponents.

Findings from KII show that the *Sabaot Peoples Online* was dominated by the *Book* sub-clan who looked down upon the other clans. As a result, most residents were not giving their contributions on that forum. This could derail the healing process in the region since peacebuilding was supposed to be all-inclusive.

Findings from KII also indicate that the older generation in the community only used the platform to get informed on current issues and to ‘read’ the mindset of the youth and hardly gave their contributions. A further inquiry into the issue revealed that lack of confidentiality in the social media platforms discouraged the community members from exploiting them. This could derail the healing process in the region since the use of ICTs in peacebuilding is tied to issues of trust between key stakeholders (Oloo, 2012). The unwillingness to share information in social media platforms and lack of collaboration among the older members of society was a challenge to the peace process since it was only the views of the youth which were being posted.

Findings from KII show that lack of access to mobile phones especially the smart phones deterred most community members from using the social media platforms. This could create new inequalities in the region even as the healing process was going on. The findings also show that computer illiteracy and lack of affordable broadband deterred community members from accessing and using the mobile phones beyond the voice and SMS. For example, the *Sabaot Women Online* Facebook group was only used by the elites in the region. As a result, most illiterate women could not use the platform to air their views. Similarly, the use of twitter accounts in the region was hampered by computer illiteracy. For this matter, the twitter accounts

such as *Mt Elgon peace tweets* and *Our citizens* were restricted to the youth and elites in the community.

#### **4.5.6 Web sites**

The findings from KII and questionnaires show that the use of websites in the region was restricted to a few actors who posted information on their website. Findings from the KII show that the Internet use was launched by some actors to enable the participants to give their views regarding the healing process in the region. For example, *Imani Media* website had a feedback page for the viewers. However, due to junk messages the use of the Internet was stopped in 2011. This implied that the residents could no longer give their views regarding the healing process in the region.

The findings further indicate that the use of the Internet was limited by computer illiteracy and access to the Internet among many residents in the region. This also was coupled with the fact that there were very few ICT centres in the region. For this reason, the use of the Internet was mostly limited to state and non-state actors who used it to keep record of their activities on the ground. Such actors included *Imani Media*, Peace Tree Network, Amani Peoples Theatre, *Vijana Umoja Pamoja*, Kenya Red Cross Society, KAREU MPYA and the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission.

The slow growth of the Internet in the region was due to limited infrastructure including fibre optic cable and electricity. For instance, some areas in Kopsiro Division got electricity when the government introduced rural electrification programme in 2014. This implies that there was low Internet usage by the actors involved in the peacebuilding process.

Another challenge to the use of the website was mail hacking. Findings from KII show that the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch which was handling human rights abuses by the military

and the SLDF had its website hacked. This was seen as a move to obliterate all torture claims from the region especially when the military was carrying out the *Operation Okoa Maisha* (Operation Save Lives) in 2008. Following the hacking, the WKHRW took precautions by deleting all information from their website immediately it was sent to Geneva and Arusha Court of Justice.

#### **4.5.7 Other ICT tools**

The findings show that the use of other ICT tools such as the satellite phones, butterfly cameras, high frequency radios (HF) and very high frequency (VHF) radios in peacebuilding in the region was very minimal. Lack of access was the greatest challenge to incorporating these tools in the peacebuilding process. The findings from KII show that they were only restricted to a few actors. For instance, the HF and VHF radios were limited to the police and the Kenya Red Cross Society. The satellite phones were also limited to the Kenya Red Cross Personnel while the butterfly cameras were not applied in the peacebuilding process.

The findings indicate that the challenges which faced the incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region included lack of access to ICT tools such television and Internet. Other challenges included poor infrastructure in the region which hindered the use of mobile phones, Internet and TV in some areas in the region. This was also coupled with unavailability of electricity in some areas of the region.



#### 4.5.8 Pearson correlation test on ICTs and peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region

To confirm whether there were any significant relationships between ICTs and peacebuilding in the region, the findings were subjected to a cross tabulation and the findings analysed using pearson correlation test as shown in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1 Pearson correlation test on ICTs and peacebuilding**

		Are ICTs important in peacebuilding the religion	List of ICT tools used in promoting peace
Are ICTs important in peacebuilding in the region	Pearson Correlation	1	.326**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	239	277
List of ICT tools used in promoting peace	Pearson Correlation	.326**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	239	272

\*\* . Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Source: Field Data**

The results in table 4.1 indicate that  $P= 0.01$ . This means that there is a significant relationship between ICTs and peacebuilding in the region. From the correlation (Pearson Correlation - approaching 1 from the positive) of response by the residents on the importance of ICT in peacebuilding in the region verses the number of ICT tools used in promoting peace, it depicts that peacebuilding can be achieved with the intense use of ICT in the region of Mt Elgon. The positive value .326\*\* of Pearson Correlation implies that the peacebuilding heavily relied on ICT from the data collected from the respondents.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents a summary of the findings regarding the role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. This is followed by conclusions drawn from research findings, recommendations and areas for further research.

#### **5.1 Summary of the findings**

This study aimed at addressing peacebuilding at the grassroots level. More importantly, it addressed the role of ICTs in the peacebuilding efforts in Mt Elgon region following the 2006-2008 intra-ethnic conflict. The objectives of the study were to identify the actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region, examine the ICT tools used in peacebuilding in the region, the application of ICTs to the peacebuilding process, the effectiveness of ICTs in the peacebuilding efforts in the region and the challenges of incorporating ICTs in the peacebuilding process in the region.

The study used the conflict transformation theory which indicates that peace can be initiated by different actors employing various approaches at any level of the conflict. The levels of peacebuilding included social aspect which involved the restoration of intra-community and inter-community relationships, psychological and economic peacebuilding. The conflict transformation theory also confirms that the actors can employ various ICTs in their peacebuilding efforts in order to empower the residents to fully participate in the peacebuilding process. Both the state and the non-state actors were involved in the peacebuilding process in

Mt Elgon region. The state deployed the security forces which helped restore normalcy in the region. Thereafter, it was involved in resolving the contentious land issue in Chepyuk settlement scheme by initiating the resettlement exercise for the displaced population in 2013.

The state also initiated the District Peace Committees which were instrumental in promoting peace at the grassroots level. The non-state actors included the non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations, Community-based organisations and civil society organisations which initiated various programmes aimed at restoring the relationships between the Sabaot clans, promoting healing and restoring the economy of the region. Among them were the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya, Justice and Peace Commission, the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch, Rural Women Peace Link, Mount Elgon Peace Initiative, Peace Tree Network and Amani Peoples Theatre among others.

The ICTs which were employed in the peacebuilding process included radio, TV, mobile phones and SMSs, Internet, VHF radios and social media platforms that is Facebook and twitter. The study found out that the ICTs were used in information gathering and sharing among the various actors. They also acted as a source of early warning, dissemination of peacebuilding messages among the community members and peacebuilding actors as well mobilisation the community members to participate in the peacebuilding process.

The findings show that ICTs were applied in the restoration of the social relations between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo* clans by offering a platform for communication. These efforts, which were initiated by the Free Pentecostal of Fellowship Kenya, the District Peace Committees (DPCs) and the Sabaot council of elders enabled the members from the two clans to begin the peacebuilding process. As discussed earlier on in the study, the conflict in the region was mainly between the *Soy* and *Ndorobo*. Their relationships had been characterised by hatred and

animosity. But through ICTs, especially radio, mobile phones and SMSs the community was able to reconcile and initiate joint peace projects. The DPCs extended the reconciliation efforts to other tribes in the region (Bukusu and Teso) with a bid to encouraging peaceful coexistence. The findings in chapter 4 had shown that the region had experienced cyclic conflicts especially in the electioneering periods. Thus, ICTs was extensively applied in restoration and promotion peaceful coexistence in the region.

The findings further reveal that ICTs were effective in enabling the actors in the region to finalise the resettlement exercise in the Chepyuk settlement scheme. The actors utilised radio, social media platforms, mobile phones, SMSs and public forums to identify genuine beneficiaries of the Chepyuk III. The findings show that ICTs empowered the residents to give their suggestions regarding the resettlement exercise and in mobilising the beneficiaries to attend the vetting exercise.

The findings also show that ICTs enabled the youth to participate in the peacebuilding process in the region. These initiatives were attained through the incorporation of various ICTs that enabled the youth to express their views regarding the peacebuilding process. Social media platforms such as Facebook groups and twitter accounts, which were popular among the youth, were used in spreading peace messages among the youth from all the Sabaot clans. The most popular Facebook groups were *Sabaot Peoples online*, *Sabaot people's Forum*, *Sabaot County*, *Mount Elgon News Network* and *Bungoma County 411*. On the other hand, the trending twitter accounts in the region were *Mount Elgon peace tweets* and *Our Citizens*.

The study also found the youth exploited their talents in creative arts to spread peace messages, promote civic education, and preach reconciliation among the Sabaot clans and advocate for the

protection of human rights. The groups which utilised creative arts in their advocacy campaigns included *Amani Peoples Theatre, Socially Educative Team, and Vijana Umoja Pamoja*.

Lastly, the findings show that a number of challenges faced the incorporation of ICTs in the peacebuilding process in the region. These included lack of access to the ICT tools such as TV, Internet and radio. Other challenges included computer illiteracy which hindered the residents from exploiting the Internet and mobile phones beyond the SMS and voice calls. Poor network coverage and infrastructure especially in regions bordering the forest belt was also a major hindrance in exploiting the mobile phone technology. In addition, lack of electricity in most parts of the region hindered the community members from accessing peace programmes promoted on TV or Internet.

## **5.2 Conclusions**

The study established that both the state and non-state actors were involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region. The state actors restored normalcy in the region thus providing a conducive environment for non-state actors to embark on post-conflict peacebuilding. In addition, the state actors finalised the resettlement process in the contentious Chepyuk III and formed the District Peace Committees whose task was to monitor peace at the grassroots level. The non-state actors on the other hand engaged in the reconciliation process among the Sabaot clans which culminated in the signing of the Mabanga Peace Accord. In addition, the ICTs facilitated the healing process among the clans by offering psychosocial counselling, economic recovery and advocacy of human rights. The non-state actors which participated in the healing process in the region included the Free Pentecostal Fellowship in Kenya, Justice and Peace Commission, the Western Kenya Human Rights Watch and Mount Elgon Peace Initiative among others.

The study established that ICTs were used by the various actors involved in the peacebuilding process in the region. The ICTs facilitated the peacebuilding process by ensuring grassroots incorporation of the residents in the peacebuilding efforts. The study shows that the frequently used ICTs were radios, mobile phones, TV and social media platforms like Facebook and twitter. The findings show that local radio stations and mobile phones were very effective in empowering the community members to participate in the peace process. These social media platforms especially Facebook groups in the region enabled the community members to monitor peace in the region as well as generate their own content especially on promoting coexistence among the *Soy* and *Ndorobo*. The information was shared in the social media platforms like Sabaot Peoples Online and other groups in the region. ICTs also empowered the residents to initiate their own peacebuilding initiatives. This involved the formation of local community based organisations (CBOs) to spearhead peacebuilding at the grassroots level. The CBOs also enabled the community members to initiate economic activities to promote self-reliance after the economic collapse that led to poverty in many areas in the region. The residents relied on mobile phones (SMSs and voice recordings) and social media platforms for information sharing.

The study also established that ICTs had greatly contributed to peaceful coexistence among all the communities in the region. This was as a result of the intercommunity dialogue meetings that were facilitated by the local FM stations and social media platforms that enabled region to have negotiated democracy in the 2013 general elections. The inclusivity of all communities in the leadership positions was an indication of ethnic tolerance which would avert future ethnic conflicts in the region.

The use of ICTs provided surveillance to the security agents and other actors. Information on the tension levels in the region initiated by the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya and the District Peace Committees enabled the actors monitor the situation on the ground on daily basis and provide early intervention. Mobile phones especially provided platforms that empowered the community members to be peace monitors thus encouraging participatory peacebuilding. In addition, the social media platforms enabled the community members to share information, spread peace messages and give their views regarding the entire peacebuilding process in the region.

The study further found that ICTs were effective in the advocacy for human rights of the residents in the region. ICTs had empowered the residents to report human rights abuses to the related authorities for appropriate action. ICTs had also enabled the marginalised members of the community to participate in elections. In addition, more children especially girls were accessing education because of the civic education conducted through radio and other platforms in the region.

However, lack of access to ICTs especially TV, satellite phones and the Internet hindered the community members from exploiting these ICTs. In addition, lack of electricity and poor network coverage in some areas in the region hindered the community members from incorporating these ICTs in the peace process.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

The study recommends that for sustained peacebuilding in the region, there should be local peace initiatives by the community members. This was because most non-state actors in the region relied on donor funding and their programmes were bound to be short-lived. It is also recommended that the actors should use ICTs for networking and collaboration in order to avoid

duplication of peace programmes in the region. The study further recommends that the actors (especially non-state actors) should avoid misusing the media for their selfish gain such as giving false reports in order to continue receiving funding from donors. Lastly, since the local politicians were blamed for instigating the conflict in the region, they should also be actively involved in preaching peace in the region using the various ICTs tools instead of being passive players in the peace process.

The study found that radio was the most effective ICT tool in the region. However, it was found that the radio stations allocated less airtime for peace programmes in Mt Elgon. This is because most of the stations (apart from *BK FM*, *Kalya FM* and *Sabo Sema*) were owned by other communities in the region. The study recommends that there is need of initiating community radios in the region in order to foster more community participation in the peacebuilding process. The study also recommends that the actors should come up with peace programmes for children since they were also affected by the conflict. In addition, there is need for the government to come up with frameworks of censoring the mass media and the social media platforms in order to curb hate speech and alarmist reports especially by the non-state actors who may want to create unnecessary tension in the region by giving false information. The study also recommends that the government should come up with a clear policy on the incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding in order to guide the actors involved in peacebuilding in various parts of the country.

The study further recommends that the actors in the region should initiate a frontline software programme to enable community members participate fully in the advocacy campaigns by sending free SMSs to the human rights advocates. This is because the SMSs and mobile charges were too expensive for the community members. This would ensure timely and accurate reporting of human rights abuses.



To avoid future conflicts in the region, the study recommends that the government should strengthen its early warning mechanisms in order to intervene before conflicts escalate to crisis level. This could also be done by platforms such as frontline SMS for information sharing between the community members and the state agents.

The study makes various recommendations regarding the Chepyuk III. First, the government should issue land title deeds to the beneficiaries of Chepyuk III and Saboti land in Trans Nzoia in order to avoid political manipulation of the resettlement exercise. Secondly, the youth should be empowered economically to avoid being manipulated by the politicians. These could be achieved by initiating ICTs centres in the region to enable the youth share their challenges on the Internet with other youth nationally and internationally. Lastly, the political leaders from the region should use ICTs such as local radio stations, television and social media platforms to preach peace in order to promote peaceful coexistence amongst the community members in the region.

In order to fully incorporate ICTs in the peacebuilding process, the study recommends that the government and other stakeholders should establish ICT centers in major institutions of learning to enhance computer literacy and efficiency of ICTs in peacebuilding in the region. The study further recommends that the stakeholders in the region should improve of surveillance by initiating geographic information systems and satellite imaging. Furthermore, the government should install CCTV cameras and butterfly in all public offices to enhance security. This will help in curbing criminal activities in the region. The same technologies can also enhance the demobilisation campaigns in the region since the security agents and other actors can use the ICTs such as SMSs to forecast trouble spots and map conflict zones.

The study findings show that teachers had the potential of initiating peace among children and the youth by initiating peacebuilding at the school level. However, the study found that most

institutions of learning in the region were inadequately equipped and lacked electricity. The study thus recommends that ICT tools especially computers and the Internet should be provided in various schools to enable the stakeholders in the education sector to incorporate them in peace education. In addition, the government should provide fiber optic cables in the region to facilitate Internet use among teachers, learners, community members and other stakeholders from the region. This is because the community members can use the Internet to generate and share peace messages. Lastly, the government should mainstream peace education in the school curriculum in order to build a peace culture among all learners in the country.

The study found that the region was agriculturally productive hence the frequent conflicts of the land. The study thus makes the following recommendations regarding the agricultural productivity in the region: First, ICTs such as the mass media and mobile phones, and the Internet should be used to help farmers market their produce in the regional and national market. Secondly, there is need of using ICTs to educate the community members on alternative means of livelihood such as initiating small scale business. And third, the county governments should improve infrastructure in the region in order to enable the community members and traders to access markets. The improvement in infrastructure will facilitate timely response and access by the security officers thus helping them fight crime. This is because the rugged terrain in the region made it inaccessible to security agents and greatly contributed to formation of militia groups which terrorised the residents for almost three years.

Although ICTs were effective in arms surrender by some militia groups, the study established that many arms were still in the hands of the civilians and could pose security threats in future. The study thus makes the following recommendations: First, The government should consider installing ICTs like closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and butterfly cameras in all the borders in order to reduce proliferation of SALWs.

Secondly, the government should consider conducting a disarmament exercise in Mt Elgon region and West Pokot County in order to reduce proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) in the region. Thirdly, there should be close border patrols and surveillance of the porous Kenya-Uganda border particularly Suam border in Tran Nzoia East Sub-County, Trans Nzoia County; Chepkube border in Cheptais Sub-County and Lwakhakha borders in Bungoma West-Sub County, Bungoma County; and Malaba border in Teso North Sub-County, Busia County. Lastly, the government should strengthen and support the use of ICTs such as mobile phones and SMSs among the residents to enable them eliminate other criminal groups in the region like *Lori Kumi*, February Eighteenth Revolutionary Movement (FERA), *Moja Kwisha*, MDF, *Baghdad Boys*, Moorland Forces, Home Boys and others to avoid future militarisation of the region. The use of SMSs and mobile phones will also enhance early warning system in the region. Security in the region can also be achieved by enhancing the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative in the region that empowers the residents to take control of the security within their neighbourhoods.

Although ICTs particularly TV and radio were effective in highlighting the SLDF menace in the region, the findings show that TV has been focusing on negative reports from the region. For instance, there was much focus on teenage pregnancies and school drop-outs among others. The study recommends that the mass media should also focus on the peace initiatives in the region such as the Sabaot cultural days and intercultural meetings. In addition, TV should promote the tourist attraction sites in the region such as the hills, caves and waterfalls in order to boost tourism industry and encourage investment in the region. Furthermore, ICTs should be used in promoting and nurturing the talents of the youth (drama, debates and songs) involved in peacebuilding in the region.

Lastly, the study recommends that ICT centres in the region should be constructed in order to promote computer literacy. In addition, the government should improve infrastructure in the region such as provision of electricity, road construction and provision of fibre optic to enable the community access Internet and television. In addition, the government should initiate the provision of free computers and Internet to schools to enable the students and teachers to promote peace education on Internet.

#### **5.4 Recommendations for future research**

The study recommends future research in the following areas:

- The role of ICTs in restoration of interpersonal communication in Mt Elgon region.
- The role of non-state actors in peacebuilding among pastoralist communities in Kenya
- The role of teachers in fostering peace education in schools
- ICT as a tool for peace education in schools in Kenya
- The role of ICTs in resolving cross-border conflicts among pastoral communities.
- The role of women in peacebuilding in conflict-torn societies in Kenya.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1 Questionnaire for community members

Case No.

I am a PhD candidate at Kabarak University undertaking a research on the “**Role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon Region**”. Owing to your status as a resident of Mt Elgon region, you have been selected to take part in this study. The results of this study will be used for academic purposes only. Please respond to the questions asked.

#### 1.0 Background information

1.1 County \_\_\_\_\_

1.2 Sub-County \_\_\_\_\_

1.3 District \_\_\_\_\_

1.4 Division \_\_\_\_\_

1.5 Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.6 Sub-Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.7 Occupation \_\_\_\_\_

#### 2.0 Demographic Information

2.1 Gender: Male  Female

2.2 Age bracket 18-25  26-30  31-40  41-50  51 and above

#### 3.0 Educational Level

Primary  Secondary  Tertiary/College  University

None

**4.0 Peacebuilding initiatives in the region**

**4.1** Are there efforts to rebuild the region after the conflict?

Yes  No

**4.2 a)** Are both the state and non-state actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region?

Yes  No

b) Please list the state actors involved in peacebuilding in the region:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

c) Please list the non-state actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

**4.3** Please indicate the peacebuilding activities initiated by these actors

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

**4.4** Have you ever participated in these peacebuilding efforts?

Yes  No

Briefly explain

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**4.5** What is the community's response towards the peacebuilding efforts?

Positive       Negative       Don't know

**5.0 ICTs and peacebuilding**

**5.1(a)** Have ICTs been incorporated in peacebuilding in the region?

Yes       No

(b) If yes, please indicate the ICTs used in peacebuilding in the region

<b>ICT</b>	<b>Most Frequent</b>	<b>Frequent</b>	<b>Not Frequent</b>
Radio			
Mobile Phones			
Television			
Facebook			
Twitter			
Website			
Satellite cameras			
Butterfly cameras			
VHF Radio			
HF Radio			
Skype			
Satellite phones			
Satellite Radio			
Others			



**5.2** Please indicate the effectiveness of these ICTs in peacebuilding efforts

<b>ICT</b>	<b>Very effective</b>	<b>Effective</b>	<b>Not effective</b>
Radio			
Mobile Phones			
Television			
Facebook			
Twitter			
Website			
Satellite cameras			
Butterfly cameras			
VHF Radio			
HF Radio			
Skype			
Satellite phones			
Satellite Radio			
Others			

**6.1** How have the various ICTs contributed to the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

**6.2 a)** Do you think the peace initiatives will bring a lasting peace in the region?

Yes

No

b) Briefly explain

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**6.3** Please indicate your recommendation to the actors involved in peacebuilding.

1.

2

3

4

**6.4** Indicate the challenges of incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding efforts in Mt Elgon region

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**6.5** What is your recommendation on how ICTs can best be incorporated in peacebuilding?

1.

2

3

**6.6** Any other recommendation

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**Thank you.**

## Appendix 2 Interview guide for Sub-County administrators

I am a PhD candidate at Kabarak University undertaking a research on the “**Role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon Region**”. Owing to your status as a resident of Mt Elgon region, you have been selected to take part in this study. The results of this study will be used for academic purposes only. Please respond to the questions asked.

### 1.0 Background information

1.1 County \_\_\_\_\_

1.2 Sub-County \_\_\_\_\_

1.3 District \_\_\_\_\_

1.4 Division \_\_\_\_\_

1.5 Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.6 Sub-Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.7 Occupation \_\_\_\_\_

### 2.0 Demographic Information

2.1 Gender:      Male               Female

2.2 Age bracket 18-25  26-30  31-40  41-50  51 and above

### 3.0 Educational Level

Primary       Secondary       Tertiary/College       University

None

### 4.0 Peacebuilding efforts in Mt Elgon region

a) Name the actors involved in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region

- b) Please indicate the peacebuilding initiatives in the region
- c) How do you involve the community in your peacebuilding initiatives?
- d) Which areas are the peacebuilding efforts concentrated?

### **5.0 ICTs and peacebuilding efforts**

- a) What is the contribution of ICTs towards in peacebuilding in the region?
- b) Name the ICTs tools that are frequently used in peacebuilding efforts.
- c) What is the effectiveness of these tools in the peacebuilding process?
- d) What challenges do you face regarding incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region?
- e) What challenges do you face in your peacebuilding efforts?
- f) Do you think the peacebuilding initiatives will bring a long-lasting peace in the region?
- g) What is your recommendation regarding the peacebuilding approaches in the region?
- h) What is your recommendation to the actors involved in peacebuilding in the region?
- i) What are your recommendations on the best way ICTs can be incorporated in peacebuilding

## Appendix 3 Interview guide for community leaders

I am a PhD candidate at Kabarak University undertaking a research on the “**Role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon Region**”. Owing to your status as a resident of Mt Elgon region, you have been selected to take part in this study. The results of this study will be used for academic purposes only. Please respond to the questions asked.

### 2.0 Background information

1.1 County \_\_\_\_\_

1.2 Sub-County \_\_\_\_\_

1.3 District \_\_\_\_\_

1.4 Division \_\_\_\_\_

1.5 Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.6 Sub-Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.7 Occupation \_\_\_\_\_

### 2.0 Demographic Information

2.1 Gender:      Male               Female

2.2 Age bracket 18-25  26-30  31-40  41-50  51 and above

### 3.0 Educational Level

Primary       Secondary       Tertiary/College       University

None

### 4.0 ICTs and peacebuilding

a) Do ICTs play any role in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region?

- b) List some of the ICTs used in peacebuilding.
- c) What is their contribution to the peacebuilding process in the region?
- d) Which actors are involved in peacebuilding in the region?
- e) How can ICTs be used in peacebuilding?
- f) Should ICTs be incorporated in other sectors of the society?
- g) Do you think the community has fully embraced ICTs?
- h) What is your view regarding the incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding?
- i) What are the challenges of incorporating ICTs to the peacebuilding process?

**5.0 Peacebuilding efforts in the region**

- a) What peacebuilding initiatives exist in the region?
- b) Which actors are actively involved in peacebuilding efforts in the region?
- c) What efforts have you made to ensure the involvement of the whole community in peacebuilding efforts?
- d) How effective are the peacebuilding efforts in the region?
- e) What efforts have you put in place in resettling the squatters in the region?
- f) What mechanisms do you use to identify the genuine squatters?
- g) Apart from the squatters, do you have other peacebuilding initiatives for those who were affected in one way or another by the conflict?
- h) What measures have you put in place to address the human rights abuses meted on the community by the security forces and the militia groups?
- i) Are there any efforts to rehabilitate the ex-combatants in the region?
- j) What peacebuilding efforts do you think should be introduced to bring a lasting peace in the region?

**6.0** What are your recommendations on the peacebuilding process in Mt Elgon region?

**7.0** What is your recommendation to the peacebuilding actors in the region?

**8.0** What are your recommendation on the best way of incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding?

## Appendix 4 Interview guide for non-state actors

I am a PhD candidate at Kabarak University undertaking a research on the “**Role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon Region**”. Owing to your status as a resident of Mt Elgon region, you have been selected to take part in this study. The results of this study will be used for academic purposes only. Please respond to the questions asked.

### 3.0 Background information

1.1 County \_\_\_\_\_

1.2 Sub-County \_\_\_\_\_

1.3 District \_\_\_\_\_

1.4 Division \_\_\_\_\_

1.5 Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.6 Sub-Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.7 Occupation \_\_\_\_\_

### 2.0 Demographic Information

2.1 Gender: Male  Female

2.2 Age bracket 18-25  26-30  31-40  41-50  51 and above

### 3.0 Educational Level

Primary  Secondary  Tertiary/College  University

None

#### **4.0 ICTs and Peacebuilding in the region**

- a) Indicate your peacebuilding initiatives
- b) How often do you organise the peacebuilding efforts?
- c) Where are your peacebuilding efforts concentrated?
- d) Who are the targets of your peacebuilding efforts?
- e) How does the community participate in peacebuilding efforts
- f) Explain the effectiveness of these activities in bringing a long-lasting peace in the region

#### **5.0 ICTs and peacebuilding**

- a) Have you incorporated ICTs in your peacebuilding initiatives?
- b) indicate the ICTs used in peacebuilding efforts
- c) What is the effectiveness of these ICTs in peacebuilding efforts
- d) What challenges do you face in your peacebuilding efforts?
- e) What challenges do you face regarding incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding?
- f) What is your recommendation to other actors involved in peacebuilding in the region?



## Appendix 5 Interview guide for peace monitors

I am a PhD candidate at Kabarak University undertaking a research on the “**Role of ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon Region**”. Owing to your status as a resident of Mt Elgon region, you have been selected to take part in this study. The results of this study will be used for academic purposes only. Please respond to the questions asked.

### 4.0 Background information

1.1 County \_\_\_\_\_

1.2 Sub-County \_\_\_\_\_

1.3 District \_\_\_\_\_

1.4 Division \_\_\_\_\_

1.5 Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.6 Sub-Location \_\_\_\_\_

1.7 Occupation \_\_\_\_\_

### 2.0 Demographic Information

2.1 Gender:      Male               Female

2.2 Age bracket 18-25  26-30  31-40  41-50  51 and above

### 3.0 Educational Level

Primary       Secondary       Tertiary/College       University

None

#### **4.0 ICTs and peacebuilding**

- a) Which peace programmes have you initiated?
- b) Where have you concentrated your peacebuilding efforts?
- c) How do you ensure participatory involvement of all stakeholders in the peace process?
- d) What are your peacebuilding efforts?
- e) What challenges do you face in your peacebuilding efforts?

#### **5.0 ICT tools**

- a) Which ICT tools have you incorporated in your peacebuilding efforts?
- b) What role do they play in your peacebuilding efforts?
- c) What challenges do you face in your peacebuilding efforts?

#### **6.0 Effectiveness of ICTs**

- a) How effective are these efforts at restoring peace in the region?
- b) Have you incorporated ICTs in your peacebuilding efforts?
- c) Which ICTs have you incorporated?
- d) What is the effectiveness of these ICTs in peacebuilding process?
- e) What challenges do you regarding the incorporation of ICTs in peacebuilding? How do you overcome the challenges?
- f) What is your recommendation to the actors involved in the peacebuilding process?
- g) What is your recommendation on the best way of incorporating ICTs in the peacebuilding process?

#### **7.0 Challenges of incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding in Mt Elgon region**

- a) Radio
- b) Mobile phones
- c) Television
- d) Facebook
- e) Twitter
- f) Websites
- g) Any other

## **Appendix 6 Focus Group Discussion guide**

### **1.0 Peacebuilding efforts in the region**

- a) There are peacebuilding efforts in the region
- b) Both the state and non-state actors are involved in peacebuilding
- c) The peacebuilding efforts are concentrated in the entire region

### **2.0 ICTs and peacebuilding in the region**

- a) The actors have embraced ICTs in their peacebuilding efforts
- b) ICTs have contributed to peace in the region
- c) ICTs have encouraged community participation and involvement in peacebuilding
- d) The community members have not fully embraced ICTs

### **2.0 Effectiveness of ICTs**

- a) ICTs are very effective in peacebuilding in the region
- b) Both the state and non-state actors have embraced ICTs in their peacebuilding efforts

### **3.0 Challenges of incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding**

- a) There are challenges in incorporating ICTs in peacebuilding in the region.
- b) The challenges are faced by residents
- c) There are challenges of accessing the ICTs

## Appendix 7 Observation checklist

The research and the research assistants observed assessed and record these items during the interview sessions:

<b>Phenomenon</b>	<b>Observed</b>	<b>Not observed</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Geographical terrain</b> Mountains Valleys Hills Caves Rivers Forests			
State of physical facilities: a) Schools b) Hospitals c) Shops d) Any other			
State of roads			
Farming activities			
Business activities			
Peacebuilding projects in the region			
Security outlets in the region			
County administrative offices			
Community atmosphere			
ICT tools			
Any other observation			

**Appendix 8 Table for Determining sample size from a given population**

*Sample Size from a Given Population*

<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>
10	10	220	140	1200	291
15	14	230	144	1300	297
20	19	240	148	1400	302
25	24	250	152	1500	306
30	28	260	155	1600	310
35	32	270	159	1700	313
40	36	280	162	1800	317
45	40	290	165	1900	320
50	44	300	169	2000	322
55	48	320	175	2200	327
60	52	340	181	2400	331
65	56	360	186	2600	335
70	59	380	191	2800	338
75	63	400	196	3000	341
80	66	420	201	3500	346
85	70	440	205	4000	351
90	73	460	210	4500	354
95	76	480	214	5000	357
100	80	500	217	6000	361
110	86	550	226	7000	364
120	92	600	234	8000	367
130	97	650	242	9000	368
140	103	700	248	10000	370
150	108	750	254	15000	375
160	113	800	260	20000	377
170	118	850	265	30000	379
180	123	900	269	40000	380
190	127	950	274	50000	381
200	132	1000	278	75000	382
210	136	1100	285	1000000	384

Note.—*N* is population size.

*S* is sample size.


**Source: Krejcie & Morgan (1970).**

## Appendix 9 FPFK Manual Guide for Tension level Indicators in Mt Elgon Region

LEVEL ONE INDICATORS		LEVEL THREE INDICATORS	
Secret meetings	1 a	Hate speech	3 a
Strange people in the area	1 b	Leaflets	3 b
Food shortage/ increase in food pricing	1 c	Militia groups	3 c
Early closing of businesses	1 d	Shifting population	3 d
Early stocking of food stuffs	1 e	Human rights abuse eg rape	3 e
murmuring	1 f	Political assassinations	3 f
		Increase in purchase in purchase of pa	3 g
		Night watching in fear of attacks	3 h
LEVEL TWO INDICATORS			
Community polarisation	2 a	Local curfews??	3 i
Change of language(coded language)	2 b	Drug and substance abuse	3 j
Transfer of property	2 c	Increased livestock theft	3 k
Severing trade links	2 d	Robbery	3 l
Disappearance of youths	2 e	Threats	3 m
Village elders calling for too many meetings	2 f	Murder	3 n
Social complaints	2 g	Burning of houses	3 o
Increase in level of family conflicts and disagreeem	2 h	Preverlance & rumours of SALW	3 p
Professionals asking for transfers and moving chi	2 i	social groupings	3 q
Demonstrations	2 j	domestic violence	3 r
Heavy presence of security personnel	2 k	kidnapping	3 s
Individuals relocating families	2 l	human trafficking	3 t


Source: FPFK (2015)

## Appendix 10 Map showing Study Area



Source: IFRC and KRCS (2007)

**Appendix 11 Map showing the contested settlement scheme areas**



**Source: Simiyu (2008)**





**Appendix 13 Research Authorisation from the County Commissioner (Bungoma)**

REPUBLIC OF KENYA



**THE PRESIDENCY**

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Telephone: 055-2030326  
FAX: 055-2030326  
E-mail: ccbungoma@yahoo.com  
When replying please Quote

Office of the County Commissioner  
P.O. Box 550 - 50200  
**BUNGOMA**

REF:ADM/5/13/78

14<sup>th</sup> August 2014

**TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

The Bearer of this letter, Mrs Cherotich Mungou , a student at Kabarak University sought an authority to carry out a research on "*The role of information communication technologies in peace-building in Mount Elgon region, Kenya,*" for a period ending 10<sup>th</sup> August, 2015.

Authority granted to her by the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation is hereby acknowledged and appreciated. Any assistance accorded to her in this pursuit would be highly appreciated.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'J.O. Awuor'.

J.O. Awuor  
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER  
**BUNGOMA COUNTY**

**Appendix 14 Research Authorisation County Director of Education (Bungoma)**



REPUBLIC OF KENYA

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
State Department of Education – Bungoma County

e- mail: [bungomacde@gmail.com](mailto:bungomacde@gmail.com)  
when replying please quote:

County Director of Education  
P.O. Box 1620-50200  
BUNGOMA

Ref.No. BCE/DE/19 VOL.1/92

Date: 13<sup>th</sup> August, 2014

All Sub-County Directors of Education  
**BUNGOMA COUNTY**

**RE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH – CHEROTICH MUNGOU**  
**(NACOSTI/P/14/0978/2907)**

The bearer of this letter Cherotich Mungou is a PhD Student at Kabarak University.

She is given authority to carry out research on the “**Role of Information and Communication Technologies in Peace Building in Mt. Elgon Region Kenya**” for a period ending **10th August, 2015**.

Kindly accord her the necessary assistance.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'JEMIMAH'.

Jemimah E.M. Maina  
For: County Director of Education  
**BUNGOMA COUNTY**

**Appendix 15 Research Authorisation County Director of Education (Trans Nzoia)**

**MINISTRY OF EDUCATION SCIENCE AND  
TECHNOLOGY  
State Department of Education**

Telegrams: .....  
Telephone: Kitale 054-31653  
Fax:  
Email: [transzoiacde@gmail.com](mailto:transzoiacde@gmail.com)  
When replying please quote:



County Director of Education,  
Trans Nzoia,  
P.O. Box 2024 – 30200  
**KITALE.**

Date: 14<sup>TH</sup> August, 2014

Ref. No. TNZ/CNT/CDE/GEN/1/VOL.I/57

**TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – CHEROTICH MUNGOU**

The above named has authority to carry out research on *“The role of information communication technologies in peace – building in Mount Elgon region, Kenya”* For a period ending 10<sup>th</sup> August, 2015

This is therefore to authorize the student to collect data and/or carry out activities related to this particular exercise in Trans Nzoia county. Whoever may be concerned is requested to co-operate and assist accordingly.

Thank you.

For:  
COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION  
TRANS-NZOIA  
P. O. Box 2024 – 30200, KITALE  
Tel: 020-2040448

*J. K. Wamocho*

**J. K. WAMOCHO  
COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION  
TRANS-NZOIA**

**Appendix 16 Research Authorisation from County Commissioner (Trans Nzoia)**



**OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT**

**MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND CO-ORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

Telephone: 054 – 30020  
Fax No: 054 – 30030  
E-mail: cctransnzoiacounty@yahoo.com  
When replying please quote:

TRANS NZOIA COUNTY  
P.O Box 11  
**KITALE**

**REF: TNZC/CONF/ED.12/2/VOL.I/7103**

14<sup>th</sup> August, 2014

**TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

This is to inform you that **Cherotich Mungou of Kabarak University of** has been authorized by National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation to carry out research on “**The role of information communication technologies in peace-building in Mount Elgon region, Kenya**” in **Bungoma and Trans Nzoia Counties**, for a period ending **10<sup>th</sup> August, 2015**.

Please accord her the necessary assistance.

PP   
**JOASH ABONGO**  
**FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER**  
**TRANS NZOIA COUNTY**

COUNTY COMMISSIONER  
TRANS-NZOIA COUNTY  
P. O. Box 11 - 30200 KITALE

**Appendix 17 The 2.5 acre farms in Chepyuk settlement scheme, Kopsiro Division**



**Source: Field Data**

**Appendix 18 Members of the FGD at MERA offices in Cheptais trading centre**



**Source: Field Data**

**Appendix 19 Residents assisting motorists along Kopsiro-Chwele road**



**Source: Field Data**



**Appendix 20 USAID/PACT funded water collection point at Kopsiro Division**



**Source: Field Data**

**Appendix 21 Traders at Kopsiro returning from Chwele market**



**Source: Field Data**

**Appendix 22 Participants of the 2014 Cheptais Peace Run receiving awards**



**Source: Field Data**

**Appendix 23 Photo of a businessman who lost an ear to the SLDF in 2007**



**Source: Field Data**

**Appendix 24 Granaries in readiness for maize harvest at Kopsiro**



**Source: Field Data**

## **Appendix 25 Published papers**

Mung'ou, C. (December, 2014). Use and Effectiveness of ICT tools in Disaster Management: A Case of Kenya Red Cross Society. *African Journal of Education, Science and Technology.* , 2, (1). pp 144-148

Mungou, C. (2014). Kenya Red Cross Society: Opportunities and Capacity Building in Use of ICT in Disaster Management. *Journal of New Media and Mass Communication.* 28, pp 1-4

Osodo, J., Kibirige, I. & Mung'ou, C. (2014). The Role of ICTs, State and Non-state Actors in Peacebuilding in Mount Elgon Region. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences.* MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy, 5 (3), pp 358-367

Mung'ou, C. (2009). *The use of ICT in Disaster Management: A Case Study of the Kenya Red Cross Society.* Masters Thesis. Nairobi: University of Nairobi

## End Notes

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<sup>i</sup> Predominantly Tutsi; many of the RPF members were refugees or children of refugees driven out of Rwanda in the aftermath of the 1959 conflict (see Bigagaza, Abong & Mukarabuga (2002: 51). Land scarcity, distribution and conflict in Rwanda. In Lind, J & Sturman (Eds). *Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's conflicts* (pp 51-78). Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies

<sup>ii</sup> Real time is the transmission of pictures less than two hours old. Using mobile satellite dishes, journalists are able to bring real time coverage of conflicts and disasters Jakobsen (2000). Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is invisible and indirect. *Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen vol. 37, no. 2, 2000, pp. 131–143 Sage Publications.*

<sup>iii</sup> Social media involves the confluence of online social networking and user-generated content. It refers in part to the platforms for content generation and consumption: Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. See Camminos (2013: 5) *The Role of Social Media and User-generated Content in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.

<sup>iv</sup> UGC refers to content that is created by Internet users, often through content platforms such as BlogSpot, WordPress, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Wikipedia, and YouTube. UGC includes blog posts, podcasts, online videos, tweets and status updates. See Camminos (2013: 5)

<sup>v</sup>Ushahidi is derived from a Swahili word meaning witness. It is an organisation that was founded in Kenya during the 2007 post -election violence (Gujer, 2011). Intelligence of the Masses or Stupidity of the Herd? In Stauffacher, D.Weekes, B., Gasser, C., Maclay, C. &Best, M. (Eds.), *Peacebuilding in Information Age: Sifting Hype from Reality* (pp.23-25). ICT4Peace Foundation/www.ict4peace.org

<sup>vi</sup>The Peace and Development Network (Peace-net) is a coalition of Kenyan NGOs formed after the 1992 ethnic clashes in Kenya. The organisation was instrumental in coordinating humanitarian assistance. See Juma (2008:44-45) *Unveiling Women as Pillars of Peace Peacebuilding in Communities Fractured by Conflict in Kenya*. Management Development and Governance Division Bureau for Development Policy United Nations Development Programme.

<sup>vii</sup>*Pesa* means “money” in Swahili. *M-Pesa* refers to Safaricom’s mobile banking system which enables mobile phone users to transact money transactions.

<sup>viii</sup> This is based on the baseline survey conducted by the researcher in 2014 in the region which identified 8 NGOs, 5 FBOs, 10 CBOs and 10 CSOs in Mt Elgon region.

<sup>ix</sup> *Shamba* system is an indigenous system of food production where crops are grown together with forest trees.



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<sup>x</sup> *Baraza* is a Swahili word for an open public forum where elders meet with the residents to resolve issues and discuss other government policies

<sup>xi</sup> *Laibons* or *Orkoiik* in the Sabaot community are prophets who acted as the eye of the community. Laibons are revered since they are believed to have God-given powers for foreseeing and predicting events to come. They are also believed to have power to interpret natural occurrences and give possible solutions. See Kamoet (2007: 23; Mwasserah, 2007). *A Historical Overview of Mt Elgon crisis*. In Okoth, P.G., Omuterema, S.O., and Kamoet, S. (Eds). *Proceedings of Mt Elgon Crisis Workshop*

<sup>xii</sup> *Siikooweet* is a drought-resistant thorny shrub with yellow fruits found in Mt Elgon region. It is mainly used for fencing compounds and is also believed to be medicinal.

<sup>xiii</sup> John Juma is not the real name of the interviewee. This was used to protect confidentiality of the interviewee.

<sup>xiv</sup> *Nyumba Kumi* is a programme started by the government in 2014 where residents are required to know ten households within the neighbourhood in order to intensify security in the country.